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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252
Thomas E Lanham, Keith C Lanham
vs.
Douglas E Fleenor

§
§
§
§

Location: Ada County District Court
Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.
Filed on: 05/02/2016

CASE INFORMATION

AA- All Initial District Court
Case Type: Filings (Not E, F, and HI)

Case Flags: Bankruptcy Stay
CASE ASSIGmmNT

DATE

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-OC-2016-8252
Ada County District Court
05/02/2016
Greenwood, Richard D.

PARTY INFORl\fATION

Plaintiff

Lanham, Keith C

Ellis, Allen Boyd
Retained
208-345-7832(W)

Lanham, Thomas E

Ellis, Allen Boyd
Retained
208-345-7832(W)

Reynard, Janine P
Removed: 04/07/2017
Court Order
Defendant

Fleenor, Douglas E

DATE

Stubbs, Richard L.
Retained
208-345-8600(W)
EVENTS

& ORDERS OF THE COURT

04/29/2016

Transfer Irt (from Idaho Court Or County)
Transfer in from CANYON COUNTY

04/29/2016

Order
Order Transferring Venue

05/02/2016

Transcript Filed
Notice OfReassignment - Judge Greenwood -- ·

05/06/2016

Motion
Defendant's Motion To Disiniss

05/06/2016

Affidavit
Affidavit Of Counsel In Sipport Of Motion To Dismiss

05/06/2016

Memorandum
Memorandum In Support Of Defendant's Motion To Dismiss

05/16/2016

Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing

INDEX
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252
05/17/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 06/27/2016 03:30PM)

05/17/2016

Notice
Notice OfBankruptcy Filing

05/17/2016

Civil Disposition Entered
Civil Disposition entered/or: Fleenor, Douglas E, Defendant; Lanham, Keith C, Plaintiff;
Lanham, Thomas E, Plaintiff. Filing date: 5/17/2016

05/17/2016

Status Changed
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk action

05/17/2016

Status Changed
STATUS CHANGED: inactive

05/20/2016

Stipulation
Stipulation For Briefing Schedule For Defendants Motion To Dismiss

05/31/2016

Amended
Amended Notice ofFiling Bankruptcy

05/31/2016

Amended Judgment - Bankruptcy Stay
Converted Disposition:
Notice ofBankruptcy Filed 5.31.16 (Amended Notice)
Party (Lanham, Keith C)

06/13/2016

Memorandum
Memorandum In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss

06/13/2016

Declaration
Declaration OfAllen B. Ellis

06/13/2016

Declaration
Declaration OfKeith C. Lanham

06/15/2016

Order
Order Re Stipulation for Briefing Schedule

06/22/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 06/27/2016 03: 30 PM: Hearing Vacated

06/22/2016

Notice of Hearing
Notice Vacating Hearing

06/23/2016

Answer
Answer And Demand For Jury Trial (Stubbs For Defendant)

06/27/2016

CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)
Vacated

07/18/2016

Motion
Motion For Leave To Substitute As Party PlaintiffIn The Stead OfPlaintiffKeith Lanham

08/04/2016

Notice of Hearing
8.26.2016@ 3pm

08/29/2016

Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)
Events: 08/04/2016 Notice of Hearing
for Leave Substitue
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252
'

08/31/2016

Order

09/01/2016

Miscellaneous
Response to Plaintiffs' Note ofIssue

09/02/2016

Notice of Hearing
10.17.16@3:00pm

09/07/2016

~ Motion for Summary Judgment

09/07/2016

ffl Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment

09/08/2016

fflNotice of Hearing
10.17.16@300PM

09/12/2016

Order
for Scheduling Conference and Order Re Motion Practice

09/21/2016

CANCELED Scheduling Conference (4:01 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)
Vacated

09/21/2016

ffl Stipulation
for Scheduling and Planning

09/22/2016

ffl Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning

09/28/2016

~Order
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial

10/03/2016

ffl Brief Filed
Plaintiffs' Answering Briefto Defendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment

10/03/2016

ffl Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment

10/03/2016

mAffidavit
Defendant Douglas Fleenor's Affidavit in Opposition ofPlaintiffs' Motion/or Partial Summary
Judgment

10/03/2016

ffl Motion for Disqualification of Judge

I

Defendant's Motion/or Disqualification ofJudge G.D. Carey
10/10/2016

mBrief Filed
Plaintiffs' Reply Briefin Support ofMotion for Partial Summary Judgment

10/10/2016

ffl Brief Filed
Defendant Douglas F/eenor's Reply Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary
Judgment

10/17/2016

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)
Events: 09/02/2016 Notice of Hearing
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No.

CV-OC-2016-8252

10/17/2016

~ Court Minutes

11/22/2016

fflorder
Memorandum Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment

12/14/2016

fflorder
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial

12/15/2016

mNotice of Service

12/16/2016

fflNotice of Service
Notice ofService ofDiscovery

12/21/2016

mRequest
Plaintiffs' First Request for Production

12/21/2016

ffl Notice of Service

12/21/2016

~Motion
Joint Motion to Continue Trial Date

0l/10/2017

fflNotice of Hearing
(01/26/2017 03:00 pm)

01/12/2017

mWitness Disclosure
Defendant's Disclosure ofExpert Witnesses

01/12/2017

fflNotice
Notice ofService ofDiscovery

01/12/2017

fflNotice
Notice ofService

01/20/2017

fflNotice of Service of Discovery Requests

01/26/2017
02/03/2017

Motion to Continue (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)

'fa Motion
to Release Court Records

02/07/2017

morder
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial

02/13/2017

ffl Stipulation

on the Issue to be Resolved in Summary Judgment Proceedings (I'WO CD's IN CD STORAGE) I

02/27/2017

mNotice of Service of Discovery Requests

03/24/2017

ffl Stipulation
Stipulation for Substitution ofParties
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252
04/07/2017

ffl Order
ofSubstitution ofParties

04/12/2017

ffl Notice of Taking Deposition
ofThomas Lanham

04/12/2017

ffl Notice of Taking Deposition
ofKeith Lanham

04/13/2017

ffl Witness Disclosure
Defendant's Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure

04/18/2017

fflMotion
Defendant's Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Briefin Support ofMotion for Summary
Judgment Based on Newly Obtained Evidence

04/21/2017

ffl Affidavit of Service
4/19/17

04/24/2017

ffl Order
Re Supplemental Briefing

04/26/2017

fflMotion
Motion for Sequential Briefing

04/26/2017

ffl Motion to Continue
Trial

04/26/2017

ffl Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Continuance ofTrial

04/26/2017

ffl Declaration
Second Declaration ofAllen Ellis

04/27/2017

ffl Notice of Service
ofDiscovery

04/27/2017

fflNotice
Notice ofOpposition to Motion for Sequential Briefing

04/27/2017

fflNotice
Notice ofNon-Opposition ofPlaintiffs' Motion to Continue Trial

04/28/2017

ffl Affidavit of Service
4/27117

05/01/2017

ffl Notice of Hearing

05/03/2017

05/03/2017

Motion Hearing - Civil (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)
To Continue Trial & Sequential Briefing

~ Court Minutes
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252
05/04/2017

ffl Memorandum In Support of Motion
Supplemental for Summary Judgment

05/04/2017

ffl Affidavit
ofSamantha L. Lundberg in Support ofDefendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment

05/16/2017

ffl Memorandum
Supplemental Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Partial Summary Judgment

05/23/2017

05/31/2017

fflReply
Defendant's Reply Brief in Support ofSupplemental Memorandum in Support ofMotion for
Summary Judgment
CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (4:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)
Vacated

06/07/2017

fflorder
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial

07/07/2017

fflMotion
to &tend &pert Disclosure Deadlines

07/07/2017

~ Declaration
Third Declaration ofAllen B. Ellis

07/10/2017

07/11/2017

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)
Vacated
4 days

ffl Notice of Hearing
(7/31/17@330pm)

07/12/2017

fflNotice
Notice of Change ofAddress (Attorney, Allen Ellis)

07/24/2017

ffl Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to &tend &pert Disclosure Deadlines

07/31/2017

Motion Hearing - Civil (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)
To &tend &pert Disclosure Deadline

07/31/2017

~ Court Minutes

08/17/2017

fflorder
Memorandum and Order Re: Renvewed Motion for Summary Judgment

09/06/2017

ffl Judgment of Dismissal

09/06/2017

Civil Disposition Entered

09/20/2017

CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (4:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)
Vacated

000007
PAGE60F7

Printed on 12/06/2017at11:25 AM

ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252
09/20/2017

ffl Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees

10/02/2017

fflMotion
Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees

10/02/2017

mMemorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support ofMtn to Disallow Attorney Fees

10/16/2017

ffl Notice of Appeal

10/16/2017

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court

10/30/2017

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)
Vacated
4 days

11/03/2017

mStipulation to Dismiss
with Prejudice (Keith Lanham)

11/03/2017

Dismissed With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.)
Party (Lanham, Keith C)

Stipulation filed
FINANCIAL INFORMATION

DATE

Defendant Fleenor, Douglas E
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 12/6/2017

258.00
258.00
0.00
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ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
208/345-7832 (Tel)
208/345-9564 (Fax)
ISB No. 1626

DP.M.

MAR 17 2016
CANYON COUNTY CLER!<
K BRONSON, DEPUTY

Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

*

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THOMAS E. LANHAM and KEITH C.
LANHAM,
Plaintiffs,
V.

DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~\J-OC- \ l!? Case No.

f.»-

0<3L5L

l ~-1~ 1:3

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

Come now plaintiffs Thomas E. Lanham and Keith C. Lanham, through their attorney of
record, and allege and complain against defendant Douglas E. Fleenor as follows:

I
At all times relevant, defendant Douglas E. Fleenor was an attorney at law duly licensed as
such by the State of Idaho and was retained by plaintiff Thomas E. Lanham ("Thomas L.") to
invalidate, through adjudication, a document purporting to be the last will and testament ("Will")
of plaintiffs' father, Gordon T. Lanham which said Will sought to disinherit plaintiff Thomas L. and

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1
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•

his brother, the plaintiff Keith C. Lanham ("Keith L.").
II
At all times relevant, an attorney/client relationship existed between defendant Fleenor and
plaintiff Thomas L. in the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham (Gem County Case No.
CV-2013-886) ("estate case") and other matters.
III
At all times relevant, the following conditions existed: (1) it was reasonably foreseeable that
were plaintiff Thomas L. disinherited by the aforesaid Will, that such harmful consequence would
be likewise imposed on plaintiff Keith L.; (2) the certainty that plaintiff Keith L. suffered financial
loss by the conduct of defendant Fleenor as hereinafter alleged; (3) the proximate causation which
existed between defendant's conduct, as hereinafter alleged, and plaintiff Keith L.' s financial loss;
(4) holding defendant responsible for plaintiff Keith L. 's financial loss will serve to increase the legal
profession's sense of responsibility to non-clients with a concomitant deterrent effect; (5) and to
impose a duty of care toward non-client Keith L. will not unduly burden defendant, i.e., defendant's
burden in fulfilling his professional duty of care to his client plaintiff Thomas L. is not enhanced by
recognizing that such duty is also owed to non-client plaintiff Keith L.
IV
By reason of the relationship and circumstances alleged above in paragraphs II and III,
respectively, defendant Fleenor owed a duty of care to plaintiffs.
V
On June 25, 2014, the Honorable Tyler D. Smith entered judgment in the estate case against
defendant's client plaintiff Thomas L. by denying his motion for summary judgment and granting

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2
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•

the personal representative's motion for summary judgment, i.e., holding that the Will is "legal,
valid, and binding".
VI
Notwithstanding the aforesaid judgment, the Will was defective in several respects including,

inter alia, failing to set forth dispositive provisions, failing to include a residuary clause, bestowing
unlimited donative powers of a non-charitable nature on the personal representative, failing to reflect
the requisite testamentary intent, and having other foundational defects.
VII
Spbsequent to entry of the aforesaid judgment and in breach of his duty to plaintiffs,
defendant Fleenor negligently filed a notice of appeal on August 13, 2014, in the estate case, fortynine days from entry of the judgment. As a proximate result of defendant's negligence, the District
Court, acting in its appellate capacity dismissed the appeal on the jurisdictional grounds that the
appeal was not filed within the requisite time period, i.e., forty-two days from entry of judgment.
In a subsequent appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and as a further proximate result of defendant's
negligence, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal.
VIII
As a further proximate result of defendant's negligence, the estate of plaintiffs' father was
distributed in accordance with the defective Will, which disinherited plaintiffs, rather than by
intestate succession by which succession the plaintiffs would have been the sole heirs at law, all to
the plaintiffs' financial detriment in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court.

IX
Plaintiffs have retained the services of Ellis Law, PLLC, to prosecute this matter and, in the

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3
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•

event they are the prevailing parties, they are entitled to recover their attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 12-120(3).
Wherefore, plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:
I.

For compensatory damages in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court.

2.

For costs and reasonable attorney fees;

3.

For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

Dated this 16th day of March, 2016.

Allen~
Attorney for Plaintiffs

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury in accordance with the provisions of Rule 38(b) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this 16th day of March, 2016.

Attorney for Plaintiffs

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4
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APR 2 9 2016
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk
8y ROSE WRIGHT '
DEPUTY

-
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0
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5 gieM.

APR 2 0 2016
CANYON COUNTY CLERK

T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
THOMAS E. LANHAM and KEITH C.
LANHAM,

IV OC 16 0 8 2 5 2
Case No. CV-16-2623

Plaintiffs,
ORDER TRANSFERRING VENUE
vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

The court having received the parties' stipulation, and with good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned action shall be forthwith
transferred to the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho, in and for the County
of Ada.

ORDER TRANSFERRING VENUE- 1
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DATED this

•

day of April, 2016.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

d

O

day of April, 2016, I served a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TRANSFERRING VENUE by delivering the same
to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Allen B. Ellis
Ellis Law, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone (208) 345-7832
Richard L. Stubbs
Samantha L. Lundberg
CAREY PERKINS LLP
Capitol Park Plaza
300 North 6th Street, Suite 200
P. 0. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600

11
[ ]
[ ]

/i
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-9564
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-8660

Clerk

ORDER TRANSFERRING VENUE - 2
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Richard L. Stubbs, ISB No. 3239
Samantha L. Lundberg, ISB No. 9992
CAREY PERKINS LLP
Capitol Park Plaza
300 North 6th Street, Suite 200
P. 0. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660

~ l-bfi(A

NO·----=~---P!-~~A.M.

MAY 06 2~
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk
By DEBBIE PERIONS
OEPUrV

Atto'rneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and KEITH C.
LANHAM,
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Ada
)
SAMANTHA L. LUNDBERG, having been first duly sworn upon oath,

deposes and says:
1.

I am a member of the law firm of Carey Perkins LLP, counsel of record

for Defendant in the above-captioned action, and the following statements are made of my

.

own personal knowledge and are true and correct.

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
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2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of the Last

Will and Testament of Gordon Lanham, which we obtained from the court file of In the

Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham, Gem County Case No. CV2013-886.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a certified copy of Keith Lanham's

Petition for Removal of Personal Representative and for Declaration of Intestacy and Other
Relief from the court file of In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham, Gem
County Case No. CV2013-886.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a certified copy of Memorandum in

Support of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss from the court file
of In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham,

Gem County Case No.

CV2013-886. Exhibit 3 to the Memorandum is an Affidavit of Keith Lanham dated May 22,
2014.
FURTHER your Affiant saith not.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -1.L_ day of May, 2016.
(SEAL)
MELANIE S. HILL
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise
Commission expires

¥' 61.,,/

~

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -1.L day of May, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Allen B. Ellis
Ellis Law, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone (208) 345-7832

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-9564

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 3
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ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
208/345-7832 (Tel)
208/345-9564 (Fax)
ISB No. 1626

i:= D RICH, Clerk
CHRISTO:~E~ATKINSON
By
o'.:PUTY

Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

(J.1
THOMAS E. LANHAM and KEITH C.
LANHAM,
Plaintiffs,

v.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2016-8252
DECLARATION OF
ALLEN B. ELLIS

I, Allen B. Ellis, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(d) and LC. § 9-1406, declare as follows:
Attached hereto as exhibits are true and correct copies of the following documents:
Document

Exhibit No.

Deed to Joseph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Fleenor' s Memorandum in Support of Mtn. for SJ .............................. 2
Callahan's Memorandum in Support of Cross Mtn. for SJ ........................ 3

DECLARATION OF ALLEN B. ELLIS - 1

000018

Document

Exhibit No.

Fleenor' s Motion for Reconsideration ........................................ 4
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ..................................... 5
Judgment .............................................................. 6
Notice of Appeal ........................................................ 7
Memorandum Re: Appeal of Attorney Fee Award .............................. 8
Ellis summary of audio disc received from Keith Lanham ........................ 9
Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Amended Opinion ...................................................... 11
Notice of Withdrawal of Petition for Removal of Personal Representative .......... 12
Exhibit No. 9 was prepared by me while listening to the audio disc of the decedent Gordon
Lanham's verbal narrative. The 2011 entries (except January 7) are my accurate paraphrasing of
each entry. The Will, dated February 19, 2011, appears to be an accurate transcription of the
dictation made upon multiple dates, commencing November 6, 2010 and ending January 7, 2011.
Paragraph 11 of the Will which names Judd Lanham as the "executor" is not included in the
dictation.
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State ofldaho that the foregoing
is true and correct.
Dated this 13 th day of June, 2016.

AllenB.~
Attorney for Plaintiffs

DECLARATION OF ALLEN B. ELLIS - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13 th day of June, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Richard L. Stubbs
Samantha L. Lundberg
Carey Perkins, LLP
300 N. 6th Street, Ste. 200.
Boise, Idaho 83 702

_ _ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
X Hand delivery
_ _ Overnight delivery
_ _ Facsimile (345-8660)

~

Allen B. Ellis

DECLARATION OF ALLEN B. ELLIS - 3
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lnstru..A. # 294756
EMMETT~'Z, IDAHO
03:11:08 No. of Pages: 2
11-5-2013
Recorded for: LAW OFFICE OF NANCY CALLAHAN
SHELL y TILTON
~
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy

~r

72::!.oo

Index to: DEED

~

This Deed is made on this ~ a y of November, 2013, between the Grantor
Gordon Thomas Lanham of 3555 Butte Road, Emmett, Idaho 83617 and the
Grantee Beneficiary Joseph "Joe" Lanham of 1457 E. Park Street, Emmett, Idaho

83617.
For good and valuable consideration paid by the Grantee Beneficiary, the
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Granter does transfer and convey the
following described property, subject to payment. of any mortgage or other
encumbrance thereon, to the Grantee Beneficiary effective on the Grantor's death:
Property Address: 3555 Butte Rd, Emmett, Idaho 83617
Legal Description: Attached Exhibit A
The Grantor reserves a life estate for himself during the Grantor's lifetime
coupled with an unrestricted power to convey during the Grantor's lifetime, which
includes the power to sell, gift, mortgage, lease and otherwise dispose of the
property, and to retain the proceeds from the conveyance.
EXECUTE~ this ~ a y of Nov.ember, 2013

.

.

:..

!

Granter Name: Gord9n Thomas Lanham
Gr?)ntor Si9natµ·re:£\.0l.,v,.' ; \ ~-o
. ··-:··

.

,... ··

.

.

.

.

.

~1\i:t5
·.

Sc._J<----

On this day, personally appeared before me, Gordon Thomas Lanham, known to be
the person described in and who executed this instrument, and acknowledged that
he signed the same as his voluntary act and deed, for the. uses and purposes
therein mentioned.
Witness my hand and official seal hereto affixed on this

->.L.,:,'--,,;-.-r::W4~.:-

2013.
Notary's Publi
Residing a · _ _ , P 4 , ~ ~ ~ U i £ " 1 1 : J . _ - - " - - - - - - - - My commi · n expires~~---+--==....._..,..__

AMENDED TRANSFER ON DEATH DEED- 1 of 2
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EXHIBIT 1

J
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-

A t:e~c~ of land in the 1tti 1/4 NE l/4, Sect.ion 10~ Twp. 7
il.., R.. 1 W., .B .M. , GalU County,. .Idaho, o.ora putj,cul.a;ly
l.f~•~ibed u fo-ll'*1ll: atartil;tg at tha se ~ r of the
D' 1/'- l'm l/4, Sectio~ 10. 'twp. 7 H., .R.1 W. r B.M.. run
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Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989
Attorney & Cowiselor at Law
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100
Boise, ID 83702
208-472-8846
208-947-5910 fax

•

Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham

IN lHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM
In the Matter of the Estate of

Case No. CV 2013-886

GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTIONFORSUMMARYJUDGMENT

Deceased.

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Thomas E. Lan1uµn, by and through his attorney, Douglas
E. Fleenor, and submits his Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment.
Petitioner seeks summary judgment declaring that property of the decedent passed
intestate to the decedent's heirs for the reason that the Last Will and Testament of the decedent

fails to dispose of all of decedent's property.

FACTS
The personal representative filed a purported Last Will and Testament of the above

named decedent dated January 19, 2011.
Decedent's Last Will and Testament fails to make any d.ispositive provisions or give
direction regarding the residue of his estate.
In paragraph four on page two, the Will states, "1 want (Judd] to be able to distribute my
property and my personal effects in any way that he sees fit and I will 1ry to put all the wording
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about the personal effects." Then again in the last paragraph, the Will reiterates, "I want [Judd}
to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects as stated in my Last Will and

Testament."
Page 3 of the Will contains the only possible devise, stating ".. .I gotta $3,000 sheep head
that Judd can hang up in his cabin ifhe wants to."
The remainder of the Will discusses the ownership of certain property located at his

residence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate with the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions
on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). Failure of a party to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and upon which that
party bears the bmden of proof entitles the moving party to summary judgment as a matter of law.

The Idaho Supreme Court has thoroughly addressed the standards governing motions for SUlilllUUY
judgment.

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Comt is generally required to
liberally construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions, drawing

all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Construction Management Systems,
Inc. v. AssW'ance Co. ofAmerica, 135 Idaho 680, 682, 23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001). However, Rule
56(3) requires the non-moving party to go beyond pleadings through affidavit, depositions, etc., to
demonstrate that there are genuine issue of material facts, Doe v. Durischi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d
1238 (1986). If the non-moving party fails to do so, then the moving party is entitled to summary
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judgment as a matter oflaw. Id at 46, 716 P2d at 1241; see also Sparks v. St. Lukes Reg. Medical

Ctr. Ltd, 115 Idaho 505, 768 P.2d 768 (1988).

ARGUMENT
Idaho has adopted of the Uniform Probate Code, which allows decedents to pass their
property upon death through a validly executed Will.
A will should be interpreted, if possible, in such manner as to prevent intestacy when it
evinces an intention to dispose of the entire estate. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1. 6,383 P.2d
339, 341 (1963).
However, a devisee must be identified so that the courts can be certain that the testator's
intents and purposes are being carried out Yribar v. Fitzpatrick, 91 Idaho 105, 108, 416 P.2d
164, 167 (1966), quoting 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, pg. 18, § 363.

In order to avoid intestacy, either partial or complete, the court is not permitted to place
on the will any construction not expressed in it, and which is based on supposition as to the
intention of the testator in the disposition of his estate. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383
P.2d 339,341 (1963); In re Hoytema's Estate, 180 Cal. 430, 181 P. 645; In re Beldon's Estate, 11
Cal.2d 108, 77 P.2d 1052; 95 C.J.S. Wills§ 615c.
Idaho statutes authorize a person to devise or bequeath his property, but it does not permit
him to delegate to another the power to make such disposition for him. Hedin v. Westdala

Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241,250, 81 P.2d 741, 745 (1938). Such testamentary efforts have
been likened unto powers of attorney to make wills, which the law does not pennit. Id
Each of the above cases held that a devise fails when a devisee is not designated with
sufficient legal certainty. Examples of failed devises included a gift to any charitable
organization chosen by a spouse (Hedin), devising the residue to any worthy charity selected by
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the executor (Yribar), and a failure to dispose of half the estate (Corwin). Without a defined
devisee, the court cannot ascertain or enforce a decedent's intent.
Idaho Statutes also state that any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed
ofby his will passes to his heirs. I.C. §15-2-101. In addition, if any devise fails for any reason, it
becomes part of the residue. LC.§ 15-2-606.
When a devise fails and the will lacks a residuary clause, the residue passes through
intestate succession. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5,383 P.2d 339,341 (1963).

In this case, even if the Will is vali~ the decedent clearly failed to name devisees for his
property. Therefore, as a matter of law, decedent's entire estate, with the possible exception of
one specific devise, passes to his heirs by intestate succession pursuant to Chapter 2, Title 15 of
the Idaho Code. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, summary judgment should be granted in favor of Petitioner,
finding the property of decedent passes to his heirs by intestate succession.
DATED this

'21.._ day of April, 2014.

Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
n-c.~l.
I, the undersigned, certify that on·the _L,_/day of April 2014, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s)
indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, to the following person(s):
Nancy Callahan
·101 Canal Street
·Emmett, ID 83617

~
_ffeax 208-365-1646

William F. Lee
629 E. Main Street
Emmett, ID 83617

U.S. Mail
208-365-5367
_By Hand

_By Hand

7::Fax
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Nancy L. Callahan

Idaho State Bar #4884
Rolf M. Kehne

Idaho State Bar #2180
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN
101 Canal Street

Emmett, Idaho 83617
(208) 365-1200
Facsimile:
(208) 365-1646

Telephone:

Attorneys for Personal Representative

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM
In the Matter of the Estate of:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

Deceased.

CASE NO. CV2013-886
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF CROSS MOTION FOR
SUMMARYJUDGMENTAND
MOTION TO DISMISS

This memorandum is respectfully submitted to the Court in
support

of the

SUMMARY

Personal

JUDGMENT

Representative's

AND

OPPOSITION

CROSS
TO

MOTION

THOMAS

FOR

EVERETT

LANHAM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Gordon Thomas Lanham executed a Last Will and Testament on

January 19, 2011 naming his cousin, Judd Lanham executor giving him
Power of Attorney over all of his personal and real property. The Last
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Nancy Cal'

Will and Testament of Gordon Thomas Lanham specifically provided for
his sons Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham to each receive a dollar and

a bed made by their grandfather. The children of Keith Lanham were
also specifically disinherited.

The Last Will and Testament was

transcribed from a recording made by the testator over a period of time.
On or about November 19, 2013 the testator executed a Transfer
on Death Deed naming Petitioner's son, Joe Lanham, beneficiary,
subject to payment of a mortgage to his former girlfriend and his
brother Rex Lanham Jr.'s ex-wife, Linda Louise Andrews Lanham(aka)
Linda Louise Andrews, . Gordon Thomas Lanham died on December 5,

2013.

The original Will was filed with the Court on December 20 1 2013

and Judd Lanham was informally appointed personal representative.
On January 8, 2014, Thomas -Everett Lanham, a son, filed pro se
an "Application to Attest Personal Representative" in the probate case
with a claim that the will was not valid and that the personal
representative was not qualified. On January 13, 2014, Keith Lanham,
by and through his attorney William F. Lee filed a Petition to Remove
Personal Representative with claims contesting the validity of the will

and removal of the personal representative.

The matters were set for

hearing on January 21, 2014.
On or about January 15, 2014, the personal representative
attempted to satisfy the mortgage to Linda Louise Andrews Lanham in
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the amount of $54,625.00 from funds left to the personal representative
in a POD account. He was verbally instructed by the dec€dent prior to
his death that Joe Lanham would take the ranch free and clear of any
encumbrances.

Linda Andrews Lanham refused to accept payment of

the mortgage.
On January 21, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, pro se, and Keith
Lanham with his attorney, William F. Lee, were present in Court in the
probate case.

Judd Lanham was present with counsel.

Also present

were the two witnesses to the decedent's Will, Rebecca Clift, notary,
Cathy Gillihan, sister of the decedent, and other family members. This
Court advised the parties that two matters were before the Court; the
issue of removal of the personal representative and the validity of the
Will.

The Court_ advised the parties that it was not inclined to remove

the personal representative and that the matters concerning the
construction of the will were continued for a half day trial on April 2,
2014.
On March 5, 2014 the Personal Representative and Joe Lanham
filed a Quiet Title action in Gem County Case No. 2014-185 due to Linda
Andrews' refusal to accept satisfaction of the mortgage.
On March 24, 2014 Attorney Fleenor entered an appearance in this case
on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham in the probate case and in the
quiet title action on behalf of Linda Louise Andrews Lanham.

In the
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probate case he filed another Petition for Order Removing Personal
Representative, Construing Will 2nd Determining Heirs and a Petition of
Order Restraining Persona! Representative on behalf of Thomas Everett
Lanham.
On March 28, 2014 the personal representative, Judd Lanham,
filed his affidavit concerning the audio recording of the decedent which
was the basis for the Will in contest and because the recording included
additional instruction to the personal representative for distribution of
his personal property.
On March 28, 2014, William F. Lee, on behalf of Keith Lanham,
withdrew his Petition to Remove Personal Representative and Keith's
claim contesting the validity of the will.
On April 2, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham or his attorney failed to
appear for the Court trial to construe or determine the validity of the
Will, a trial that was pending since January 21, 2014.
On April 3, 2014, Thomas E. Lanham appeared with his counsel,
Douglas Fleenor, for hearing on their Petition for Order Removing
Personal Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and a
Petition of Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court having
reviewed the record and arguments of counsel denied the Petition for
Order Removing Personal Representative and further denied the Petition
for Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court awarded the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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estate attorney's fees.

On

April

9,

2014 Attorney

Fleenor filed

an

Answer and

Counterclaim in the quiet title action alleging the deed transferring the
ranch to Joe Lanham was void and the ranch should be included in the
estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham. Linda Louis Andrews further claimed
that the decedent failed to make any principle payments on the
December 17, 2002 mortgage entitling her to $137,369.46.

Paragraph

6 of the Counterclaim alleges that:

"On August 19, 2004, Gordon Thomas Lanham coerced Linda Lanham
into signing a "Mortgage Payment", by threatening to expose and
distribute personal, private and revealing photographs of Linda Lanham.
The purported amount of the interest payment was $23,400.00."
Paragraphs 8 and 9 further allege:
\\That on December 11, 2006, Gordon Thomas Lanham fraudulently
caused Linda Lanham to enter into an accord and satisfaction agreement
by promising her payment of cash in the amount to $50,000. The
accord and satisfaction consisted of Linda Lanham signing a Satisfaction
of Mortgage for the December 17, 2002 Mortgage, in exchange for
Gordon Thomas Lanham paying Linda Lanham $50,000 in cash and
executing a new Promissory Note and Mortgage in the amount of
$50r000 bearing interest at the rate of 3% annum.
Upon obtaining
Linda Lanham's signatures, Gordon Thomas Lanham left the premises
without paying Linda Lanham any of the promised amounts."

On April 21, 2014 the personal representative and Joe Lanham
filed a reply to Linda Andrew's counterdaim alleging any claims of fraud
made by Linda Andrews is barred by the statute of limitations and the
only amount due to Linda Andrews is $54,625.00.
On about April 21, 2014, an estate check in the amount of
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$54,625.00 was sent to Mr. Fleenor and Linda Louise Andrews Lanham.
On April 23, 2014, Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment in Gem County Case No.2014-187 on behaif of Linda Louise
Andrews Lanham on the issue that the Deed to Joe Lanham is void and
claims that the ranch should be included in the decedent's estate. On
that same day Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in
this probate case on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham on the issue that
the Will fails to make any dispositive provisions or give direction

regarding the residue of his father's estate and should pass intestate to
decedent's heirs.
ARGUMENT

The Last Will and Testament of Gordon Thomas Lanham clearly
and

unambiguously

and

for

independent

reason,

specifically

bequeathed that his sons, Thomas Everett Lanham and Keith Colby
Lanham, each receive one dollar and a bed that there grandfather
made for them each as children be returned to them, with the intent
that .his sons take nothing from his estate.

The will also specifically

states that the children of Keith Colby Lanham would receive nothing
from his estate.
On the first page of the will Gordon Thomas Lanham states that:

(

/

"This is a new day. It's the 29 th of November. Thanksgiving is over and
I just wanted to add to this program that my son, Thomas Everett
Lanham, 48 years old, has already been given all that he needs to have
and that I am going to leave $1 (sic) more dollar against whatever is
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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legal to him and then he is going to be on his own,"
On Page 2 paragraph 1 the Will states:

"It's a new day and it's snowing. It's 1st December 2010. It's the first
snow out back. I am not really looking forward to it, .... but anyway, I
want to go on about my son, Keith Colby Lanham and his wife, Amy
Lanham, that I am going to try to write it down or leave it in this
recording that... what I leave them is going to be $1 because in my
estate I don't want him to be able to sell and profit off his alcoholism or
drugs ....
Track 7 and 8 of the audio recording previously submitted allows
one to hear this decision he made to disinherit his sons in the decedent's

own words.
Track 8 of the audio recording made by the decedent (the entry
dated March 19, 2011) on the CD previously submitted to the Court,
clearly and unambiguously instructed that the lots at Big Creek property
were to be distributed as follows:
"My plans are to leave that 27 acres on the east side of that Big Creek
Property to Jamie Gillihan, my sister's only son, and I want to plan for
leaving the 20 acres on the west side to my grandson Joseph Lanham
and my other grandson Thomas Robert John Lanham and he is only
eighteen and Joe is 21 so I don't know how that will work on a deed etc.
However that works, but anyway, I'm working on what I am going to do
with this house and 34 acres because of the $50,000 mortgage that
Lizzie has on it, I'm thinking that Jamie can pay her mortgage for his
2 7" acres ... "
The Court should take judicial notice of the quiet title action
concerning the decedent's real property, Gem County Case No. CV2014-

187. In that case the issue is payment of the "$50,000 mortgage that
Lizzie has on it", her counterclaim states· that she is entitled to
(
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$137,369.49, her claim the deed intended to gift the ranch to Joe

Lanham is void, and claiming that the ranch shou:d be included in this
estate case, presumably as part of the residuaf estate.

Then in this

case, Thomas Everett is challenging the validity of the will to claim an
intestate portion of the residual estate.
Trial courts must determine the admissibility of evidence as a
"threshold question" to be answered before addressing the merits of
motions for summary judgment.

Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning

Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778,784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992), Ryan v
Beisner, 123 Idaho at 45, 844 P.2d at 27 (Ct.App. 1992), Gem State

Co.

Ins.

v

Hutchinson,

145

Idaho

10,

175

P.2d. l 72(2007),

Montgomery v Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1 at 6 (Idaho 2009).
When considering evidence presented in support of or opposition
to a motion for summary judgment, a court can only consider material
which would be admissible at trial.
Canal,Co.,

Petricevich v Salmon River

92 Idaho 865-,869, 452 P.2d 362,366 (1969) I.R.C.P.

56(e).
In addressing

the evidentiary issues raised concerning the

statements attributed to Gordon Thomas Lanham on the CD recording
concerning the

distribution of his estate,

and the Affidavits of

Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Judd Lanham and Keith Lanham inform the
court of the decedent's reasons and intent to completely disinherit
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remaining property after his specific bequests would be personal
property items to be distributed in-kind, if possible.
The intended beneficiaries of this estate are the sons of Thomas
Everett Lanham, namely Joseph "Joe" Lanham and Robert "Robby"
Lanham.

Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing argument and the evidence submitted
herewith, the Court should dismiss Thomas Everett Lanham's claim,
find that Gordon Thomas Lanham fully disposed of his estate in his will
and his audio recordings and the personal property remaining in the
decedent's estate should be distributed by the personal representative
at his discretion for the reasons set forth herein and as intended by
Gordon Thomas Lanham.

Further, that the Court should order that

Thomas Everett Lanham reimburse the estate the attorney1 s fees
incurred herein.

Dated this ~ a y of May 2014.

f!i~4=

Attorneys for Personal Representative
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Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989
Attorney & Counselor at Law
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100
Boise, ID 83702
208-4 72-8846
208-94 7-5910 fax
Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM
In the Matter of the Estate of
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

Case No. CV 2013-886
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Deceased.

COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham, by and through his attorney of record,
Douglas E. Fleenor, and moves this Court to reconsider its ruling on his Motion for Summary
Judgment.
The deceased, Gordon Thomas Lanham, left a Will naming his cousin Judd Max Lanham
as Personal Representative, and stating that his two sons, Thomas and Keith were each to receive
one dollar and a bed.. However, the Will fails to dispose of all of decedent's property. Thus, any
property not disposed of by the Will, passes through intestate succession according to Idaho's
probate statutes.
DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS
Paragraph 1 of the Will is simple exordium clause, where the testator identifies himself.
In Paragraph 2, the testator states that he has children and grandchildren, and states that he
is going to make Judd Max his executor and give him Power of attorney over his property.
In Paragraph 3, the testator names his two sons, identifies deeds and some personal
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property.
In Paragraph 4, the testator states that Judd Max is his executor and gives him Power of
Attorney, "now and even after I am dead." Testator states that he wants Judd to be able to
distribute property "any way that he sees fit." Testator also states he has property in Big Creek
Idaho.
In Paragraph 5, Testator states he is leaving one dollar to his son, Tom.

In Paragraph 6, which begins page two of the Will, the Testator leaves one dollar to his
other son, Keith and Keith's heirs.
In Paragraph 7, the Testator discusses property that belonged to Linda Lanham (or her son,

Todd), and property that belonged to the Testator. The Testator states that, "I haven't decided
where to disperse of it lately."
In Paragraph 8, beginning on the bottom of page two and continuing on page three, the
Testator discusses property that belonged to his sister, Kathy (and her family), and states that
Kathy can disperse them with Judd's help. The Testator also discusses his personal property,
including books and an antique cabinet, and states that Kathy and Judd can "sort thru some of that
stuff however they want." Testator also identifies an antique table and chairs, and antique rocker
that belonged to "Lizzie," and an antique radio. Testator then states he has guns, and that a bed
belongs to Keith and another bed belongs to Tom. Testator identifies a sand painting that belongs
to "Lizzie" and a "$3,000 sheep head that Judd can hang up in his cabin." Testator then states that
there is property in his safe that Judd can "disperse of how ever he wants."
In Paragraph 9, the Testator discusses the 47 acres in Big Creek Idaho and states that he
was to give"½ to one person and½ to another." Testator then states that he has picture, furniture
and household good, and owes a mortgage to Linda Andrews. Testator identifies checks, cash,
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coins, and guns in a safe.
In Paragraph 10, on page four, the Testator states that he received a receipt for money owed
on a $50,000 mortgage, and states that the guns could be sold to pay part of the mortgage off.
In Paragraph 11, the Testator again names Judd Max Lanham as his executor and gives him
Power of Attorney. Testator states again that he want Judd to be able to distribute his property as
stated in his Will.
In summary, the Testator names Judd Max Lanham as his executor (paras 2, 4, and 11) and
states that he wants Judd to have power of attorney (paras, 2, 4, and 11) and for Judd to distribute
his property as he sees fit (paras 4, 8) or as stated in the Will (para 11 ).
Testator then disposes of one dollar to each of his two sons, Tom and Keith (paras 5 and 6).
Testator identifies personal property belonging to other people: Linda (para 7), Kathy,
Lizzie, Keith, & Tom (para 8).

This identification of ownership could be interpreted as

dispositions to these people.
Testator also allows Judd to hang a sheep head in his cabin (para 8), which is likely
disposition of the sheep head to Judd.
Testator also states that his guns "can be sold" to pay of a $50,000 mortgage (para 10),
which is likely a precatory statement, rather than a command.
Besides the dollar to each son, the personal property belonging to other persons, and the
sheep head, Testator failed to dispose of any other property in his Will. Although Testator
identifies some of his property, he does not state how to dispose of it (paras 3, 7, 8, and 9).
Further, Testator identifies property and states he does not know how he wants to dispose of it
(paras 7 & 9).
Besides Judd's authority, Testator also allows Kathy to decide where certain of his
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personal property will go, including plates, china, coffee grinding machine, and tables (para 8).
Finally, this Court may interpret the last two sentences of paragraph 8 as giving the content
of the safe Judd. However, Testator later directs the guns in the safe to be sold to pay the
mortgage (para 10).
At best, the Will only disposes of the aforementioned personal property. By its terms, the
Will does not dispose of any of Testator's real property, banking accounts, or accounts receivable,.
According to the Inventory filed by the Personal Representative, these assets have a combined
value of more than $300,000. Since the Testator did not dispose of all his property via his Will,
"particularly in the absence of a residuary clause, then the omitted property must descend
according to the laws of succession. LC.§§ 14-102 and 14-103; Page on Wills, Vol. 2, § 927; 95
C.J.S. Wills§ 615 c.; In re Peabody's Estate, 21 Cal.App.2d 690, 70 P.2d 249." In re Corwin's
Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 P.2d 339, 341 (1963). The issue in Corwin's Estate was nearly

identical to this case. The decedent had disposed of part of his property through his will, but
failed to dispose of all of his property. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that property not disposed
of through the will passed through the laws of succession. Id. Since the Testator in our case has
not disposed of all of his property through his Will, this Court should determine which property
remains to pass to Testator's heirs through intestate succession.
' PAROLE EVIDENCE
Respondents argue, without citing any known law, that this Court should consider parole
evidence when determining the intent of the Testator. However, as cited by the Petitioner during
oral arguments, Idaho Law does not allow for parole evidence to be considered when determining
a testator's intent. The Idaho Supreme court has stated:
Courts are not permitted in order to avoid a conclusion of intestacy
to adopt a construction based on conjecture as to what the testator
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may have intended, although though [sic] not expressed.' In re
Hoytema's Estate, supra. See also In re Tarrant's Estate, 38 Cal.2d
42, 237 P.2d 505; In re Searl's Estate, 29 Wash.2d 230, 186 P.2d
913, 173 A.L.R. 1247; 2 Schouler on Wills, Executors and
Administrators, (6th ed.),§ 862, p. 980. Courts cannot speculate as
to what was in the mind of the testator, what he intended to do, or
what he intended to declare in his will, but our task herein is to
determine what was meant by what the testatrix did declare in her
will by the words she actually used therein. Presumptions and
auxiliary rules applicable to probate matters are all subordinate to
the cardinal rule just enunciated.' In re Watson's Estate, 32
Cal.App.2d 594, 90 P.2d 349. See also In re Maloney's Estate, 27
Cal.App.2d 532, 80 P.2d 998; In re Klewer's Estate, 124 Cal.App.2d
219,268 P.2d 544, 41 A.L.R.2d 941; Blattv. Blatt, 79 Colo. 57,243
P. 1099, 57 A.L.R. 221; Chicago Daily News Fresh Air Fund v.
Kerner, 305 Ill.App. 237, 27 N.E.2d 310.
In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho I, 6, 383 P.2d 339,342 (1963).

Again, Corwin's estate is very similar to our case. In Corwin, testimony was presented as
to the testator's intent in distributing his property which did not pass via his will. The Court ruled
that parole testimony of testator's intent was not allowed, only the words actually used by the
testator in his will could be used in determining his intent. Id Likewise, any parole evidence
offered by Respondents should not be considered by this Court. Only the actual words in the
Will, which conform to the formalities required when making a will, should be considered when

determining Testator's intent.
POWER OF ATTORNEY
Since the Will does pot dispose of the bulk of Testator's property, this Court may be
tempted to recognize Testator's statements that Judd or Kathy be able to dispose of his assets as
they saw fit. Respondent's did not argue or cite any law which would allow such a provision in
either their brief or in oral arguments. On the contrary, Idaho law specifically prohibits a Testator
from disposing of his assets in this fashion.

Idaho statutes authorize a person to devise or

bequeath his property, but it does not permit him to delegate to another the power to make such
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disposition for him. Hedin v. Westdala Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241, 250, 81 P.2d 741, 745
(1938). Yribar v. Fitzpatrick, 91 Idaho 105,108,416 P.2d 164, 167 (1966). In Hedin and Yriba,
the testators directed their executors to give assets to worthy charities. In Hedin, the executor was
decedent's spouse, who would certainly know his intentions. However, the Court in both cases
ruled such dispositions did not distribute assets according the intent of the testator, but only as to
the intent of other persons, and therefore were disallowed, Id. Our case is obviously comparable.
The Testator states that Judd or Kathy can pick how to distribute his property, not how he would
distribute his property. As such, no court could ever enforce whether Testator's intent was
followed. And as ruled by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hedin and Yriba, this type of distribution
is not allowed.
Petitioner respectfully requests this Court reconsider its opinion that the Will disposes of
all of Testator's property, and that parole evidence can be used to ascertain the Testator's intent in
disposing of his property.
DATED this ~day of June, 2014.

Douglas . ee
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, certify that on the?D day of June 2014, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be forwarded to the following person(s):
Nancy Callahan
101 Canal Street
Emmett, ID 83617

U.S. Mail
Fax 208-365-1646
_By Hand

Dou~~;fb
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Nancy L. Callahan
Idaho State Bar #4884
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Idaho State Bar #2180
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101 Canal Street
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM
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)

In the Matter of the Estate of:

GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

Deceased.

CASE NO. CV2013-886

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON MOTION AND CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER came before the Court June 20, 2014 on a Motion for

Summary judgment filed by Claimant-Petitioner Thomas Everett Lanham and
on

a

Cross-Motion

for

Summary

Representative, Judd Lanham.
and

Memoranda

submitted

Judgment

filed

by

the

Personal

The Court considered the filings, affidavits
before the

hearing,

and

considered

oral

arguments of counsel made at the hearing.
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EXHIBITS

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

th

Decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham passed away December 5

2013, after long-declining health problems.

'

In the time leading up to his

death, decedent met ·with friends and family and his attorney and discussed
his various kinds of assets and his intent for transferring them upon his
death.

Some of those people who participated in those discussions signed

affidavits that were included in the record.
2.

Decedent periodically dictated his thoughts into an audio

recorder.

That audio was transcribed and typed into the form of a will.

Decedent signed the will before witnesses.

Decedent's and the witnesses'

signatures were notarized and that will was submitted for probate.
3.

Decedent made additional recordings after he executed the will.

The audio recordings made by decedent were part of the record before the
Court as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Judd Lanham, the Personal
Representative. The record also included affidavits from Keith Colby Lanham
and Cathy Lanham Gillihan, submitted by the Personal Representative.
4. The Court finds no reason to doubt the validity of the will. From
the affidavits and especially the audio recordings, it is clear that decedent
Gordon Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the
time of he executed the will.

He demonstrated a thorough grasp of the

extent and nature of his assets. He also demonstrated a good grasp of his
potential heirs, and his relationships with them and sound reasons for
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 2
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treating each as he did.

There is no evidence suggesting that anyone

exercised undue influence or coercion over decedent.

In fact, in spite of

decedent's failing health and physical maladies, it appears he was a strong
willed and independent thinker at the time he executed the will. 1
5.

Claimant Thomas Everett Lanham advanced several claims, but

he failed to support his claims and arguments with one iota of credible,
admissible evidence.

Based upon the language of the will itself, the

affidavits, the audio recordings and the entire record, the Court finds in
favor of the Personal Representative on every factual dispute.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The will of decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham is legal, valid, and
binding.
2.
will,

Decedent's intent is sufficiently clear from the language of the

particularly as

recordings and the

bolstered

and explained

by contemporary

audio

affidavits submitted, to allow administration and, if

necessary, judicial enforcement.

As to the claimant, Thomas Everett

Lanham, decedent's intent is very clearly that claimant take by the will only
one dollar ($1.00) and a bed and there is no lawful reason to frustrate
c"

decedent's intent.

1. The Court notes that a court trial had been scheduled for early April on the issue
of the will's validity but that neither claimant, Thomas Everett Lanham, Jr., nor his attorney,
Mr. Douglas Fleenor appeared at the time and date scheduled.
The Personal
Representative's request for costs and attorney fees is pending.
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3. There are no issues of material fact remaining to be determined
by the Court and the Personal Representative is entitled to judgment as a

matter

of

law

and

the

Court

therefore

GRANTS

the

Personal

Representative's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
ATTORNEY FESS AND COSTS

The issue of an award of costs and attorneys fees will be taken up at
a future time and date.
SO ORDERED this

_Jj_r-ltay of June, 2014.

Hon.~ryler D. Smithat
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies services of the foregoing FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS upon the following in the manner indicated.

[ XX ] Deposit in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid, addressed to:

Douglas Fleenor
Attorney For Claimant,
Thomas Everett Lanham
702 West Idaho Street, Suite 1100
Boise, Idaho 83702
[XX] Deposit in her Gem County Courthouse Mail basket:

Nancy Callahan
Attorney for Personal Representative,
Judd Lanham
Law Offices of Nancy L. Callahan.
101 Canal St.
Emmett, Idaho 83617

-dJ__

Service accomplished and this Certificate signed on this25:_ day of
June, 2014.
SHELLY TILTON

laura-Dodson

B
Deputy Court Clerk
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Laura SHE1J-tT1LTON, CLERK
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Nancy L. Callahan
Idaho State Bar #4884
Rolf M. Kehne
Idaho State Bar #2180
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN
101 Canal Street
Emmett, Idaho 83617
Telephone:
(208) 365-1200
Facsimile:
(208) 365-1646
Attorneys for Personal Representative

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

In the Matter of the Estate of:
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)
)
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)
)
)

GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

Deceased.

CASE NO. CV2013-886

JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER came before the Court June 20, 2014 on a Motion for
Summary judgment filed by Claimant-Petitioner Thomas Everett Lanham and
on

a

Cross-Motion

for

Summary

Representative, Judd Lanham.
and

Memoranda

submitted

Judgment

filed

by

the

Personal

The Court considered the filings, affidavits
before the

hearing,

arguments of counsel made at the hearing.

and

considered

oral

The Court having entered

written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and having
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announced in open Court the granting of the Personal Representative's
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Claimant
Thomas Everett Gordon take nothing by his Motion for Summary Judgment;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Personal Representative's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
and the Personal Representative may continue to administer the estate in
accord with the Decedent's intent and according to law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that consideration of an award of costs and
fees is reserved for decision at a future time and date.

so ORDERED this

..J!i!!fav of June, 2014.
Hori. tylerti. Smith
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies services of the foregoing FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS upon the following in the manner indicated.

[ XX] Deposit in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid, addressed to:
Douglas Fleenor
Attorney For Claimant,
Thomas Everett Lanham
702 West Idaho Street, Suite 1100
Boise, Idaho 83702

[ XX ] Deposit in her Gem County Courthouse Mail basket:
Nancy Callahan
Attorney for Personal Representative,
Judd Lanham
Law Offices of Nancy L. Callahan.
101 Canal St.
Emmett, Idaho 83617

0c_tb-

Service accomplished and this Certificate signed on this ..Qij!day of
June, 2014.
SHELLY TILTON

By

Laura~Dodson

Deputy Court Clerk
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Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989
Attomey & Counselor at Law
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100
Boise, ID 83702
208-472-8846
208-947-5910 fax

SHELLY TILTON, CLERK

Laura

DGQSGA--DEPUTY

Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM
In the Matter of the Estate of
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

Case No. CV 2013-886
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Deceased.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF AND ms ATTORNEY OF RECORD
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham, appeals the Decision and Order of the Magistrate Court in

this matter as follows:
1.

Petitioner appeals from the Order of the Magistrate Court in and for the Third

Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Gem.
2.

Petitioner makes this appeal to the District Court for the Third Judicial District.

3.

Petitioner appeals the Magistrate's Order in this matter dated June 25, 2014 and

entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.
4.

This appeal is taken upon matters oflaw.

5.

The hearings in this matter were recorded. The tape recordings of the hearings are

in the possession of the Clerk of the Court of Gem County.
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6.

Issues Appellant asserts on appeal will be stated in a Statement oflssues on Appeal

which will be filed by Defendant pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(f)(6), but which will include:
a.

The Will of the Decedent is clear and plain. The intent of the Decedent

should not be bolstered and explained by parole evidence
b.

A plain reading of the Will establishes that the Decedent did not dispose of

the residue of his estate.
c.

Other issues as may be determined during the course of this appeal.

This appeal is taken pursuant to Rule 83, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

DA1ED this\ J"'day of August, 2 0 1 ~

Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

o~~ 4, I caused a true and correct copy

I, the undersigned, certify that on the {5:tiay
of the foregoing to be forwarded to the following person(s):
Nancy Callahan
101 Canal Street
Emmett, ID 83617

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TfllRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

In the matter of the estate of.
Gordon Thomas Lanham,

Case No. CV-2013-886
Thomas B. Lanham,
Appellant,
MEMORANDUM RE: APPEAL OF
ATTORNEY FEB AWARD

vs.
Judd Lanham, personal representative
for the estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham,

Respondent.

This matter is before the court on appeal from an order of the magistrate below awarding
attorney fees in a probate case. The petitioner below and appellant on appeal, Thomas Lanham,
is represented by Patrick J. Geile ofFoleyFreeman, Meridian. The personal representative of the
estate and respondent on appeal, Judd Lanham, is represented by Nancy Callahan, Emmett. The
matter has been fully briefed, no oral argument has been requested, and the time for requesting
argument under the case scheduling order has now expired. The case is deemed submitted on the
briefs without argument.
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For the reasons stated below, the order of the magistrate is vacated, and the matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Background Proceedings
Gordon Thomas Lanham passed away on December 5, 2013. Judd Lanham (hereafter
Judd), a cousin of the decedent, filed a petition for informal probate of will and appointment of
personal representative, together with what was purported to be the decedent's last will, with the
magistrate court on December 20, 2013. In due course, a statement of informal probate of will
and an order designating Judd

as the personal representative of the estate were issued.

On January 8, 2014, Thomas E. Lanham (hereafter Thomas), a son of the decedent, filed

a pro se pleading contending the will was invalid and Judd was unqualified to serve as personal
representative. On January 13, 2014, Keith Lanham (hereafter Keith), a son of the decedent, filed
a petition through counsel also contending the will was invalid and seeking to remove Judd as

personal representative. A hearing on the issues raised in both pleadings was set for January 21,
2014.
On January 21, 2014, a hearing was held. Thomas appeared pro se and Keith and Judd
appeared with their respective counsel. Several family members and the witnesses to Gordon's

will were also present. The magistrate judge noted there were two issues presently before the
court: (1) the issue of removal of Judd as personal representative, and (2) the issue of the validity
of the will. The court declined to remove Judd as personal representative at that time. The judge
set the matter for a bench trial on April 2, 2014. The record indicates that a written notice of trial
was prepared by the clerk at the time, with copies handed to everyone present at the hearing. A
notice of service reflecting this service is in the file.
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Thomas retained counse~ who appeared in the case for the first time on March 24, 2014,
by filing a petition to temporarily restrain Judd's activity as personal representative, together
with a new petition to remove Judd, determine the validity of the will, and determine Gordon's
lawful heirs. These petitions were noticed for hearing April 3, 2014, the day after the bench trial
was scheduled.
On March 28, 2014, Judd filed an affidavit averring that he had made available to each of
the parties in the case a compilation of audio recordings of conversations Gordon and Judd had
prior to Gordon's death regarding final distribution of Gordon's estate. Included in the audio
recordings was a recording of the decedent stating how he wanted his property distributed.
Apparently according to Judd's affidavit, this portion of the tape was transcnbed and placed in
will format, then signed by the decedent before witnesses, resulting in the transcription he had
filed along with his petition for informal probate in December 2013.
On March 31, 2014, the attorney for Keith filed a notice of withdrawal of Keith's
objection to the will and to Judd's appointment as personal representative.
On April 2, 2014, Judd and his counsel appeared for the bench trial, along with several
witnesses. Thomas and his counsel failed to appear. The magistrate judge noted Thomas had set
a hearing for the following day, and continued the matter to the next day. No other orders were
entered.
On April 3, 2014 a hearing was held. Judd and Thomas, with counse~ appeared. The
parties argued their respective positions on Thomas' s petitions, and the magistrate judge, after
reviewing the arguments and the record, ruled from the bench that he was denying the petitions
filed by Thomas. No orders were entered on this ruling.
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Thomas filed a motion for summary judgment on April 23, 2014, again contending the

will was invalid and the residue of the estate should pass to Gordon's heirs under the laws of
intestacy. The motion was not supported by affidavit, exlubit, or any other evidence, other than
evidence previously entered. The estate filed a response, along with a counter motion for
summary judgment, both supported by affidavits from Judd, Keith, and a sister of the decedent,
as well as the previously submitted audio recordings.

On June I 0, 2014, a hearing was held. The magistrate judge heard argument on the
summary judgment motions, noted Thomas had put on no evidence in support of his position,
and announced from the bench that he intended to grant the estate's motion for summary
judgment and dismiss the motions filed by Thomas. Thomas filed a motion for reconsideration
on June 20, 2014, apparently from the magistrate's oral rulings, as no written orders had been
entered. The magistrate entered a written decision and order on summary judgment on June 25,

2014, granting the summary judgment of the personal representative, denying the motions filed

by Thomas, and dismissing his petitions. This court later concluded that this order mooted the
motion for reconsideration and constituted the final appealable order on the matter. The effect of
these rulings was to continue the probate of the will under the administration of Judd.

On July 9, the estate filed a motion fur attorney fees, requesting fees and costs pursuant to
J.C.§§ 12-120, 12-121 and 12-123(2)(a), and I.RC.P. 11 and 54(e), but not including J.C. § 15-

8-208. Thomas filed an opposition on July 31, contending he had not brought claims
"frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation," and arguing the requested fees were
excessive.
On August 13, 2014, Thomas filed a notice of appeal to this court from the final order
issued June 10, 2014. The appeal was filed more than 42 days after entry of the order appealed
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from This court dismissed the appeal on February 10, 2015, for lack ofjurisdiction on the
ground it had been untimely filed. This court notes than an appeal of this ruling has been filed
with the Supreme Court.
The magistrate below addressed the estate's attorney fee motions in a memorandum
decision on February 19, 2015. An attorney fee detennination, the magistrate judge explained,
would require resolution of the questions of. (1) which party had ''prevailed," for purposes of the
relevant statutory and rule provisions, and (2) whether the non-prevailing party "acted
frivolously and without basis in fact or law."
With respect to the prevailing party question, the magistrate judge noted Thomas had
failed to appear for the April 2, 2014, bench trial and could not point to "good cause or excusable
neglect," had lost on his removal and restraint petitions, and had finally lost on all his claims on
summary judgment. As a result, the magistrate judge concluded, the estate was clearly the
prevailing party in the proceedings.
Turning to the frivolousness question, the magistrate ruled that Thomas's failure to
appear for the trial on April second, bis duplication of arguments already made and ruled upon,
and his repeated "failure to present any evidence supporting his claims or in opposition of the
motion made by the estate," compelled a conclusion that the claims against the estate ''were
frivolous and without foundation" and attorney fees were warranted. After considering the
estate's itemization and the relevant Rule 54 factors, the magistrate judge awarded the estate

$9,000 in fees.
On March 23, 2015, Thomas appealed this court's order dismissing the appeal to the
appellate court. On the same day, he appealed the magistrate's award of attorney fees to this
court.
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On appeal here, Thomas contends the magistrate judge abused his discretion in awarding
the estate $9,000 in attorney fees, by relying improperly on a statutory provision, LC.§ 15-8208, not cited by the estate in its initial request, and by finding the requisite frivolous conduct.

Further, Thomas maintains, the magistrate judge erred as a matter of law by issuing a decision on
attorney fees within forty-two days of this court's dismissal of the prior appeal-a window in
which, he theorizes, the proceeding should have been automatically stayed.
The estate responds by arguing the magistrate judge appropriately relied upon several
applicable statutory provisions in making the award, acted within his discretion in finding the
claims frivolous, and had the authority to issue an attorney fee decision even while the
underlying disposition was subject to appeal The estate requests attorney fees on appeal under
I.RC.P. 54, LC.§ 12-121 et seq., 1.RC.P. 11, I.AR 11.2, and I.C. § 15-8-208.
Scope and Standard of Review

The court reviews a magistrate's attorney fee award for abuse of discretion Thomas v.

Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,639, 132 P.3d 392,396 (2006). An award is said to have been within the
magistrate's discretion under I.C. § 12-121 if the magistrate was "left with the abiding belief that
the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."

McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551,562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003).
Analysis
A. Applicability of Idaho Code § 15-8-208. The estate correctly points out that our

appellate courts have "held in a variety of contexts that a correct ruling or order, based upon an
incorrect theory, will nonetheless be upheld on appeal under the proper theory.,, Fournier v.

Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600,602 (Ct. App. 1994). Provided, as the Fournier
court explained, "a statutory or contractual justification for an award of fees must be advanced
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below by the party seeking such an award." Id. At a minimum, the Fournier court noted, due
process requires that any theory selected on appeal as the "correct theory'' upon which an
attorney fee award may be based must have been "advanced at the trial level by the party seeking
fees." Id. In this case, the arguments and references in the court below were all made with regard
to an award of attorney fees for cause, based upon the argument that the proceedings were
frivolous and without foundation. There was no reference to the basis of fees under the probate
code, J.C.§ 15-8-208; it was not mentioned in the pleadings, nor in argument.

B. Bases alleged for imposition of attorney fees. Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides that
"[i]n any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or
parties," subject to the condition that the provision "shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute
which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees." Rule 54, I.RC.P., limits the
application ofI.C. § 12-121, directing that under this section of the code fees "may be awarded
by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Idaho Code § 12-123 addresses
an overlapping application, providing that "at any time prior to the commencement of the trial in
a civil action or within twenty-one days after the entry ofjudgment in a civil action, the court
may award reasonable attorney's fees to any party to that action adversely affected by frivolous
conduct." Frivolous conduct, under that provision, is defined as "conduct of a party to a civil
action or of his counsel of record" that "obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure
another party to" the action, or "is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and
cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law." J.C. § 12-123(b).
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Interpreting those provisions in the past, our Idaho Supreme Court has explained the
"entire course" of litigation "must be taken into account" in making an attorney fee
determination, and "ifthere is at least one legitimate issue presented, attorney fees may not be
awarded even though the losing party has asserted other factual or legal claims that are frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation." Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 731, 302 P.3d
349, 356 (2013). Recently, the Supreme Court has expressed concern that "a single, triable issue
of fact may excuse a party from the aggregate of misconduct that necessitates or dominates the
conduct of the lawsuit." Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 632,
329 P.3d 1072, 1080 (2014).
The Maslen court backed away from a strict application of the rule and recognized that an
award of attorney fees under J.C.§ 12-121 may still be appropriate if the court, in considering
the entire course of litigation, is left with the conviction that the management of the case as a
whole was frivolous or without foundation, notwithstanding the existence of an isolated
legitimate issue. The Supreme Court in Maslen ruled that in such an instance, the court should
apportion an attorney fee award, separating out and awarding attorney fees for those portions of
the case found to be frivolous or without foundation, but not awarding fees fur the portions of the
case found to rest upon legitimate issues.
An award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 is discretionary, but the discretion is not
unfettered. The trial court is obligated to make specific findings of fact upon the elements of the
case deemed to be frivolous or without foundation in order to support the award of fees. The
problem with the instant case lies here; the court below advanced the conclusions that the
circumstances were frivolous and without foundation, but without reference to specific facts to
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support the conclusions. This might be accepted if the record was clear and the facts supporting
the conclusions obvious. That is not the case here.
Here, the magistrate judge noted the combination of. (1) the failure to appear at the April
2, 2014, bench trial without explanation, (2) the failure to present any evidence supporting his
claims, and (3) the failure to present any evidence resisting the estate's claims, all indicated that
Thomas's claims against the estate were frivolous and without foundation.
The first item cannot stand. The failure to appear at a scheduled hearing, without more, is
not sufficient to prove frivolous conduct, or that the proponent's case is without foundation. It is
not an uncommon occurrence for a lawyer to miss a scheduled hearing through simple oversight
or mistake. The matter did not get calendared, or the lawyer forgot to look, or the lawyer just
forgot. None of these are excusable, and frequently the circumstances will put the lawyer in a
significant predicament with regard to whatever issue was involved in the overlooked hearing.
But, in the absence of evidence of repeated happenings or of a deliberate course of conduct, the
circumstance ofan isolated event of missing one hearing is not sufficient, standing alone, to
support a conclusion that the case was frivolous nor is it evidence that the case that would have
been advanced was without foundation.
In the instant case, the magistrate referred several times to the missed hearing, but
without connecting it to any course of conduct or deliberate indifference or other showing that
the circumstance was not an isolated instance of simple oversight. The magistrate's conclusion
that the incident is evidence of frivolous conduct or that the case was without foundation is not
supported. His connection of the occurrence to the fmdings of an entitlement for attomey fees
under I.C. § 12-121 is error. Given that he stated several times that he was relying upon this
circumstance in his final conclusion, the error is prejudicial and necessitates a remand.
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In ruling on the sufficiency ofThomas's case, the magistrate appears to combine the
second and third items. The magistrate discusses Thomas's motion for summary judgment and
his defense of the motion filed by Judd together. In ruling on these issues, he held, uAlthough
Thomas Lanham, Jr. made several claims and allegations, he failed to support those claims with
any admissible evidence necessary to sustain his burden of proof." The problem here is there is

no "burden of proof' in a sunnnary judgment. The summary judgment motion rises or falls upon
a showing, or lack thereof, based upon "the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file,
to get her with the affidavits, if any," that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. I.R. C.P.

56(c).
In a summary judgment proceeding, the term "burden of proof' only has meaning with
reference to the existence, or the lack thereof, of a dispute over an issue of fact, and to the point
that if there is any question over the issue, the patty with the burden of proof must come forward
with a showing that there are no disputes in the facts to be presented at trial. If an affidavit is
submitted, it must be based on first-hand knowledge and contain admissible evidence. If the
burden ofproofis relevant to a summary judgment, it is as part oftl1e ruling either that the party
with the burden ofproofhas demonstrated that there are no facts in dispute to be proved at trial,
or it is part of the ruling that the defending party has demonstrated that the facts claimed by the
party with the burden of proof may not be found as claimed, thereby creating a dispute to be
resolved at trial, and preventing a summary judgment.

It is not necessary under this construct that the defending party put up "admissible
evidence" of anything; while a defending pmiy may not rely upon mere denials, he may
demonstrate that the evidence relied upon by the party with the burden of proof is not admissible.
The contentions of the party with the burden of proof may not be legally sufficient, or
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inadmissible as unfounded conclusions, as assuming facts not proved, as un-excepted hearsay, or
for a variety oflegal deficits preventing their admission at the summary judgment stage and
making them matters for the trier of fact to resolve at trial. He may show this because of a legal
insufficiency, because of inherent or judicially cognizable credibility problems, or because of
foundational issues pertaining to admissibility. Or he may be able to point to specific evidence
contained in the affidavits and other materials already in the record or as submitted by the
opponent, and demonstrate that this evidence supplied elsewhere is sufficient to contravene the
main evidence and raise issue of fact. The point here is that it does not have to be done by
counter affidavit. Rule 56(e) has been construed to mean that when a counter-affidavit is
submitted, it must be of evidentiary quality, based on first-hand knowledge and advancing
admissible facts.

It is true that a defending party may not create ru1 issue of fact by merely denying an
avennent of fact offered by the adverse party, but must specificaJJy declare the counter-fact. But

if the fact advanced is, itself, inadmissible because it is conc1usory, or inherently problematic, or
contains within it a legal hurdle requiring further foundation, or if the defending party suggests
the existence of other evidence already in the record that demonstrates a foundational deficit or
recognized objection that is not ru1swered, that would suffice as a defense to having swnmary
judgment entered against the party, even in the absence of a separate affidavit or counteraffidavit. Counsel may rely upon the affidavits and materials supplied by the opposing party.
The point is that on summary judgement it is not who presented the evidence or the issue,
it is what is the state of the record after all such is considered; is there or is there not a dispute as
to any material fact necessitating a trial?
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In this case, the magistrate merely noted that "Thomas Lanha~ Jr. filed no response to
the estate's motion, as required by I.R.C.P. (56)(e)." Rule 56(e) says responsive showing may be

by affidavit or as otherwise provided. This subpart of the rule does not absolutely require an
affidavit-elsewhere in the rule it says the entire file may be considered in determining the
existence/non-existence or disputed/non-disputed facts. However, here the magistrate seems to
read this rule as saying there must be a counteraffidavit, or else.
Appellant argues that he demonstrated the existence of facts in dispute through other
means. Neither the magistrate nor the appellant specify what this means. This court notes very
broadly that the appellant, a son of the decedent, would be cut off almost entirely once the
purported will is admitted to probate-the bequest in the will to Thomas was for $1.00 only. The
will was prepared from a transcript of an audio recording-it is not clear whether an attorney
was involved. The will was witnessed, but the capacity of the witnesses is not clear. If there was
no wiU, Thomas v.;ould be entitled a share of the estate under the laws of intestacy. Further, as a
son of the decedent, Thomas would be entitled to preference over the cousin as personal
representative. None of this appears by affidavit, but all appears either by law with reference to
the laws of intestacy, or by reference to the allegations in t11e petition for informal probate
submitted by Judd. Until the summary judgment, there was no adjudication nor were there any
specific findings by the magistrate on any of these items.
The statement ofinfonnal probate was not an adjudication. No definitive rulings were
made at the January 21, 2014 hearing. It would seem that Thomas, as a questioning heir, is
entitled to an adjudication that the will is the will, and that the cousin is entitled to letters of
administration over any of the statutorily preferred heirs. From the record, it appears that Judd
provided some information that would have been crucial to any detennination in the fonn of
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copies of the audio recordings to Keith and Thomas and their lawyers just before the April
hearings. Keith decided to withdraw his objection; Thomas did not.
There is nothing in the record for these motions as to what these audio recordings were
from the standpoint of their origination, reliability, or purpose. There is nothing to indicate what
the foundation was in tenns of how they were made, who made them, how they were maintained,
and as to the accuracy of any of the contents. It appears these recordings were at least part of the

foundation for the will, for the contention that the decedent was of sound mind and not acting
under duress, for the decedenfs decision in cutting off the sons, and for his decision to appoint
the cousin as the personal representative.
There are some representations as to some of this, but no findings or conclusions from the
court on any ofit. Someone-it is not clear who-caused a portion of the audio recording to be
typed up into a format of a will, and obtained the decedent's signature. It is not clear from this
simple explanation that the decedent knew it was a will or intended it so. The burden of proof
upon all of this, and particularly_upon the admission of these tapes, would be upon Judd, not
Thomas, at both the summary judgment stage and at trial.
All of this may actually have been submitted to the court below, but there are no findings

by the magistrate on any ofit, either in the ruling on summary judgment or in the ruling on
attorney fees. Thomas may not have had any specific facts to offer to refute the implications of
the materials offered by Judd, but he might have thought it sufficient to raise the issue and then
cross examine the proponents on most of it. One would certainly think the custodian of the aura]
recordings would be subject to examination on the foundation-for if the foundation for these
aural recordings was found lacking in any material respect, the entire case might have crumbled.

·"° - "
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If there is substance to any of these legal deficiencies, Thomas would not be required to
advance any counter evidence to sustain his defense of the summary judgment filed by Judd. The
actual burden of proof is on Judd, and if it can be demonstrated that the evidence submitted by
the proponent is lacking, or leaves any material issue for the trier of fact at trial, summary
judgment should not be available. Since Judd would have the burden of proof upon the issue of
the will, if there was a basis to find the evidence Judd was advancing presented an open question
in any material aspect that might be found insufficient at trial to sustain his burden of proof, that
would be a sound argument to present in defense of a summary judgment.
Thomas might be wrong in so relying. The magistrate apparently concluded the
foundational evidence was sufficient. But all that can be gleaned from the magistrate's written
findings is that Thomas was wrong, and just being wrong does not mean the position taken was
frivolous or without foundation. See, e.g., Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 879,
865 P.2d 965,970 (1993) ("An action is not deemed to have been brought frivolously simply
because it ultimately fails."); Lieurance-Ross v. Ross, 142 Idaho 536, 542, 129 P.3d 1285, 1291

(Ct. App. 2006) (emphasizing that "failure to present a persuasive custody case did not render"
pursuit of the case "frivolous and unreasonable.''). Given the open questions that come to mind
because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the manner in which the will was drafted,
perhaps raising an issue as to the competence and possibility of duress of the decedent, perhaps
as to questions as to the legal sufficiency of the will, given further how it was prepared and
witnessed, the hearsay nature of the central evidence, and the foundational issues over the aural
recordings, I do not believe it can be concluded that resting on an expectation that the foundation
for some essential part of some of this might have been found lacking, can be said to be frivolous
or without foundation, without specific findings to resolve these unanswered questions.
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This is not to conclude that the magistrate was in error; this is only to conclude the
magistrate's findings are insufficient to support his conclusion. See, e.g., McGrew, 139 Idaho at
562 ("Although an award of attorney fees under the statute is discretionary, the award must be
supported by findings, and those findings, in turn, must be supported by the record.''). The court
below fastens on the failure to appear at the April 2 hearing and the failure to affirmatively
advance evidence by affidavit. Standing alone or taken together, these conclusions are
insufficient to demonstrate frivolousness or lack of foundation. There may well be additional
details in the record and other indicia from which further findings can be drawn. But on the
record before this court, the bare conclusions cannot be sustained. See Severson v. Hermann,

116 Idaho 497, 499, 777 P .2d 269, 271 (1989) ("[O]n review, we are left with nothing but a bare
conclusion lacking the requisite underpinning ....").

Therefore, the matter will be

remanded for reconsideration by the magistrate consistent with this opinion, and for the entry of
properly detailed and specific findings of fact, whichever way the magistrate finally concludes,
to support the conclusions reached.

C. Ruling on attorney fees with appeal pending. There is no merit to the argument that
the magistrate lacked authority to rule on the attorney fee issue once the appeal to the district
court had been filed. The appellate rules clearly provide that the trial court retains jurisdiction to
act on matters pertaining to costs and attorney fees after the filing of a notice of appeal. I.AR
13; I.R.C.P. 83.
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D. Attorney fees on appeal. There is no prevailing party yet, and therefore no basis for

considering attorney fees at this juncture.
Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the ruling of the court below awarding attorney fees to the estate and
against Thomas E. Lanham is vacated. The matter is remanded to the magistrate below to reconsider
the issue of attorney fees in light ofthe directions contained herein, and to prepare appropriately
detailed findings of fact supporting any conclusions reached. No attorney fees on this appeal.
Dated

21 day ofNovember, 2015.
Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on 25 November, 2015, s/he served a true and conformed
copy of the original of the foregoing MEMORANDUM RE: APPEAL OF ATTORNEY FEE
AWARD upon the following individuals in the manner described:
Upon Patrick J. Geile, Matthew G. Bennett, Foley Freman, PLLC, PO Box 10,
Meridian, ID 83680;
and upon Nancy L. Callahan by placing a copy in each said counsel's box at the
Clerk's Office.
whens/he deposited the same into the US Mail, sufficient postage affixed.

SHELLY TILTON, Clerk of the Court

By:~C1Q~DDeputy Clerk
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SUMMARY OF DISC RECEIVED FROM
KEITH LANHAM ON MARCH 22, 2016
This disc is dictation by G. T. Lanham. The below entries are not chronological but are in
the order as contained on the disc. The entrie_s are paraphrased versions of Mr. Lanham's
dictation.
February 1, 2011: Beautiful day. In the hospital with dehydration. Will be giving some
items to Judd.
NOTE: WILL IS DATED FEBRUARY 19, 2011.
March 3,2011:

Lists vehicles, trailers, equipment, horse, tools, tool boxes.

March 9,2011:

Keith does not call back. Leave Keith one dollar. More personal
property listed for Judd to take care of.

March 19, 2011:

27 acres (east) of Big Creek: to Jamie Gillahan
20 acres (west) of Big Creek: to Joe and Thomas (grandsons)
34 acres and 86 acres (w/ water) to?

May 20, 2011:

four inches of snow

no date:

Will be including some new information about my will.

September 27,2011:

No reference to property
NOW BACK TO 2010

December 12, 2010: para. 8 of will
December 19, 2010
January 7,~:

cJJ""\.

para. 9 of will
para. IO of will

November 16, 2010: para 1 of will
November 18, 2010: para 2 and 3 of will
November 19, 2010: para. 4 of will
November 29, 2010: para 5 of will
December 1, 2010:

para. 6 of will

EXHIBIT9
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December 9, 2010:

para 7 of will

NOTE: The transcriber of Mr. Lanham's dictation (Rebecca Clift?) obviously
listened to the disc in its entirety and then transcribed it chronologically by the date of each entry.
The transcription was on January 19, 2011, prior to Mr. Lanham completing his dictation.
Paragraph 11 of the will, naming Judd the executor is not contained in the dictation.
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LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN
101 Canal Street

Emmett, Idaho 83617
Telephone: (208) 365-1200
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646
Attorneys for Personal Representative

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

In the Matter of the Estate of:

GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

_________
Deceased

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2013-0886

INVENTORY

The undersigned, as Personal Representative of the estate of the
above named decedent, states and represents as follows:

1.

The schedule attached hereto constitutes a full and complete
inventory of the property owned by the decedent as far as the
same has come to the possession or knowledge of the
undersigned;

2.

The values set forth in such schedules are the fair market values
of the decedent's property as of December 5, 2013, the date of
the decedent's death, as determined by the undersigned.
DATED this

,J1vJ day of April 2014.
--.
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JUDD·M. LANHAM

Personal Representative
INVENTORY - PAGE 1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2L~/

THE UNDERSIGNED, states that on the ~
day of April 2014, the
undersigned caused delivery in the manner indicated to the following persons
at the addresses shown below:

,,

/court Basket
William F. Lee
Attorney for Keith Colby Lanham
3421 Butte Road
Emmett, Idaho 83617
Douglas E. Fleenor
Attorney for Thomas Everett Lanham
Facsimile: (208) 947-5910
Kathy Gillihan
10041 DeWitt
Boise, Idaho 83704 .

Douglas E. Fleenor
Attorney for Linda Louise Andrews Lanham
Facsimile: (208) 947-5910

Judd Max Lanham
1504 N. McKinney
Boise, Idaho 83704

la an
for Personal Representative
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Inventory of Property
Gordon Thomas Lanham, Deceased
As of December 5, 2014
ASSETS

Real Propertv
Ranch and Land at 3555 Butte Rd.
Emmett. ID in Gem County Parcel #RP00418700

$170,691 *

Land at 3557 Butte Rd., Emmett, ID
Gem County Parcel #RP00418817 2012 Assessed Value
47+ acres on Big Creek in Valley County;
2012 Assessed Value (undeveloped forest land)
(Market value assumed to be considerably higher)

Bank Accounts
Home Federal Bank
Idaho Central Credit Union

3,983 *

1,620

8,559 **
144,549 **

Accounts Receivable
Undistributed proceeds of Hazel Lanham estate

To Be Determined

Personal Property

Household Goods, Fann Tools and Equipment
Guns (preliminary unappraised valuation)
Cash and Coins
Total

8,500
3,500
12,200

$353,602

LIABILITIES
Encumbrances and Debts
Mortgage held by Linda Louise Andrews Lanham

(50,000)

Medical Bills (amounts pending insurance claims filed)

(21,318)

Miscellaneous

(7,036)

Total
TOTAL NET VALUE

($ 78,354)

$275,248

* Payable on Death Transfer of Ownership Deed
**Payable on Death Account
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 43105
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF: GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,
-Deceased.
--------------JUDD LANHAM,
Personal RepresentativeRespondent-Respondent on
Appeal,
v.
THOMAS E. LANHAM,
Respondent-Appellant-Appellant
on Appeal.

________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

2016 Opinion No. 13A
Filed: February 25, 2016
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
AMENDED OPINION
THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION
DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2016,
IS HEREBY AMENDED

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Gem
County. Hon. D. Duff McKee, District Judge; Hon. Tyler D. Smith, Magistrate.
Intermediate appellate decision dismissing appeal, affirmed.
Foley Freeman, PLLC; Patrick J. Geile and Matthew G. Bennett, Meridian, for
respondent-appellant-appellant on appeal. Matthew G. Bennett argued.
Law Offices of Nancy L. Callahan; Nancy L. Callahan and Rolf M. Kehne,
Emmett, for personal representative-respondent-respondent on appeal. Rolf M.
Kehne argued.

HUSKEY, Judge
Thomas E. Lanham (Appellant) appeals from the district court's order dismissing the
appeal filed in this case, arguing that his appeal to the district court was timely. For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm.

1
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After Gordon Thomas Lanham's (Testator) death, Judd Max Lanham (Respondent) filed
an application for informal probate and was appointed personal representative. Subsequently,
Appellant filed a petition for order restraining the Respondent. After a hearing, the magistrate
denied Appellant's motion.
Appellant then filed a motion for summary judgment. Respondent filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. At the hearing on June 10, 2014, the magistrate
granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondent. On June 20, 2014, Appellant filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the motion neither included a notice of hearing nor indicated
whether Appellant desired oral argument; both requirements under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
7(b). 1 On June 25, 2014, the magistrate filed both an order granting the Respondent's crossmotion for summary judgment and a judgment.
acknowledge the motion for reconsideration.

In the judgment, the magistrate did not
Appellant did not pursue the motion for

reconsideration after the final judgment was filed.
On August 13, 2014, Appellant appealed to the district court. Respondent filed a motion
to dismiss, arguing that Appellant's appeal was untimely filed. The district court held that the
notice of appeal was filed outside the forty-two-day period and that the motion for
reconsideration did not toll the time for appeal because it was filed before the magistrate entered
the judgment. Appellant timely appeals.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether an appeal to the district court was timely filed is a question of law. Goodman

Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 147 Idaho 56, 58, 205 P.3d 1192, 1194 (2009).
Over questions of law, we exercise free review. Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho
610, 613, 826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992); Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 555, 768 P.2d 815, 818
(Ct. App. 1989).

,

Unless a motion may be heard ex parte, I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A) requires a written motion
and a notice of hearing to be filed with the court. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l) requires a party to indicate on
the face of the motion whether the party desires to present oral argument.
2
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III.
ANALYSIS

Appellant argues the magistrate's judgment was not a valid final judgment. Appellant
also argues that his motion for reconsideration should be treated like a motion to alter or amend
judgment and that his motion tolls the period for appeal.
A.

The Magistrate's Judgment was a Valid Final Judgment

Appellant argues the magistrate's judgment was not a valid judgment because it, inter
alia, contains a recital of the pleadings, in contravention of I.R.C.P. 54(a). Appellant cites
Wicket v. Chamberlain, 159 Idaho 532,363 P.3d 854 (2015), in support of his position.

In Wicke!, the appellant filed a complaint against the respondent for medical malpractice.
The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted on
July 25, 2013. The district court entered a purported final judgment on July 30, 2013. The
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on August 12, 2013, which the district court denied.
Appellant timely appealed. On October 28, 2013, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the
district court because the July 2013 order was not a final judgment as defined by I.R.C.P. 54(a).
On October 30, 2013, the Appellant filed a second motion for reconsideration. The district court
entered a proper final judgment on October 31, 2013. On December 18, 2013, the district court
determined it did not have jurisdiction to consider the second motion for reconsideration because
it was filed more than fourteen days after the entry of the July 2013 judgment. The appellant
again appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted the July 2013 judgment was not
a valid final judgment but, instead, was an interlocutory order.

The second motion for

reconsideration was timely because it was filed before or within 14 days of the entry of the actual
final judgment entered in October 2013. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district
court on December 23, 2015.
Of note, on February 12, 2015, the Supreme Court entered an order entitled In Re:
Finality of Judgments Entered Prior to April 15, 2015 (Standing Order). In pertinent part, the
order stated that "any judgment, decree or order entered before April 15, 2015, that was intended
to be final but which did not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) ... shall be
treated as a final judgment."
Wicket neither overrules nor contradicts the Standing Order. The doctrine of the law of

the case provides that upon:
3
000077

an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a
principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes
the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress,
both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal.
Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512,515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000). In Wicke/, the Supreme Court

determined that the initial judgment was not a final judgment almost two years before it issued
the Standing Order. Wicke!, 159 Idaho 537, 363 P.3d at 859. Therefore, under the law of the
case, as of October 2013, when the second motion for reconsideration was filed, the July 2013
order was not a valid final judgment. Even though the opinion on the second Wicke/ appeal was
issued after the Standing Order, the Supreme Court was obligated to follow the law of the case
established in the previous appeal. To allow the parties to relitigate the finality of the initial
purported final judgment would transgress the purpose of the doctrine of the law of the case.
Therefore, we hold that Wicke/ is not controlling precedent in this case and this Court will defer
to the Standing Order as the controlling authority.
Although the final judgment issued in this c_ase did not comply with I.R.C.P. 54(a), it
became a valid final judgment by virtue of the Standing Order.
B.

The Magistrate Presumptively Denied Appellant's Motion by Entering the Final
Judgment
Appellant argues that his motion can be treated as either a motion for reconsideration

under I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) or a motion to alter or amend judgment under I.R.C.P. 59(e).
Appellant further argues that his motion, under either rule, tolled the period for appeal.
Respondent argues Appellant's motion was a motion for reconsideration pursuant to
I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) and cannot toll the period of appeal because it was not timely filed. We
hold that although Appellant's motion was a timely filed motion for reconsideration under
I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B), it was presumptively denied when the magistrate entered the final
judgment. Because the motion for reconsideration was presumptively denied, it did not toll the
time for appeal.
1.

Appellant's motion
I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B)

was

a

motion

for

reconsideration

under

We begin by determining whether Appellant's motion is actually a motion for
reconsideration under I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) or a motion to alter or amend judgment under
I.R.C.P 59(e). A motion for reconsideration allows a party to move a court to reconsider an
interlocutory order. I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). An interlocutory order is an order that is temporary in
4
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nature or does not completely adjudicate the parties' dispute. Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace
& Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 107, 294 P .32 1111, 1119 (2013). When an order granting

summary judgment is filed before a final judgment, the order granting summary judgment is an
interlocutory order. Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903,911,332 P.3d 815, 823 (2014).
Here, Appellant moved the court to reconsider its ruling on Respondent's cross-motion
for summary judgment, not the final judgment. Because Appellant filed the motion prior to entry
of the final judgment and was only challenging the order granting summary judgment, an
interlocutory

order,

Appellant's

motion

is

a

motion

for

reconsideration

under

I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(2)(B), rather than a motion to alter or amend judgment under I.R.C.P. 59(e).
2.

Appellant's motion for reconsideration was timely filed

Having determined that Appellant's motion was a motion for reconsideration under
I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B), we now determine whether Appellant's motion was timely filed. A motion
for reconsideration of any interlocutory order of the trial court may be made at any time before
the entry of final judgment, but not later than fourteen days after the entry of the final judgment.
1.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B). When judgment has been pronounced in open court, requiring a litigant to
wait to seek reconsideration until the court clerk has file-stamped the written order would be
hyper-technical and violate the spirit of the rules of civil procedure. See Willis v. Larsen, 110
Idaho 818, 821, 718 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1986). Therefore, Appellant's motion was timely filed,
even though it was filed prior to entry of the written order.
3.

Appellant's motion for reconsideration was presumptively denied by entry of
the final judgment

A final judgment is "an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject
matter of the controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties. It
must be a separate document that on its face states the relief granted or denied." T.J.T., Inc. v.
Mori, 148 Idaho 825,826,230 P.3d 435,436 (2010). The purpose of a rule requiring that every

judgment be set forth on a separate document is to eliminate confusion about when the clock for
an appeal begins to run. Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 619,
226 P.3d 1263, 1266 (2010). A final judgment that does not dispose of outstanding issues in a
case does not fulfill its purpose. Therefore, where a trial court fails to rule on a motion for
reconsideration filed prior to the entry of a final judgment, we presume the district court denied
the motion when it entered a final judgment. See State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 61,343 P.3d 497,
503 (2015).
5
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In Wolfe, the appellant was convicted of first degree murder in 1982. In 2004, he filed an

Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Id. at 58, 343 P.3d at 500. The
motion was denied as untimely; the appellant filed a timely motion for reconsideration. Id.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, the appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief. Id. Thereafter, the district court ordered that the motion for reconsideration
and the petition for post-conviction relief be decided in one civil case. Id. at 61, 343 P.3d at 503.
The district court subsequently issued its memorandum decision and order advising the parties
that the appellant's claims would be dismissed as untimely but did not separately or explicitly
rule on the motion for reconsideration. Id. at 59,343 P.3d at 501. The district court then entered
its order dismissing the appellant's civil case. Id. Four years later, the appellant moved the
district court for a hearing on his seven-year-old motion for reconsideration. Id. The district
court denied the appellant's motion for a hearing; a timely appeal followed. Id.
The Supreme Court held the district court did not err when it denied the appellant's
motion for a hearing on the motion for reconsideration. Id. at 61, 343 P.3d at 503. The Court
presumed, under the doctrine of the presumption of regularity and validity of judgments, that the
district court considered the appellant's motion for reconsideration when it issued its
memorandum decision and order. Id. The Court further noted, "[W]e have held that where a
district court fails to rule on a motion, we presume the district court denied the motion." Id.
Because the district court did not rule on the appellant's motion for reconsideration, the Supreme
Court presumed the district court denied the motion. Id. at 62, 343 P.3d at 504. The Court noted
that the presumption became a conclusion because the subsequent order dismissed the entire civil
case. Id. The Court then held, because the order dismissed the entire case and the appellant
failed to file a notice of appeal within forty-two days, the district court did not err in denying the
motion for a hearing. Id.
As in Wolfe, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration that was neither explicitly ruled
.on nor mentioned in the final judgment. However, as in Wolfe, we presume the court denied the
motion when it failed to rule on it.

The presumption became a conclusion when the final

judgment was entered. Additionally, presumptively denying outstanding motions by entering
final judgment ensures that a final judgment actually ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject
matter of the controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties, while
simultaneously avoiding confusion about when the time for an appeal begins to run.
6
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As noted above, Appellant's motion for reconsideration failed to comply with several
sections of LR.C.P. 7.

The failure to comply with I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A) and I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l) was

further exacerbated by Appellant's failure to pursue his motion for reconsideration at any time
prior to the filing of the notice of appeal or acknowledge his motion for reconsideration in his
opening appellate brief to the district court. 2 If Appellant was interested in pursuing the motion
for reconsideration, it was incumbent upon Appellant to bring the motion to the attention of the
court. See Wolfe, 158 Idaho at 62 n.3, 343 P.3d at 504 n.3. Because Appellant waited forty-nine
days after the entry of judgment to file his appeal, the appeal is untimely. I.R.C.P. 83(e).
Moreover, fairness and equity do not allow Appellant to destroy the finality of a
judgment by failing to pursue the motion in this case and then claim that failure tolled the time
for appeal. The rules of civil procedure shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. I.R.C.P. l(a). But to allow a
motion that did not comply with I.R.C.P. 7, and which Appellant did not pursue, to toll the
period for appeal does not advance those goals. 3

Instead, it allows a party to attempt to

indefinitely toll the period of appeals and can create confusion about when the time for an appeal
begins to run.
Accordingly, we hold that an outstanding motion for reconsideration is presumptively
denied when a trial court enters a final judgment and thus, does not toll the time for filing an
appeal.
C.

Attorney Fees on Appeal

Appellant seeks an award of costs and attorney fees under Idaho Code §§ 15-8-208 and
12-121.

In addition to those statutes, Respondent seeks costs and attorney fees under

I.C. § 12-123, I.R.C.P. 11, and Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2.

2

Even ifwe did not presume the magistrate denied Appellant's motion for reconsideration,
Appellant abandoned that motion by not pursuing it at any point between the entry of the final
judgment and the filing of the notice of appeal. Appellant had the burden to pursue the motion
for reconsideration in the event the district court failed to rule on it. Because he failed to pursue
the motion, Appellant abandoned the motion. See Wolfe, 158 Idaho at 62 n.3, 343 P.3d at 504
n.3; see also Worthington v. Thomas, 134 Idaho 433, 437, 4 P.3d 545, 549 (2000).
3

In addition to the civil rules mentioned above, Appellant also failed to state that his
motion for reconsideration was based on I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(2)(B). I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l) (a motion shall
state with particularity the ground therefor, including the number of the applicable civil rule).
7
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On appeal, Appellant did not act frivolously. Therefore, neither party is entitled to fees
under LC. §§ 12-121 and 12-123, LR.C.P. 11, or LA.R. 11.2.

Under LC. § 15-8-208, an

appellate court may, in its discretion, award costs or attorney fees to any party. We hold that
neither party is entitled to costs or attorney fees on appeal.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the district court's intermediate appellate decision dismissing
appeal is affirmed.
Chief Judge MELANSON and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR.
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WlLLlAM F. LEE
Attorney at Law
629 E. Main Street
Emmett, ID 83617
ISBN 1509
(208) 365-5367

Attorney for Petitioner Keith C. Lanham

lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIIlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR IBE COUNTY OF GEM

IN THE MATTER OF TIIE ESTATE OF

)

GORDON THOMAS LANHAM

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2013-886
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF
PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
AND FOR DECLARATION OF

JNTESTACY AND OTIIBR RELIEF

)

Deceased.

)

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Petitioner Keith Lanham hereby withdraws his
Petition for Removal of Personal Representative and for Declaration of Intestacy and Other Relief
filed in this matter on the ground and for the reason that said Petitioner no longer
wishes to pursue
..,

said Petition.
Dated this 30th day of March 2014.

Attorney for Petitioner Keith Lanham

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE AND FOR DECLARATION OF INTESTACY AND OTHER RELIEF-I

EXHIBIT 12
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31 st day of March 2014, served a true and correct copy of
this Notice to Nancy Callahan, attorney for said Estate and Judd Lanham, by leaving a copy is said
counsel's basket at the Gem County Clerk's office and to Douglas Fleenor attorney for Thomas
Lanham by facsimile transmission to said counsel's facsimile of record being: 947-5910.

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE AND FOR DECLARATION OF INTESTACY AND OTHER RELIEF-2
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Richard L. Stubbs, ISB No. 3239
Samantha L. Lundberg, ISB No. 9992
CAREY PERKINS LLP
Capitol Park Plaza
300 North 6th Street, Suite 200
P. 0. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and KEITH C.
LANH~M.
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL

vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendant, by and through his counsel of
record, Carey Perkins LLP, and hereby answers the Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows:

First Defense
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1
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•
Second Defense

I.
Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Plaintiffs' Complaint not
herein expressly and specifically admitted.

II.
Admit that Defendant is, and at all relevant times was, an attorney licensed
to practice law in the State of Idaho.
Admit that Defendant had an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff Thomas
Lanham.

Third Defense
Lack of privity between Plaintiff Keith Lanham and Defendant.

Fourth Defense
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel.

Fifth Defense
Plaintiffs' damages, if any, were proximately caused by the negligence,
omissions, actions or comparative fault of other third persons or entities for which this
answering Defendant is not legally responsible and that responsibility should be compared
by Idaho law.

Sixth Defense
Plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages, if any.

Seventh Defense
Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part by the fact that their injuries
and damages, if any, were proximately caused, in whole or in part, by superseding and/or
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intervening acts or omissions of Plaintiffs and/or persons or entities other than the
Defendant, and/or by superseding and/or intervening forces other than those controlled by
Defendant.

Eighth Defense
Plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest as to some or all of their claims.

Ninth Defense
Plaintiffs' clai,ms are barred by the doctrine of prevention.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintiffs take nothing by way of their
Complaint, that their claims against Defendant be dismissed with prejudice, that Defendant
be awarded his attorney fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to all applicable law
and for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and reasonable.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Defendant demands a trial by jury of twelve ( 12) as to all issues.
DATED this 23 rd day of June, 2016.
CAREY PERKINS LLP

BY--,-----------1-t-----Riehard L. Stubbs, 0 the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23 rd day of June, 2016, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL by
delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as
follows:
Allen B. Ellis
Ellis Law, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone (208) 345-7832

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-9564

7 Richard L. Stubbs

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4

000088

-

-

3

NO
FILED
(
:
A.M. _ _ _ _P.M._ _ __

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83 713
208/345-7832 (Tel)
208/345-9564 (Fax)
ISB No. 1626

AUG 3 1 2016
~:r1t,tr~TOfiiHE~ D. RICH Clerk
tit SIANTIAGO BARRIOS
DEPUTY

Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD, as party plaintiff in the stead
of Keith C. Lanham
Plaintiffs,
V.

DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2016-8252
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Come now plaintiffs, through their attorney of record, and move the Court for an order of
partial summary judgment on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that plaintiffs are entitled to prevail on the following issues as a matter of law:
(1)

Proximate causation: That had the underlying notice of appeal In the Matter of the

Estate of Gordon T. Lanham (Gem County Case No. CV 2013-0886) been timely filed, plaintiffs
Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham would have been adjudicated the intestate heirs to the decedent's
real property; and

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT-!
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(2)

Defendant owed a duty of care to Keith Lanham: Notwithstanding the absence of a

conventional attorney/client relationship between defendant and plaintiff Keith Lanham, under the
circumstances defendant Fleenor owed plaintiff Keith, as an intestate heir, a duty of care to file a
timely appeal.
This motion is based upon the memorandum oflaw filed herewith, the declaration of Allen
B. Ellis, the affidavit of Samantha L. Lundberg, and the pleadings and records in this action.
Dated this ~ day of August, 2016.

Al£5f%7

Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this _ _ day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Richard L. Stubbs
Carey Perkins, LLP
P.O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701

_ _ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
_ _ Hand delivery
_ _ Overnight delivery

(~5-8660)

Allen B. Ellis
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTm6fll$JBAH«B D. RICH, Clerk
By SANTIAGO BARRIOS
DEPUTY

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD, as party plaintiff in the stead
of Keith C. Lanham,

1

Plaintiffs,
v.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2016-8252

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Honorable Richard D. Greenwood

Attorney for Plaintiffs

Attorney for Defendant

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
208/345-7832 (Tel)
208/345-9564 (Fax)
ISB No. 1626

RICHARD L. STUBBS
SAMANTHA L. LUNDBERG
CAREY PERKINS, LLP
P.O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
208/345-8600 (Tel)
208/345-8660 (Fax)
ISB Nos. 3239, 9992
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SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Nature of case and grounds for partial summary judgment: In this action for legal
malpractice, the will ofthe decedent Gordon Lanham disinherited his surviving children, the plaintiffs
Thomas and Keith Lanham. In the underlying probate matter, the magistrate erroneously ruled that
the will of Gordon Lanham disposed of the entirety of his assets. In reality, the will failed to devise
the decedent's real property which should have passed to plaintiffs by intestate succession. Plaintiff
Thomas Lanham retained defendant Fleenor to appeal the magistrate decision.

Mr Fleenor

negligently filed an untimely appeal which was ultimately dismissed and which dismissal was
affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals.
By plaintiffs' motion, they seek to dispose of two issues:

(1)

Proximate causation: In the context of proximate causation, plaintiffs seek

a ruling that had the underlying appeal not been dismissed, the plaintiffs would have prevailed. As
such they would be accorded the status of intestate heirs to the undevised real property. Based upon
the unanimous authority cited below, the Court, not the jury, must opine as to the merits of the appeal.
(2)

Duty of care owed to Keith:

Plaintiff Keith Lanham did not have an

attorney/client relationship with defendant Fleenor. That is, it was Thomas Lanham who retained Mr.
Fleenor to pursue the appeal. However, under the criteria set down in Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140
Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), particularly the foreseeability of harm to Keith in the event of an
untimely appeal, defendant Fleenor owed a duty of care to Keith as well as Thomas. Much like a
named beneficiary in a will who takes nothing because of a drafting error, Keith, an intestate heir, was
damaged by the untimely appeal and has standing to allege professional negligence. See Lucas v.

Hamm, infra, p. 16.
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Standard of review: The Court is familiar with the standard of review respecting motions

for summary judgment and it will not be recited here, e.g., Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Hymas, 157
Idaho 632,637,339 P.3d 357 (2014). Suffice it to say that issues identified above are issue oflaw,
and there are no issues of fact to be disposed of in these motion proceedings.
Exhibits:

The referenced exhibits are the exhibits attached to the Lundberg affidavit

(alphabetical) and Ellis declaration (numbered) previously filed.
THE FAILURE TO TIMELY APPEAL THE MAGISTRATE
DECISION PROXIMATELY RESULTED IN PLAINTIFFS
LOSS OF THEIR STATUS AS INTESTATE HEIRS.
Gist of alleged malpractice: The Lanham Will (Exhibit A) which lacked a residuary clause
failed to devise two pieces of real property. 1 Notwithstanding, the magistrate erroneously ruled that
the Will bequeathed the testator's estate in its entirety. Defendant attorney appealed the magistrate
decision but missed the appeal deadline by seven days. As a proximate result, plaintiff Thomas
Lanham was prevented from reversing the magistrate decision by which reversal both plaintiffs would
have acquired the status of intestate heirs to the decedent's real property.
According to the leading treatise on legal malpractice, attorney errors in post-judgment and
appellate matters make up a substantial portion of malpractice suits filed.
Attorneys frequently have been sued concerning posttrial procedures
or appeals. .
. The nature of alleged errors is as varied as the
posttrial procedures available to the client. These include failing to
make posttrial motions; improperly made posttrial motions; advising
against taking an appeal; failing to advise of an appeal; failing to take
preliminary steps necessary to appeal, such as moving for a new trial;

1

As used herein, the rfieaning of the term "residuary clause", is consistent with the definition in
Black's Law Dictionary: "A tJstamentary clause that disposes of any estate property remaining after the
I
satisfaction of specific bequests and devises". Id., Seventh Edition, p. 1311.

l
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failing to file notice of appeal timely; failing to file required records,
transcripts, and factual statements necessary to perfect the appeal; and
negligence in presenting the client's intentions.
Legal Malpractice, 2012 Edition (West), Mallen & Smith, Vol. 4, sec. 33:43, pp. 924,925 (emphasis
added), including seven pages of footnotes with citations.
In Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 83 5 P .2d 1293 ( 1992), the client stated a cause of action
against his attorney for filing an untimely motion for new trial.
Dismissed appeal and proximate causation:

The magistrate's Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law (prepared by the executor's attorney) are Exhibit 5 to the Ellis declaration. The
Court of Appeals recently affirmed the district court's decision, sitting as an appellate court, that
defendant Fleenor had failed to timely file an appeal from the magistrate decision. See In the Matter

of the Estate of Gordon Lanham (Docket No. 43105, 2016 Opinion No. 13A, February 24, 2016).
That is, it is undisputed that defendant Fleenor filed an untimely notice of appeal. See Judgment
(Exhibit 6) and Notice of Appeal (Exhibit 7). By the failed appeal, plaintiffs lost their claim to being
intestate beneficiaries to the real property in the Lanham Estate. See Exhibit 11.
Two major real estate holdings of the decedent are the focus of the herein litigation: (a) a 220
acre ranch in Gem County, and (b) a 47 acre parcel in Valley County ("Big Creek"). The Will does
not purport to devise either piece of real estate.
As to Big Creek, the Will does not devise that property but recites "I want to think about that
47 acres in Big Creek" (Exhibit A, p. 3). As to the 220 acre ranch, the Will is silent. This silence is
due to the fact that the decedent attempted to deed that property to his grandson thirty days before he
died. See Exhibit 1 to Ellis declaration. This so-called deed was never "delivered" in the eyes of the
law because the decedent retained all possessory rights to the ranch including the right of sale and
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retention of the sale proceeds., i.e., the ranch remained in decedent's estate. Garrettv. Garrett, 154
Idaho 788, 791 (2013).
The executor must have recognized that this deed was ineffective to convey the ranch property
because the ranch is included on the executor's inventory. See Exhibit 9.
Because the Will did not devise these two acreages and given the absence of a residuary
clause, these properties should have passed to the plaintiffs by intestate succession, i.e., they are the
sole surviving offspring of the widowed decedent. That is, the magistrate committed error in ruling
that the Will disposed of the entirety of the decedent's estate. See Exhibits 5 and 6 (Findings of
Fact/Conclusion of Law and Judgment). Defendant's untimely appeal allowed the magistrate's error
to go unchallenged.
Idaho law of partial intestacy: In the absence of a specific devise of the property as well as
the absence of a residuary clause, Idaho case law requires that this real property descend according
to intestate succession, i.e., there is a partial intestacy arising from the Lanham Will:
In other words if the will clearly discloses that the testator did not
dispose of all of his property, particularly in the absence of a residuary
clause, then the omitted property must descend according to the laws
of succession.

In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5,383 P.2d 339 (1963).
Defendant Fleenor acknowledged this point oflaw in his unsuccessful motion for summary
judgment: "When a devise fails and the will lacks a residuary clause, the residue passes through
intestate succession. In re Corwin 's Estate

.

."

See Fleenor brief, Exhibit 2, p. 4. The

executor's brief is Exhibit 3 and Fleenor's reconsideration brief is Exhibit 4.
Plaintiffs recognize that the Courts "favor testacy rather than intestacy". In re Corwin 's
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Estate, 86 Idaho at 5. Notwithstanding, a Court may not be allowed to speculate as to testamentary
intent.
However, in order to avoid intestacy, either partial or complete, the
court is not permitted to place on the will any construction not
expressed in it, and which is based upon supposition as to the intention
of the testator in the disposition of his estate.

Id., 86 Idaho at 5.
There is not a hint in the Will as to whom the testator intended as beneficiary as to either Big
Creek or the ranch property. In fact as to Big Creek, he expressed the desire to "think about" it
(Exhibit A, p. 3). A fair inference is that the Will does not reference the ranch because it was
decedent's intention, as borne out later, to dispose of it by an attempted inter-vivos transaction. See
Exhibit 1.
Plaintiffs' entitlement as intestate heirs is not affected by the testamentary language limiting
their bequests to one dollar apiece: A general principle of both American and British jurisprudence
is that a testator can only alter the mandate of the intestacy laws by disposing of the property by will.
That is, decedent's disinheritance of plaintiffs does not impair their status as intestate heirs to the real
property not disposed of by the Will.
. . . Michigan has held that a testator could not limit or eliminate
an heir from receiving that portion of an estate governed by the statute
descent and distribution except by disposing of the property by will.
Southgate v. Karp, 154Mich. 697, 118N.W. 600; Inre McKay Estate,
357 Mich. 447, 98 N.W.2d 604.
In these cases, Michigan followed the general rule in American and
British jurisprudence. Boisseau v. Aldridges, 5 Leigh 222, 32 Va. 222,
27 Am Dec. 590; Coffman v. Coffman, 85 Va. 459, 8 S.E. 672, 2
L.R.A. 848; Todd v. Gentry, 109 Ky. 704, 60 S.W. 639; Pickering v.
Stamford, (1797), 3 Ves. Jun. 492 (30 Eng. Rep. 1121); Johnson v.
Johnson, 4 Beav. 318 (49 Eng. Rep. 361). See also Page on Wills
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(Lifetime ed.), § 939, p. 857; 96 C.J.S. Wills§ 1225, p. 1072; 57 Am.
Jur § 1170.
In the Estate of Brown, 106 N.W.2d 535,537 (Mich. 1960).

Plaintiffs concede that the absence of a residuar:y clause does not, per se, render the Will a
nullity: Plaintiffs do asset that failure of the Will to devise the real properties and the absence of a
residuary clause, require that those properties descend according to the laws of intestate succession,
i.e., to plaintiffs as the surviving issue of the decedent. See Idaho Code§ 15-2-103.
There is a fatal ambiguity in the Will as to what extent the executor was given "donative"
powers: At one point in the Will, the testator recites that the executor may distribute the estate
property as he "sees fit". However, thereafter the testator makes specific bequests of personal
property to certain persons. As to the Big Creek property, he wants to "think about it". Then, the
concluding sentence of the Will constrains the executor to "distribute my property and personal
effects as stated in my Last Will and Testament". Exhibit A, p. 5. See below regarding odd
circumstances of the Will's creation (pp. 10, 11 ).
There are several inconsistencies in the above Will provisions. However, it is clear that the
executor was not given authority to distribute the Big Creek property. And because of his subsequent
attempted conveyance of the ranch property, bequeathing that property was likely not on testator's
radar screen at the time the Will was signed.
In order for a power of appointment to be coherent and enforceable, there must be a clear
definition of what property is subject to the power. Here, given the mishmash of testamentary intent,
i.e., expressed uncertainty (Big Creek), actual devises to named persons, devises as the executor "sees
fit", an ineffective inter-vivos transfer, and post-Will "devises" (Exhibit 9), it cannot be determined

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 9

000099

from the Will what property is actually subject to the so-called power of appointment. As noted in
the California case cited by defendant, the power of appointment, to be effective, must designate
specific assets of the decedent. Estate ofConroy, 67 Cal.App.3d 734, 738, 135 Cal Rptr 807 (App.
1977).
In the event the power of appointment existed, it clearly did not pertain to property that (a) the
testator had not decided about (Big Creek), or (b) property that was not identified in the Will (the
ranch property).
The odd circumstances surrounding the Will's origins: The background of the Will's
authorship lends credence to the assertion that it suffers from at least partial intestacy. This
background also accounts for the various ambiguities noted above. As evinced by the informal syntax
of the Will, it was dictated by the testator, transcribed, and signed with the apparent testamentary
formalities. After execution, the testator made further devises by dictation which were never
incorporated into the Will. See Exhibit 9 to Ellis declaration. This raises the reasonable inference
that the testator did not perceive Exhibit A (the Will) to be his last will and testament.
In Judge McKee's written decision on an attorney fee issue, he made the following
observations about the Will and the adjudicative process with respect thereto (paraphrased from Judge
McKee's Memorandum Decision, Exhibit 8):
(1) The will was prepared from a transcript of an audio recording; it is not clear

whether an attorney was involved;
(2) There is nothing in the record as to the origination, reliability or purpose and
accuracy of the audio recordings;
(3) It is not clear who typed the audio into the format of a will and obtained the
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decedent's signature and whether the decedent knew it was a will;
(4) The burden of proof on the foregoing would be on the executor, Judd;
(5) One would think that custodian of the audio disc would be subject to examination
on foundational issues;
(6) The will was witnessed but the capacity of the witnesses is not clear;
(7) As son of the decedent, plaintiff Thomas would be entitled to preference over
the cousin as personal representative;
Exhibit 8, pp. 12 - 15.
These unanswered questions posed by Judge McKee underscore the fragility of the
magistrate's decision, rendering its affirmance problematic had there been a timely filed notice of
appeal, i.e., there was a sound argument for full intestacy given the slapdash origins and preparation
of the Will.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS ARE VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS THAT
AS TO TIME-BARRED APPEALS THE COURT, NOT THE JURY,
DETERMINES WHETHER THE UNDERLYING APPEAL
WOULD HA VE BEEN SUCCESSFUL.
A key issue in this case is plaintiffs' assertion that a timely appeal would have been successful.
In the language of tort law, resolution of this issue determines whether there is "proximate causation".
For example, an untimely appeal may constitute negligence, but if the appeal lacked merit there is no
completed tort, i.e., no proximate causation. The question presented is whether the merits of the
appeal in this case are to be addressed by the jury with the assistance of experts or by the Court as an
issue of law.
As in many legal malpractice cases, the Court here is presented with a case-within-a-case.
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In the recurring error of a missed statute of limitation, the plaintiff is required to "litigate an action
that was never tried" which "is the accepted and traditional means of resolving issues in the
underlying proceeding . . " Legal Malpractice, Vol. 4, sec. 37:15, pp. 1510, 1511.
However in the instance of a time-barred appeal, the distinction is that, unlike a barred trial
due to the expiration of the limitations period, an appeal presents legal issues, not factual issues,
which legal issues cannot be addressed by the traditional device of a case-within-a-case for jury
consideration. Thus the choice becomes whether ( 1) the Court determines what would have been the
appeal result, or (2) whether such resolution is reached by the jury with the assistance of expert
witnesses.
The overwhelming majority view is that, because an appeal involves issues oflaw, the Court,
not the jury, is tasked with determining the outcome of the appeal. As authors of the leading treatise
on legal malpractice note:
The resolution of a petition or appeal must and can be made by the
trial judge as an issue of law, based on review of the transcript and
record of the underlying action, the argument of counsel, and subject
to the same rules of review as should have been applied to the motion
or appeal. This does not usurp the entitlement to a jury because the
issue is one of law.
Legal Malpractice, 2012 Edition, Vol 4, sec. 33.43, p. 942.
The above quote is footnoted with multiple case authority from twenty-eight jurisdictions,
including California, Oregon, and Washington. As the Michigan Supreme Court held:
In summary, we hold that the question whether a court or a jury should
determine whether the underlying appeal would have been successful
is reserved to the court because whether an appeal would have been
successful intrinsically involves issues of law within the exclusive
province of the judiciary.
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Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko, 513 N.W.2d 773, 786 (Mich. 1994).

And the Washington Supreme Court:
In cases involving an attorney's alleged failure to perfect an appeal,
however, the burden of proving causation takes on a different light.
The cause in fact inquiry becomes whether the frustrated client would
have been successful if the attorney had timely filed the appeal.
Specifically, the client must show that an appellate court would have
( 1) granted review, and (2) rendered a judgment more favorable to the
client. Not surprisingly, numerous other courts confronted with
making this causation determination have not delegated it to the jury.
Rather, they have consistently recognized that these latter two
determinations are within the exclusive province of the court, not the
jury to decide [cases cited].
Daugert v. Pappas, 704 P.2d 600,603 (Wash. 1985)

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED, DEFENDANT
FLEENOR OWED A DUTY OF CARE, NOT ONLY TO HIS CLIENT
THOMAS LANAHAM, BUT TO THOMAS' FELLOW INTESTATE
BENEFICIARY, KEITH LANHAM, A NON-CLIENT.
Erosion of privity as an absolute condition to tort liability: From the early twentieth century
through the present time, the national judiciary has expanded the field of potential tort victims. From
manufacturers (McPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) to public weighers
(Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922), liability has been expanded, compensating those

persons injured by, but not party to, the original commercial transaction. A similar development in
the professional liability context did not occur until the mid-twentieth century, i.e., Biakanja v. Irving,
320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R. 2d 1358 (Cal. 1958) (notarial malpractice); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685
(Cal. 1961) (legal malpractice). The majority rule now is that, under the proper circumstances, an
attorney may owe a duty of care to a non-client:
As noted by the leading treatise on legal malpractice:
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The modem trend in the United States is to recognize the existence of
a duty beyond the confines of those in privity to the attorney-client
contract. Whatever the legal theory, however, there must be a duty of
care owed by the attorney to the plaintiff. The issue of duty usually
presents a question of law for the court. . . . A duty exists under
two principal theories. The first approach is a multi-criteria balancing
test, which originated in California. Another approach is the concept
of a third-party beneficiary contract.
Legal Malpractice, 2012 Edition (West), Mallen & Smith, Vol I, sec. 7.8, p. 781.
Idaho has adopted the multi-criteria balancing test. See Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho
134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), citing both Biakanja and Lucas v. Hamm. The test for liability to a nonclient focuses on, among other factors, foreseeability of harm to the non-client, proximate causation,
and the certainty that a legal injury was inflicted. In Harrigfeld, the plaintiff, omitted from the will
as a beneficiary, alleged that the drafting attorney's negligence resulted in this omission. The Court
rejected this assertion, ruling that the plaintiff failed to meet the Biakanja/Lucas criteria: "The
attorney has no duty to insure that persons who would normally be the objects of the testator's
affection are included as beneficiaries in the testamentary instruments." Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at
138.
Conduct to which the Harrigfeld criteria are to be applied: Plaintiff Thomas Lanham
("Thomas") retained defendant Fleenor to contest the attempted probate of the testator's will as
pertaining to the entirety of the testator's estate. In the course of this representation, defendant
Fleenor was tasked with the assignment of filing a timely notice of appeal to challenge the
magistrate's conclusion that the Will disposed of the entire Lanham estate. The successful outcome
of this appeal would be the descendance of the ranch and Big Creek to Thomas and Keith Lanham
by intestacy. That the challenge was made by his client Thomas, and not Keith, did not obscure the
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obvious fact that a finding of intestacy would inure to both their respective benefits in equal amounts.
Application of the Harrigfeld criteria to defendant's untimely appeal (Id. 140 Idaho at 138):
Criterion

As applied

Forseeability of defendant's negligence
harming Keith

Keith had exposure equal to Thomas, i.e.,
untimely appeal would create financial loss
for Keith

Degree of certainty that Keith suffered
financial injury.

Absolute certainty

Connection between missing appeal
deadline and Keith's financial loss.

Undisputed proximate causation

Policy of preventing future harm

Increased sensitivity to non-clients

Moral blame for missed appeal deadline

Marginal (criterion unclear)

Extent of burden to profession by
imposing liability for Keith's loss.

Burden of making a timely appeal not
enhanced by liability to Keith

Availability of insurance for the risk

Insurance available

The major criteria noted in Harrigfeld, i.e., foreseeability, proximate causation, and certainty
of loss, clearly point to the conclusion that defendant Fleenor owed a duty of care to Keith Lanham.
The lesser criteria of (a) burden on the profession, (b) policy of preventing future harm, and (c)
insurance availability also favor acknowledging a duty to Keith, the non-client.

The only

imponderable is the question of"moral blame". Notably, in Lucas v. Hamm, the Court deleted this
criterion without explanation. Id, 56 Cal. 2nd at 588, 589, but the Harrigfeld decision equated
negligence to "moral blame", i.e. "sufficient moral blame attached to the negligent preparation or
execution of testamentary instruments to impose liability". Id 140 Idaho at 138.
The Lucas parallel: In Lucas, the testator directed his attorney to prepare a will which
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included gifts to several beneficiaries. Through a drafting error, the gifts were disallowed as
constituting an illegal restraint on alienation. Opined Chief Justice Gibson in Lucas: " . . [O]ne
of the main purposes which the transaction between defendant and testator intended to accomplish
was to provide for the transfer of property to plaintiffs; the damage to the plaintiffs [non-clients] in
the event of invalidity of the bequest was clearly foreseeable". Id, 56 Cal 2nd at 589 (bracketed
material explanatory).
Likewise here: the damage to Keith Lanham in the event of an untimely appeal was clearly
foreseeable, i.e., arising out of his entitlement under the law of intestacy (just as the Lucas plaintiffs
had entitlement by the testator's bequest). At the time defendant Fleenor faced the challenge of filing
a timely appeal, it was foreseeable that failure to do so would deprive Keith, as well as his client
Thomas, of their rightful status as intestate heirs. Unlike the plaintiff in Harrigfeld, plaintiff Keith
Lanham is not imposing upon attorney Fleenor the duty of speculating as to appropriate testamentary
beneficiaries.
No conflict of interest: Had Mr. Fleenor actually represented both Thomas and Keith in
opposing full testacy, such representation would not constitute a conflict of interest. That is, during
the course of such litigation, the interests of the brothers Lanham were co-extensive, i.e., either they
would be held to be intestate heirs (sharing equally) or, alternatively, disinherited offspring. Mr.
Fleenor would have had no power to manipulate a result which favored one client over the other.
Likewise, had the litigation been fully prosecuted as was attempted with Thomas the sole
client, a favorable appeal result would effect Thomas and Keith equally, i.e., intestate heirs sharing
equally, notwithstanding Keith's status as a non-client.
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CONCLUSION
Proximate causation: From one standpoint, this action is a relatively straight-forward case of
professional negligence, i.e., failure to file a timely notice of appeal. However, imbedded in the
negligence analysis is the question whether a timely appeal would have reversed the magistrate
decision. The law is clear that, for two reasons, a timely appeal would have reversed the magistrate
and the real property would have passed to the plaintiffs by intestate succession: (1) the Will did not
devise the real property; and (2) there was no residuary clause i.e., "a testamentary clause that
disposes of any estate property remaining after the satisfaction of specific bequests and devises". See
footnote 1.
By virtually unanimous authority, the Court, not the jury, is to make the determination as to
the appellate outcome, had there been a timely appeal. Idaho common law makes it clear that, in the
absence of a residuary clause, undevised property must pass according to the law of intestate
succession. In short, the magistrate's ruling that the Will devised the entirety of the decedent's estate
is in error and would have been vacated on appeal.
Duty owed to plaintiff Keith Lanham: Under the criteria enunciated in Harrigfeld, defendant
Fleenor owed Keith a duty of care. Like Mr. Fleenor' s client Thomas, Keith Lanham was a potential
intestate heir, and defendant Fleenor owed him the same duty of care as was owed to Thomas. That
is, it was reasonably foreseeable that a missed appeal deadline would impact Thomas and Keith in
identical fashion.
DATED This __3_L day of August, 2016.

Allen B. Ellis
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this~ day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Richard L. Stubbs
Samantha L. Lundberg
Carey Perkins, LLP
300 N. 6th Street, Ste. 200.
Boise, Idaho 83 702

_ _ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
.. X RaHd delhr.efj'"' A{;
_ _ Overnight delivery
Facsimile (345-8660)
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Richard L. Stubbs, ISB No. 3239
Samantha L. Lundberg, ISB No. 9992
CAREY PERKINS LLP
Capitol Park Plaza
300 North 6th Street, Suite 200
P. O. Box 519
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendant Douglas Fleenor, by and through
his attorney of record, Carey Perkins, LLP, and moves this Court, pursuant to Rule 56 of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for entry of summary judgment in favor of said
Defendant on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
Defendant Douglas Fleenor is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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This Motion is supported by the documents and pleadings on file with the
Court, the Affidavit of Counsel in support of Motion to Dismiss dated may 6, 2016; and
upon Defendant’s Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this 7th day of September, 2016.
CAREY PERKINS LLP

By

/s/ Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant

CAREY PERKINS LLP

By

/s/ Samantha L. Lundberg
Samantha L. Lundberg, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
7th day of September, 2016, I
electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICourt/EFiling system which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the ICourt/E-Filing Registered
Participants as follows:
Allen B. Ellis
Ellis Law, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone (208) 345-7832

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-9564
ICourt/E-Filing

/s/ Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
000110

Electronically Filed
9/7/2016 4:21:53 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Elyshia Holmes, Deputy Clerk

Richard L. Stubbs, ISB No. 3239
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

I.
INTRODUCTION
This is a legal malpractice action brought by Thomas Lanham and the
bankruptcy trustee, standing in the shoes of Keith Lanham, against attorney Douglas
Fleenor. Douglas Fleenor represented Thomas Lanham in an action challenging his father
Gordon Lanham’s will. Plaintiffs allege Douglas Fleenor committed malpractice when he
did not file a timely appeal in the prior lawsuit challenging the validity of the will.
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This case comes before the Court on Douglas Fleenor’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. This Memorandum will show that the Magistrate Court’s finding the Gordon
Lanham’s will was valid under Idaho law was based on substantial and competent
evidence in the record. As a result, the Appellate Court would not have disturbed the
decision on appeal. The Appellate Court also would have affirmed because the Magistrate
Court correctly found Gordon Lanham’s will to be valid. Additionally, Keith Lanham’s
claims are barred because Douglas Fleenor did not have an attorney-client relationship
with Keith Lanham and did not owe him a duty of care. Keith Lanham also waived his claim
when he stated that he believed his father’s wishes in his will should be honored. Keith
Lanham also is bound by his judicial admission. Accordingly, Douglas Fleenor requests
the Court grant his motion for summary judgment.
II.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are material to the Motion for Summary Judgment and are
undisputed.
1.

Thomas Lanham retained Attorney Douglas Fleenor to bring an action

to invalidate the will of the Lanhams’ father, Gordon Lanham. Complaint, Par. I.
2.

The will sought to disinherit Thomas and Keith Lanham. Complaint,

3.

An attorney-client relationship existed between Thomas Lanham and

Par. I.

Douglas Fleenor with respect to the action to invalidate the will. Complaint, Par. II.
4.

Keith Lanham was not a client of Douglas Fleenor, Complaint, Par. III,

and was represented by his own attorney. See In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon

DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - 2
000112

Thomas Lanham, Gem County District Court CV2013-886, Keith Lanham’s Petition to
Remove Personal Representative dated January 13, 2014, filed by Attorney William F.
Lee. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit B.
5.

Keith Lanham also provided an affidavit in which he stated, “I believe

and accept that my father made the specific gifts to my brother, Thomas Everett, and me
as set forth in his Will for his own personal reasons and his wishes should be honored.”
Affidavit of Keith Lanham dated May 23, 2014, In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon
Thomas Lanham, supra. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May
6, 2016, Exhibit C.
6.

Gordon Lanham’s estate was distributed according to the will, rather

than intestate succession. Complaint, Par. VIII.
7.

The will that is the subject of the Lanhams’ Complaint is the Last Will

and Testament of Gordon Lanham (“Lanham Will”). Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
8.

The Lanham Will was signed by Gordon Lanham on February 19,

2011. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
9.

Two witnesses to Gordon Lanham’s signing or acknowledging of the

Lanham Will, signed the Lanham Will stating that Gordon Lanham signed or acknowledged
the will in their presence, and that he appeared to be of sound mind and under no duress,
fraud, or undue influence. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May
6, 2016, Exhibit A.
10.

An Idaho Notary Public notarized Gordon Lanham’s signature of the
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Lanham Will, stating that Gordon Lanham personally appeared before her, acknowledged
to her that he signed the Lanham Will. The Notary Public also declared under penalty of
perjury that Gordon Lanham appeared to be of sound mind and under no duress, fraud or
undue influence. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016,
Exhibit A.
11.

In the Lanham Will, Gordon Lanham acknowledges specific property

he owns and his relationship with his potential heirs. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
12.

In the Lanham Will, Gordon Lanham recognized Thomas and Keith

Lanham as his sons, and left them each one dollar. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
13.

In the Lanham Will, Gordon Lanham stated that Thomas Lanham

“has already ben given all he needs to have.” Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to
Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
14.

In the Lanham Will, Gordon Lanham stated that he was not giving

Keith Lanham more money than one dollar because he did not want Keith Lanham “to be
able to sell and profit off of his alcoholism...” Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to
Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
15.

The Lanham Will named Judd Lanham as the executor of the

Lanham Will and gave Judd Lanham power of attorney over Gordon Lanham’s property
and personal effects. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6,
2016, Exhibit A.
16.

The Lanham Will discussed specific furniture and antiques owned by
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Lanham family members, and stated that the family members would be left with that
property and would be able to disperse of it however they saw fit. Affidavit of Counsel in
Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
17.

The Lanham Will specifically gave a wooden bed to Keith Lanham

and another to Thomas Lanham. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss
dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
18.

The Lanham Will discussed in detail the guns Gordon Lanham

owned, and stated that they could be sold off to pay part of the mortgage. Affidavit of
Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
19.

The Magistrate Court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

on Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on June 25, 2014. Declaration of
Allen Ellis dated June 13, 2016, Exhibit 5.
20.

The Magistrate Court found: “The Court finds no reason to doubt the

validity of the will. From the affidavits and especially the audio recordings, it is clear that
decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the time
of (sic) he executed the will. He demonstrated a thorough grasp of his potential heirs, and
his relationships with them and sound reasons for treating each as he did. There is no
evidence suggesting that anyone exercised undue influence or coercion over decedent.
In fact, in spite of decent’s failing health and physical maladies, it appears he was a strong
willed and independent thinker at the time he executed his will.” Declaration of Allen Ellis
dated June 13, 2016, Exhibit 5.
21.

The Magistrate Court also found: “Claimant Thomas Everett Lanham
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advanced several claims, but he failed to support his claims and arguments with one iota
of credible, admissible evidence. Based upon the language of the will itself, the affidavits,
the audio recordings and the entire record, the court finds in favor of the Personal
Representative on every factual dispute.” Declaration of Allen Ellis dated June 13, 2016,
Exhibit 5.
22.

The Magistrate Court then held: “The will of decedent Gordon

Thomas Lanham is legal, valid, and binding. Decedent’s intent is sufficiently clear from the
language of the will, particularly as bolstered and explained by contemporary audio
recordings and the affidavits submitted, to allow administration and, if necessary, judicial
enforcement. As to the Claimant, Thomas Everett Lanham, decedent’s intent is very clearly
that claimant take by the will only one dollar ($1.00) and a bed and there is no lawful
reason to frustrate decedent’s intent. There are no issues of material fact remaining to be
determined by the Court and the Personal Representative is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law and the Court therefore GRANTS the Personal Representative’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment.” Declaration of Allen Ellis dated June 13, 2016, Exhibit 5.
23.

Douglas Fleenor filed a Notice of Appeal on August 13, 2014.

Complaint, Par. VII.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment
is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, and the admissions on file together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Here, Plaintiffs have moved for partial
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summary judgment. Where the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment
relying on the same facts, issues and theories, the parties effectively stipulate that there
is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the district court from granting
summary judgment. Intermountain Forest Management v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136
Idaho 233, 31 P.3d 921 (2001).
IV.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE MAGISTRATE COURT’S FINDINGS
OF FACT
The Lanhams’ malpractice claim against Douglas Fleenor alleges that he did
not timely file an appeal, and if he had timely filed an appeal, the Appellate Court would
have found that the Magistrate Judge improperly granted the Personal Representative’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
A court’s findings on cross motions for summary judgment will not be
disturbed on appeal so long as the record is sufficient to support the findings. Riverside
Development Co., v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 522, 650 P.2d 657, 664 (1982); Cougar
Bay Co., Inc. v. Bristol, 100 Idaho 380, 383, 597 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1979) (in reviewing
the sufficiency of the record to sustain a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the Court limits the review to whether there is substantial, competent, although conflicting
evidence, in the record to support the findings).
The Magistrate Court based its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
the language of the Lanham Will itself, the affidavits, the audio recordings and the entire
record. The Court held there was no reason to doubt the validity of the Lanham Will, stating
“from the affidavits and especially the audio recordings, it is clear that decedent Gordon
Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the time of (sic) he
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executed the will. He demonstrated a thorough grasp of his potential heirs, and his
relationships with them and sound reasons for treating each as he did. There is no
evidence suggesting that anyone exercised undue influence or coercion over decedent.
In fact, in spite of decedent’s failing health and physical maladies, it appears he was a
strong willed and independent thinker at the time he executed his will.” The Court further
stated that Claimant Thomas Everett Lanham advanced several claims, but he failed to
support his claims and arguments with one iota of credible, admissible evidence. Based
on these findings, the Magistrate Court granted the Personal Representative’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.
The Magistrate Court’s findings concerning the Lanham Will based on
substantial and competent evidence in the record. As a result, even if the appeal of the
Magistrate Court’s decision was timely filed, the Appellate Court’s review would have been
limited to determining whether the Magistrate Court’s findings were supported by evidence
in the record. The Lanhams have failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate the
Magistrate Court’s decision was not based on substantial and competent evidence.
Further, while Thomas Lanham previously failed to support his claims with “one iota of
credible, admissible evidence,” even if there had been conflicting evidence, the Appellate
Court would still refrain from disturbing the Magistrate Court’s ruling so long as there was
evidence in the record to support its findings.
V.
THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S CONCLUSION THAT THE LANHAM WILL WAS VALID
WAS NOT IN ERROR
The Lanhams’ malpractice claim alleges they sustained damages as a result
of Gordon Lanham’s estate being distributed pursuant to the Lanham Will. The elements
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of a legal malpractice claim are : (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the
existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the failure to perform that duty; and (4) the
failure to perform that duty must be a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the client.
Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269, 923 P.2d 976 (1996); Soignier v. Fletcher, 151
Idaho 322, 324, 256 P.3d 730, 732 (2011) (citing Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 706,
652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982)). However, as the Magistrate Court correctly found, the Lanham
Will was valid under Idaho law. Even assuming for the sake of argument Douglas Fleenor
failure to perform a duty, the alleged breach of that duty did not cause harm to the
Lanhams because the Appellate Court would have sustained the Magistrate Court’s correct
decision.
i.

Gordon Lanham Executed a Valid Will

In 1971 the Idaho Legislature extensively revised Idaho’s statutes relating to
descent and distribution on death. Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 747
P.2d 18 (1987). For the most part, the prior statutes were repealed in total and replaced
by provisions of the Uniform Probate Code ( “UPC”). Id. The Idaho Legislature specifically
stated the two purposes of the adoption of the UPC were to “simplify and clarify the law
concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors and
incapacitated persons,” and “to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in
distribution of property.” Idaho Code §§15-1-102(b)(1) and (2). The provisions of the
Uniform Probate Code are to be “liberally construed and applied...” In Re Estate of
Kunzler, 108 Idaho 374, 377, 699 P.2d 374, 1391 (1995).
The Legislature defined a will as “a testamentary instrument and includes
codicil and any testamentary instrument which merely appoints an executor or revokes or
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revises another will.” Idaho Code §15-1-201(56). The test of the testamentary character
of an instrument “is not the testator’s realization that it is a will, but his intention to create
a revocable disposition of his property, to accrue and take effect only upon his death, and
passing no present interest.” In re Estate of Webber, 97 Idaho 703, 707, 551 P.2d 1339,
1343 (1976) (quoting Estate of Hengy, 53 Idaho, 515, 519, 26 P.2d 178, 179 (1933))
(greeting card did not qualify as holographic will because testator did not write card with
testamentary intent).
Any “emancipated minor or any person eighteen (18) or more years of age
who is of sound mind may make a will.” Idaho Code §15-2-501. The Comment to the
Official Text states:
Part 5 of Article II (Chapter 2) deals with capacity and
formalities for execution and revocation of wills. If the will is to
be restored to its role as the major instrument for disposition of
wealth at death, its execution must be kept simple. The basic
intent of these sections is to validate the will whenever
possible. To this end, the age for making wills is lowered to
eighteen, formalities for a written and attested will are kept to
a minimum, holographic wills, written and signed by the
testator are authorized, choice of law as to validity of execution
is broadened, and revocation by operation of law is limited to
divorce or annulment. However, the statute also provides a
more formal method of execution with acknowledgment before
a public officer.
Comment to Official Text, General Comment to Idaho Code §§15-2-501 to 15-2-513
(emphasis added). The execution of wills is governed by Idaho Code §15-2-502:
Except as provided for holographic wills, writings within section
15-2-513 of this part, and wills within section 15-2-506 of this
part, or except as provided in sections 51-109, 55-712A, or 55712B, Idaho Code, every will shall be in writing signed by the
testator or in the testator’s name by some other person in the
testator’s presence and by his direction, and shall be signed by
at least two (2) persons each of whom witnessed either the
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signing or the testator’s acknowledgment of the signature or
the will.
The Comment to the Official Text states:
The formalities for execution of a witnessed will have been
reduced to a minimum. Execution under this section
normally would be accomplished by signature of the
testator and of two witnesses; each of the persons signing
as witnesses must “witness” any of the following: the signing
of the will by the testator, an acknowledgment by the testator
that the signature is his, or an acknowledgment by the testator
that the document is his will. Signing by the testator may be by
mark under general rules relating to what constitutes a
signature; or the will may be signed on behalf of the testator by
another person signing the testator’s name at this direction and
in his presence. There is no requirement that the testator
publish the document as his will, or that he request the
witnesses to sign, or that the witnesses sign in the presence of
the testator or of each other. The testator may sign the will
outside the presence of the witnesses if he later acknowledges
to the witnesses that the signature is his or that the document
is his will, and they sign as witnesses. There is no requirement
that the testator’s signature be at the end of the will; thus, if he
writes his name in the body of the will and intends it to be his
signature, this would satisfy the statute. The intent is to
validate wills which meet the minimal formalities of the
statute. A will which does not meet these requirements may
be valid under Section 2-503 as a holograph.
Comment to Official Text, Idaho Code §15-2-502(emphasis added); see In re Estate of
McGurrin, 113 Idaho 341, 743 P.2d 994 (Ct.App. 1987)(discussing legislative history of
Idaho Code §15-2-502).
Idaho Code §15-2-603 addresses rules of construction and intention:
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the
legal effect of his dispositions. The rules of construction
expressed in the succeeding sections of this Part apply unless
a contrary intention is indicated by the will.
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Construing §15-2-603, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, “The language of the will is to be
given its ordinary and well understood meaning.” Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 32, 665
P.2d 1041, 1042 (1983)(affirming magistrate’s construction of will). “If the testator’s intent
can be determined from the face of his will, that intent, unless it is in contravention of some
established rule of law or public policy, must be given effect.” Id. at 34, 665 P.2d at 1044.
In construing the provisions of a will to ascertain the meaning of a testator, the cardinal rule
of construction is to ascertain the testator’s intent, and “this intent is to be ascertained from
a full view of the everything within the four corners of the instrument.” Wilkins v. Wilkins,
137 Idaho 315, 320, 48 P.3d 644, 649 (2002)(affirming magistrate’s construction of will).
The Lanham Will satisfies all requirements under Idaho law. The Lanham Will
is a testamentary instrument. The Lanham Will is entitled “Last Will and Testament.” In
the Lanham Will Gordon Lanham referred to giving “executor” Judd Max Lanham “a Power
of Attorney for full control now and even after I am dead.” Gordon Lanham stated, “I want
him to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects as stated in my Last Will
and Testament.” These statements show Gordon Lanham’s intention to create a revocable
distribution of his property, to accrue and take effect only on his death, and to pass no
present interest.
Compare the Lanham will to the greeting card in In re Estate of Webber,
supra. In the greeting card, Arthur Webber addressed the card to Jessie Nail, and wrote
on the back of the card, “Aug. 1, 1969 I bid this world goodbye I leave this land to you,” and
signed his name. Extrinsic evidence was admitted at trial that was conflicting as to Mr.
Webber’s intent. Mr. Webber’s widow and an attorney both testified that while conferring
with the attorney on other legal matters, Mr. Webber asked about a will and intestate
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succession and after the attorney explained the law of intestate succession to Mr. Webber,
Mr. Webber replied to the effect that he did not think that he needed a will. Testimony was
adduced that on several occasions Mr. Webber stated that he did not have a will and that
he intended that the farm be given to his wife upon his death, apparently under the laws
of intestate succession. The trial court resolved the conflicting evidence in favor of Mrs.
Webber. The Idaho Supreme Court held that in light of the evidence presented, the finding
by the trial court that Arthur Webber did not execute the greeting card alleged to be his will
with testamentary intent must be affirmed. Id. at 707, 551 P.2d at 1343.
In contrast, the Lanham Will is entitled Last Will and Testament. Gordon
Lanham discusses at length the fact that he intends to create a distribution of his estate
upon his death. The Lanham Will discusses Gordon Lanham’s property in detail. Gordon
Lanham ends the Lanham Will by stating that he wants Judd Lanham, his executor, to
have power of attorney for full control to distribute the property after his death. Unlike the
greeting card, Gordon Lanham makes his testamentary intent clear. See In re Estate of
Webber, 97 Idaho 703, 551 P.2d 1339 (1976).
The Lanham Will satisfies the requirements of Idaho Code §15-2-502 that
it be a writing signed by the testator and that it be signed by at least two other persons
each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator’s acknowledgment of the
signature of the will. The Lanham Will is in writing. Each witness stated that Gordon
Lanham appeared to be of sound mind and under no duress, fraud or undue influence.
Gordon Lanham’s signature of the Lanham Will is notarized by an Idaho notary public. The
notary states that Gordon Lanham acknowledged to her that he executed the Lanham Will.
The notary further stated under penalty of perjury that Gordon Lanham appeared to be of
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sound mind and under no undue influence.
These elements are sufficient to satisfy the Idaho Probate Code’s minimal
requirements for a will. The Lanham Will satisfies the “minimal formalities of the statute.”
Under these circumstances, the Lanham Will must be validated “whenever possible.”
Gordon Lanham’s intention as expressed in the Lanham Will “controls the legal effect of
his dispositions.”

Gordon Lanham’s intent, unless it is in contravention of some

established rule of law or public policy, must be given effect.
There is no Idaho law or public policy prohibiting a person from choosing not
to distribute property to his adult children. “Courts favor testacy rather than intestacy.” In
re Estate of Corwin, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 P.2d 339, 343 (1963)(reversing district court’s
judgment and ordering that distribution occur as provided for in will). Gordon Lanham was
not required to, but listed reasons for not distributing property to Thomas and Keith
Lanham. In the case of Thomas Lanham, Gordon Lanham stated in the Lanham Will that
he felt Thomas Lanham “has already been given all he needs to have and that I am going
to leave $1 more dollar against whatever is legal to him and then he is going to be on his
own.” Gordon Lanham stated in the Lanham Will that as to Keith Lanham and his spouse,
“what I leave them is going to be $1 because in my estate I don’t want him to be able to
sell and profit off of his alcoholism or drugs ever since his car wreck he has been on pain
pills and ever since his son rode in the rodeos and got himself into a domestic violence
case and went to prison, now his father is the same way.” This was a sound choice by
Gordon Lanham that he was legally entitled to make. Gordon Lanham rationally chose not
to leave the vast majority of his estate to Thomas or Keith Lanham. Thomas and Keith
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Lanham are not pretermitted children. See, Idaho Code §15-2-302. The Court could not
overturn what Gordon Lanham decided to do in his valid Last Will and Testament.
A.

There is no requirement a will contain “dispositive provisions”

The Lanhams allege in their Complaint that the Lanham Will was defective
“in several respects,” including “failing to set forth dispositive provisions.” It is assumed
that in making this allegation, the Lanhams intend to allege that the Lanham Will did not
contain provisions disposing of Gordon Lanham’s property. However, the Lanham Will did
in fact dispose of Gordon Lanham’s property. Gordon Lanham gave his executor power
of attorney and stated that the executor should distribute Gordon Lanham’s property and
personal effects as stated in the Lanham Will. The Idaho Probate Code permits a testator
to do this. Idaho Code §15-2-610 discusses the exercise of a power of appointment by the
testator. The Comment to the Official Text of §15-2-610 states in relevant part:
Under this section and Section 2-603 the intent to exercise the
power is effective if it is “indicated by the will.” This wording
permits a Court to find the manifest intent if the language of
the will interpreted in light of all the surrounding circumstances
shows that the donee intended an exercise, except, of course,
if the donor has conditioned exercise on an express reference
to the original creating instrument. In other words, the
modern liberal rule on interpretation of the donee’s will
would be available.
(Emphasis added). See Conoway v. Fulmer, 54 So.624, 625 (Ala. 1911)(“The will is but
the expression of the desire of and direction by the testator as to what shall be done with
the property left by him, and if he does not desire to make any disposition save such as the
law provides, but does desire to name the one who shall administer upon his effects, he
has the right to do so.”), cited on other grounds, In re Heazle’s Estate, 72 Idaho 307, 240
P.2d 821(1952) (reversing lower court with directions to receive additional evidence as to
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testator’s competence). Here, Gordon Lanham expressly stated in his will that he intended
his executor to make distributions in accordance with his statements in the Lanham Will.
Gordon Lanham made it plain that he did not want the vast majority of distributions going
to Thomas and Keith Lanham. The Court was required by the modern liberal rule to
interpret the will in a way that honored Gordon Lanham’s intent.
Additionally, Gordon Lanham made statements in the Lanham Will directing
how property should be disposed. The Lanham Will described furniture that was to go to
Linda Louise Andrews Lanham. Thomas and Keith Lanham were each given a bed.
B.

There is no requirement a will contain a residuary clause

The Lanhams allege that the Lanham Will is invalid because it does not
contain a residuary clause. Idaho law does not require a will to have a residuary clause.
The Idaho Court of Appeals considered a holographic will in In re Estate of Bradley, 107
Idaho 860, 693 P.2d 1062 (Ct.App. 1984)(deletion of residuary clause did not invalidate
will). The testatrix prepared a holographic will. She subsequently made changes to the
will be deleting certain provisions, including a residuary clause. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the deletion of the residuary clause did not demonstrate an intent by the
testatrix to cancel specific devises which she had made and which she did not delete. The
Court of Appeals noted that Idaho Code §15-2-603 requires that “[t]he intention of a
testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions.” The Court
therefore was required to determine the validity of the will “’as we find it…giving due effect
to all cancellations and additions.’” Id., 107 Idaho at 862, 693 P.2d at 1064 (quoting, In the
Matter of the Estate of Fisher, 47 Idaho 668, 672, 279 P.2d 291, 292 (1929)). In fact,
because she deleted certain provisions and left others as she drafted them, her intent was
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clear that by deleting the residuary clause, she did not intend to cancel the will in its
entirety.
If the deletion of the residuary clause did not invalidate the holographic will
in In re Estate of Bradley, then the absence of a residuary clause in the first place does
not invalidate the Lanham Will.
C.

There is no restriction on bestowing donative powers on the
personal representative

As discussed above, Idaho Code §15-2-610 allows a testator to designate
the personal representative to have the power to dispose of property under the will. Until
termination of his appointment a personal representative has the same power over the title
to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust, however for the
benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate. Idaho Code §15-3-711; see
also Estate of Conroy, 136 Cal.Rptr. 807, 809 (Cal.Ct.App. 1977)(A “power of
appointment” is defined generally as a power or authority conferred by one person by deed
or will upon another to appoint the person or persons who are to receive and enjoy an
estate or an income therefrom after the testator’s death).
Here, Gordon Lanham had the power as testator to empower the personal
representative to distribute his estate. The Lanham Will in fact discusses generally how
Gordon Lanham wanted property distributed, and the fact that he did not want the bulk of
the property distributed to Thomas and Keith Lanham. The fact that Gordon Lanham
chose to do this does not invalidate the Lanham Will.
ii.

Summary

Although the Lanhams claim that the Lanham Will is defective, in reality the
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underlying Court properly decided that the Lanham Will is a “legal, valid and binding” will.
In doing so, the Court was favoring testacy over intestacy, validating the will whenever
possible. The Lanham Will satisfied “the minimal formalities” of the Idaho Probate Code.
Under the circumstances, the Court was constrained to interpret the Lanham Will so as to
ascertain and fulfill Gordon Lanham’s intent. Gordon Lanham’s intent was to not give the
bulk of his estate to Thomas and Keith Lanham.

VI.
DOUGLAS FLEENOR IS NOT LIABLE TO KEITH LANHAM BECAUSE MR.
FLEENOR DID NOT OWE HIM A DUTY AND BECAUSE KEITH LANHAM WAIVED
HIS CLAIM
The Trustee contends that although Keith Lanham did not have an attorneyclient relationship with Douglas Fleenor, Douglas Fleenor still owed him a duty. This is
contrary to Idaho law. As a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only
to his or her client and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorneyclient relationship. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323, 336 P.3d 256(2014)(attorney providing
opinion letter to stockholder which specifically stated that the stockholder could rely on the
opinions in the letter had voluntarily assumed duty to stockholder and was subject to
potential liability for legal malpractice). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized only
narrow exceptions to the general rule. In Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d
884 (2004)(intended beneficiary of will could sue attorney who drafted will for malpractice),
the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed whether an attorney drafting a will should potentially
be held liable to a beneficiary of the will. In deciding whether to recognize a duty, the
Court engaged in a “balance-of-the-harms” test:
That test involves the consideration of policy and the weighing
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of factors, which include: the foreseeability of the harm to the
plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the
injury;
the closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; the moral blame
attached to the defendant’s conduct; the policy of preventing
future harm; the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach; and the availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id. at 138, 90 P.3d at 888. Considering those factors, the Court held that an attorney
preparing testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified
therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the testator to have them properly
executed, so as to effectuate the testator’s intent as expressed in the testamentary
instruments. Id. at 139, 90 P.3d at 889. The Court found that the harm to the intended
beneficiaries was clearly foreseeable. In this setting, the Court found that the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the harm is direct. The Court found that there was
sufficient moral blame attached to the negligent preparation or execution of testamentary
instruments to impose liability. Id. at 138, 90 P.3d at 888. The Court held that imposing
such a duty might prevent future harm by creating an incentive to prepare such instruments
carefully because otherwise there would be no liability for the negligent drafting of such
instruments. Finally, the Court found that extending the duty to this degree would not
unduly increase the burden upon attorneys to use care when drafting testamentary
instruments, and insurance is readily available to cover such risk.
The Harringfeld Court noted that its extension of the attorney’s duty was “very
limited.” Id. It did not extend to beneficiaries not named or identified in the testamentary
instruments.

The extension of an attorney’s duty with respect to preparation of

testamentary documents “will not subject attorneys to lawsuits by persons who simply did
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not receive what they believed was their fair share of the testator’s estate, or who
simply did not receive in the testamentary instruments what they understood the testator
and stated or indicated they would receive.” Id. at 139, 90 P.3d at 889 (emphasis added).
In Taylor v. Riley, supra, an attorney representing a corporation wrote an
opinion letter to a stockholder. The opinion letter expressly stated that the stockholder
could rely upon the opinions stated in the letter. The Idaho Supreme Court held that under
the circumstances that the attorney voluntarily undertook to issue the opinion letter and
stated that the stockholder could rely on it, the attorney had a duty of care to the
stockholder, and was potentially liable for legal malpractice. Id. at 339, 336 P.3d at 272.
Turning to the case at hand, the Idaho Supreme Court has already made it
plain that it would not apply the “balance-of-the-harms” test to recognize a duty under these
circumstances. Keith Lanham seeks to impose liability upon Douglas Fleenor because
Keith Lanham “simply did not receive what [he] believed was [his] fair share of the
testator’s estate.” Harrigfeld v. Hancock, supra (emphasis added). In addition, if an
attorney representing a beneficiary in an estate dispute owed duties to other persons who
were potential beneficiaries, it could create risk of conflicting duties. It would be improper
to impose a duty on an attorney representing one heir contesting a will as to another heir
where the two heirs have a potential conflict of interest. See, Pelham v. Grieseheimer,
440 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982)(holding that to conclude attorney representing a spouse in a
divorce also owed a duty to the children would create conflict of interest situations).
Here, Thomas and Keith Lanham had a conflict of interest. Keith Lanham
was represented by separate counsel in the lawsuit. It would be improper to impose a duty
on an attorney to a beneficiary in an estate dispute where that beneficiary was represented
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by another attorney. Further, Keith Fleenor took a position in the underlying lawsuit that
was a direct contravention to Thomas Lanham’s position. See Affidavit of Keith Lanham.
Keith Lanham’s assertion in the affidavit is a waiver of his present claim. Fullerton v.
Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 136 P.3d 291 (2006)(affirming trial court’s finding of waiver).
This is not the case in Taylor v. Riley where another party’s attorney made
representations to a person and told that person he could rely on those representations.
There is no evidence that Douglas Fleenor ever represented Keith Lanham. There is no
evidence that Douglas Fleenor provided any communication to Keith Lanham. There is
no basis for finding Douglas Fleenor voluntarily assumed a duty.
Accordingly, Douglas Fleenor’s motion for summary judgment against Keith
Lanham should be granted because Keith Lanham did not have an attorney-client
relationship with Douglas Fleenor and it would be improper to impose a duty upon Douglas
Fleenor under these circumstances. The claim also should be dismissed because Keith
Lanham waived his claim.
VII.
KEITH LANHAM IS BOUND BY HIS JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
A judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party
about a concrete fact within the party's peculiar knowledge, not a matter of law and not an
opinion.

Grain Growers Membership & Investment Trust v. Liquidator for the

Universal Life Insurance Co., 144 Idaho 751, 759, 171 P.3d 242, 250 (2007). Keith
Lanham testified in his affidavit dated March 22, 2014, filed in the lawsuit contesting the
Lanham Will:
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3. I believe and accept that my father made specific gifts to my brother,
Thomas Everett, and me as set forth in his Will for his own personal reasons
and his wishes should be honored.
4. The remainder of my father's personal property consists primarily of old
farm and ranching equipment and vehicles, household items and sentimental
memorabilia. These items of personal property and the lots at Big Creek
should be distributed according to his will and his recorded wishes made
after he executed his will. Judd Lanham is the appropriate person to
manage and distribute my father's estate as he knows what my father
wanted to do.
5. A few years ago my father quitclaimed my brother Thomas Everett
approximately 100+ acres. This was not intended as a gift. My brother
promised to help support my father so he could pay his bills, including the
mortgage to Linda Andrews Lanham. My brother abandoned my father after
the quitclaim deed was recorded.
6. I reconciled with my father prior to his death. I do know that my father
was completely estranged from my brother, Thomas Everett, at the time of
his death on December 5, 2013.
Affidavit of Keith Lanham (see Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to
Dismiss, Exhibit C).

This sworn testimony by Keith Lanham contains the following

statements about concrete facts within Keith Lanham's peculiar knowledge:
•
Keith Lanham believes and accepts that Gordon Lanham made the
specific gifts to Thomas and Keith Lanham as set forth in the Will for his own
personal reasons and his wishes should be honored.
•
Gordon Lanham's personal property and lots at Big Creek should be
distributed according to Gordon Lanham's will and his recorded wishes made
after he executed his will.
•
Judd Lanham is the appropriate person to manage and distribute
Gordon Lanham's estate as Judd Lanham knows what Gordon Lanham
wanted him to do.
•
Thomas Lanham promised to support Gordon Lanham in exchange
for a quitclaim to 100+ acres, and then Thomas Lanham abandoned Gordon
Lanham after the quitclaim deed was recorded.
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•
Gordon Lanham was completely estranged from Thomas Lanham at
the time of his death.
Keith Lanham is bound by these judicial admissions. Keith Lanham provided
his affidavit testimony expecting the Court to rely on his testimony. The Magistrate Court
admitted the Affidavit of Keith Lanham, and relied on his affidavit testimony in rendering
its decision that the Lanham Will was valid. Idaho law does not permit Keith Lanham to
revoke his testimony. A litigant is not allowed to revoke his testimony that the Court in fact
relies upon in rendering its decision. Keith Lanham's testimony is part of the substantial
evidence on which the Magistrate Court relied on issuing its decision. Keith Lanham's
testimony is completely binding on his claim.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
Even assuming Douglas Fleenor breached a duty, the alleged breach did not
cause harm because the Appellate Court would have sustained the Magistrate Court's
correct decision. The Magistrate Court's findings were supported by the substantial
evidence in the record. An Appellate Court would not have reversed the Magistrate Court's
conclusions of law, since they were correct, in that the Lanham Will was valid. Further,
Keith Lanham did not have an attorney client relationship with Douglas Fleenor and it
would be improper to impose a duty on Douglas Fleenor as to Keith Lanham under the
present circumstances. Additionally, Keith Lanham waived his claim. Therefore, for the
foregoing reasons, Douglas Fleenor requests the Court grant his motion for summary
judgment.
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DATED this 7th day of September, 2016.
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Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD, as party plaintiff in the stead
of Keith C. Lanham,
Plaintiffs
V.

DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2016-8252
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)

Come now plaintiffs, through their attorney of record, and submit this answering brief to
defendant's motion for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P.
Preliminary note: Plaintiffs incorporate their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment filed August 31, 2016, as though set forth in full herein.

This earlier

Memorandum addresses issues of (I) proximate causation, (2) whether the proximate cause issue
is within the province the court, rather than a jury; and (3) the duty of care owed Keith, a non-client.
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KEITH LANHAM'S WITHDRAWAL OF HIS PETITION FOR A DECLARATION
OF INTESTACY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AwAIYER OF ms CLAIM
AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE
Defendant erroneously argues that plaintiff Keith has "waived" his right to sue defendant
for malpractice: Defendant argues as follows:
Further, Keith Fleenor (sic) took a position in the underlying lawsuit
that was a direct contravention to Thomas Lanham's position. See
affidavit of Keith Lanham. It is incredulous that Keith Lanham now
contends that Mr. Fleenor owed him a duty where Keith Lanham
made a judicial admission in the will contest taking a directly adverse
position to Mr. Fleenor's client. . . Keith Lanham's assertion in
the affidavit is a waiver of his present claim.
Defendant's Brief, p. 17.
Although not entirely clear, defendant apparently is contending that Keith's withdrawal of
his petition for intestacy bars this claim for legal malpractice. The precise dynamics of this "waiver"
are not identified by defendant, nor is there helpful case authority, i.e., the only citation is to a case
dealing with waiver ofthe right to declare a purchase invoice void. Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho
820 (2006).
At the time of the so-called waiver, it must be shown that the waiving party "intentionally
relinquished a known right or advantage". Id.. 142 Idaho at 824: As reflected in the 2014 affidavit
of Keith Lanham, at the time of the withdrawal of his petition, he believed that his father's real
property had either been disposed ofby the Will (Big Creek) and that the remainder (the ranch) had
been deeded to grandson Joseph. See declaration of Keith Lanham filed herein as corroborated by
his 2014 affidavit (Exhibit 3 to Exhibit C to Lundberg affidavit). As testified in his declaration
herein, he withdrew his petition for declaration ofintestacy because he did not want to incur attorney
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fees in attempting to recover personal property of relatively little value. That is, in Keith's eyes, at
the time he withdrew his petition, the intestacy claim did not include a claim to the real property.
Defendant erroneously equates Keith's waiver of his claim against the estate as a waiver of
his claim against defendant Fleenor. The one has nothing to do with the other.
Even ignoring this error, the petition for withdrawal was made upon the mistaken beliefthat
(1) the Will had devised the Big Creek property, (2) that his father had conveyed the ranch prior to
his death, and (3) that all that remained in the Estate was relatively valueless personal property.
Accordingly, even if characterized as a waiver, his mistaken perception of things prevented the socalled waiver from being effective because it was not a "relinquishment of a known right or
advantage". Id.
Given the elements of waiver, i.e., relinquishment of a known right, genuine issues of
material fact are presented which preclude summary adjudication. Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P.; Brand S

Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731,734,639 P.2d 429 (1981).
KEITH LANHAM'S SO-CALLED "ADMISSIONS" ARE ERRONEOUS OR
IRRELEVANT TO THESE PROCEEDINGS AND INCLUDE CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW UNDERTAKEN BY A LAYMAN.
Defendant argues in his brief (pp. 21 - 23) that plaintiff Keith Lanham has made certain
"admissions" to which he is "bound". However, defendant fails to explain the relevancy of these
admissions to his motion for summary judgment. As set forth below the so-called admissions offact
in Keith's 2014 affidavit (Exhibit 3 to Exhibit C) are either erroneous, irrelevant, or both. Two
"admissions" are points oflaw conceruing which Keith, a layman, lacks the competence to articulate:
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Alleged admission

Erroneous

Irrelevant

(1) Decedent made specific bequests to
the plaintiffs which should be honored.

Legal conclusion

X

(2) Big Creek property should be devised
according to the Will.

X

X

(3) Quitclaim of 100 acres to Thomas was
a gift. Then Thomas abandoned decedent

X

(4) Decedent was estranged from Thomas;
Keith reconciled with decedent.

X

(5) Judd Lanham is appropriate person to
be personal representative.

X

X

As can be readily seen, four of the five so-called admissions have no relevance to (1)
proximate causation, (2) whether defendant Fleenor owed Keith Lanham a duty of care, or (3)
whether Keith waived his claim of malpractice. Defendant's brief fails to point us in the direction
of relevancy. The purported admission dealing with the Big Creek property is simply erroneous and
constitutes a legal conclusion which is beyond Keith's competence.
CONCLUSION
Prior briefing: As noted above, plaintiffs' summary judgment brief, incorporated herein by
reference, deals with issues of proximate cause, proximate cause adjudication, and the duty of care
which defendant Fleenor owed Keith Lanham and is responsive to defendant Fleenor's motion for
summary judgment.
Waiver: At the time plaintiff Keith withdrew his petition for intestacy, he believed that the
real property of the decedent had either been devised by the Will or had been conveyed away during
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the decedent's life. That is, there cannot be a waiver in the absence of an intentional relinquishment
of a known right. Stated more baldly, withdrawing a petition for intestacy has nothing to do with
the herein malpractice claim.
Purported admissions: Defendant's brief fails to identify the relevance of these admissions.
As is reflected in the above chart, the admissions are, in the main, irrelevant. The single admission
that is not irrelevant, i.e., that Big Creek was devised by the Will, is flat out erroneous and a
conclusion of law opined by the layman Keith Lanham.
Dated this 3'd day of October, 2016.

1···77_7!::_

\/~

Allen B. Eilis/ ·
c ·
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

I.
INTRODUCTION
The first issue raised in the Lanhams’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
is whether Douglas Fleenor’s alleged failure to timely file an appeal proximately caused the
Lanhams to lose their status as intestate heirs. However, in making this argument the
Lanhams apply the wrong standard of review. The correct analysis of an appeal is whether
the Magistrate Court based its findings on sufficient facts in the record. See Camp v. East
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Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002). There is sufficient evidence in the
record to support a finding that the Lanham Will was valid under Idaho law. Further, the
Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld juries deciding the issue of proximate cause
in legal malpractice cases.

See Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 813 P.2d 350

(1991)(affirming jury’s determination that attorney’s conduct was not a proximate cause of
plaintiff’s damages); Murray v. Farmers Insurance Co., 118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101
(1990)(affirming jury determination of proximate cause in attorney malpractice lawsuit).
Taking the determination of violation of standard of care of proximate cause away from
juries would violate Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution (“The right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate….”).
Additionally, there is a genuine question as to whether Douglas Fleenor’s
failure to timely file an appeal was a breach of his duty of care based upon Thomas
Lanham’s hesitation to pursue the appeal. (Affidavit of Douglas Fleenor in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated September 30, 2016). After the
Magistrate Judge denied Douglas Fleenor and Thomas Lanham’s motion for summary
judgment in the prior proceeding, Douglas Fleenor informed Thomas Lanham there was
a limited time frame to appeal. Id. Due to concerns over cost, Thomas Lanham instructed
Douglas Fleenor to wait while he decided whether he wanted to pursue an appeal and to
only proceed if and when Thomas Lanham gave him approval. Id. After the deadline had
passed, Thomas Lanham informed Douglas Fleenor he wanted to proceed with the appeal.
Id. Douglas Fleenor informed Thomas Lanham that the appeal deadline had passed but
there may be a chance it would still be accepted due to their motion for reconsideration,
and filed the appeal on August 13, 2014.
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The second issue the Lanhams raised is whether Keith Lanham, who was
not a client of Douglas Fleenor, has a right of action against Douglas Fleenor. It is
undisputed that Keith Lanham did not have a contractual attorney-client relationship with
Douglas Fleenor. It is additionally undisputed that Keith Lanham took an adversarial
position to Thomas Lanham in the prior proceedings. (Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit C). Douglas Fleenor represented and owed
a duty of care to Thomas Lanham. Douglas Fleenor cannot be held to have also had a duty
to a litigant adverse to his client.
Based on the foregoing reasons, Douglas Fleenor requests the Court deny
the Lanhams’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
II.
VALIDITY OF THE LANHAM WILL
i.

The Magistrate Judge’s Ruling Would Not Have Been Overturned on
Appeal

If we are evaluating the efficacy of an appeal, findings of fact based on
substantial evidence will not be overturned on appeal even in the face of conflicting
evidence. Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008). So long as the
record is sufficient to support the Court’s findings, it will not be disturbed on appeal.
Riverside Development Co., v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 522, 650 P.2d 657, 664 (1982). In
this case, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Lanham Will was valid. This decision
was based on affidavits and audio recordings of the Lanham Will, ultimately finding
“decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the time
he executed the will. He demonstrated a thorough grasp of the extent and nature of his
assets. He also demonstrated a good grasp of his potential heirs, and his relationships with
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them and sound reasons for treating each as he did.” (Declaration of Allen Ellis dated June
13, 2016, Exhibit 5). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence and would not have been overturned on appeal. The Lanham’s
reference to Judge McKee’s findings and observations concerning the Lanham Will are not
persuasive in the current matter. Judge McKee’s statements regarding the Lanham Will
were dicta, made while deciding whether to award attorney’s fees and should not be
utilized by this Court in determining whether the Lanham Will was valid, or whether the
Magistrate Judge’s determination that the Lanham Will was valid was supported by
substantial evidence.
ii.

Gordon Lanham Executed a Valid Will

Idaho requires the following “minimal formalities” for a will:
•

The testator must be an “emancipated minor or any
person eighteen (18) or more years of age who is of
sound mind.” Idaho Code Section 15-2-501. A testator
is of ‘sound mind’ if he knows, “in general, without
prompting, the nature and extent of the property of
which he is about to dispose, and nature of the act
which he is about to perform, and the names and
identity of persons who are to be the objects of his
bounty, and his relation toward them.” Wooden v.
Martin (In re Conway), 152 Idaho 933, 943-44, 277 P.3d
380, 390-91 (2012)(citing In re Heazle’s Estate, 74
Idaho 72, 76, 257 P.2d 556, 558 (1953));

•

The will must be a testamentary instrument, which
means that it demonstrates the testator’s intention to
create a revocable disposition of his property, to accrue
and take effect only upon his death, and passing no
present interest. Idaho Code Section 15-1-201(56); In
re Estate of Webber, 97 Idaho 703, 707, 551 P.2d
1339, 1343 (1976);

•

The will must be “signed by the testator or in the
testator’s name by some other person in the testator’s
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presence and by his direction, and shall be signed by at
least two (2) persons each of whom witnessed either
the signing or the testator’s acknowledgment of the
signature of the will.” Idaho Code Section 15-2-502.
The Lanham Will meets these requirements. Gordon Lanham was above the
age of eighteen and of sound mind when he executed the Lanham Will. He acknowledged
his property, his heirs, and his relation to them. He appointed Judd Lanham as his
Executor, and granted him Power of Attorney, to have full control to distribute his property
after his death. The Lanham Will is in writing, signed by the testator, in the presence of two
witnesses, each of whom witnessed both the signing and the testator’s acknowledgment
of the signature of the will. Each witness stated Gordon Lanham appeared to be of sound
mind and under no duress, fraud or undue influence. A notary further stated under penalty
of perjury that Gordon Lanham appeared to be of sound mind and under no undue
influence. The Lanham Will complies with the minimal formalities set forth under Idaho law.
iii.

Thomas and Keith Lanham Seek to Circumvent Gordon Lanham’s
Testamentary Intent by Declaring Part of the Property Should Pass
Intestate

If the Court determines that the Lanham Will is valid, but also finds there are
ambiguities concerning the proper distribution of property, before requiring property to pass
intestate, it is the goal of the Court to determine the testator’s intent from within the four
corners of the will. Wilkins v. Wilkins (In Re Estate of Wilkins), 137 Idaho 315, 319, 48 P.2d
644, 648 (2002). Here, there is no question as to what Gordon Lanham intended. Gordon
Lanham intended that specific items of property be distributed as stated and then gave
Judd Lanham discretion to distribute the remaining property. Nonetheless, the Lanhams
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continue to argue that the Lanham Will is defective and so the property should pass
intestate, particularly regarding two pieces of real property.
Relying on In re Corwin’s Estate, the Lanhams contend “in the absence of
a specific devise of the property as well as the absence of a residuary clause, Idaho case
law requires that this real property descend according to intestate succession.”
(Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment pg. 7.) This argument fails to
consider the fact Gordon Lanham granted Judd Lanham power of appointment in lieu of
creating a residuary clause. In In re Corwin’s Estate, the testator left one half of her estate
to her granddaughter, but provided that in the event the granddaughter predeceased her,
her brother was to receive an undivided interest in the estate. In re Corwin’s Estate, 86
Idaho 1, 383 P.2d 339 (1963). The granddaughter was still living at the time the testator
died. Accordingly, the court found the testator had failed to dispose of the other half of the
estate. Id. at 5. The court held the undevised half of her property must pass through
intestate succession because there was no residuary clause. Id. at 6. Because the will in
In re Corwin did not include a power of appointment, it is clearly distinguishable from the
case at hand.
While arguing there are no dispositive provisions regarding the Big Creek
and Ranch properties, the Lanhams assert that “the failure of the Will to devise the real
properties and the absence of a residuary clause, require that those properties descend
according to the laws of intestate succession.” (Memorandum in Support of Partial
Summary Judgment, pg. 9). This argument does not recognize that a residuary clause
cannot co-exist with a power of appointment. A power of appointment cannot be created
if there is “a general residuary clause in a will, or a will making general disposition of all of
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the testator’s property.” Idaho Code Section 15-2-610. The reason being that a power of
appointment authorizes “a power or authority given to a person to dispose of property, or
an interest therein, which is vested in a person other than the donee of the power.” Estate
of Conroy, 67 Cal. App. 3d 734, 738, 136 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1977).
The Lanhams contend that if a power of appointment existed in the Lanham
Will, it doesn’t pertain to property that Gordon Lanham had not decided about, or property
not identified in the will. In asserting this argument, the Lanhams cite to Estate of Conroy,
stating that a power of appointment must “designate specific assets of the decedent” to be
effective. (Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment, pg. 10). However there
is no discussion of such a requirement in that case. Gordon Lanham chose to grant Judd
Lanham Power of Attorney over all personal and real property stating “I want him to be
able to distribute my property and my personal effects in any way that he sees fit and I will
try and put all the wording about the personal effects.” (Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A) (emphasis added).
Additionally, the Lanhams argue that the Lanham Will’s disinheritance of
Thomas and Keith Lanham does not impact their status as intestate heirs. This ignores the
presumption that if a provision in a will can be construed in more than one way, intestacy
should be avoided, “especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator
to dispose of his or her entire estate, or where intestacy will result in persons sharing in the
estate whom the testator expressly cut off in the will.” Estate of Kuttler, 185 Cal. App. 2d
189, 202, 8 Cal. Rptr. 160,167 (1960) (the court found “where an intention to disinherit an
heir is expressed clearly and manifestly in a will, so as to leave no reason for doubt, a
construction of the will which would leave the testator intestate as to any portion of the
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property will not be adopted to defeat the intention and thus allow the heir to have some
share in the estate.”); In Re Corwin’s Estate, supra, 86 Idaho at 5, 383 P.2d at 343 (“Courts
favor testacy over intestacy”). The Lanhams were each left $1 dollar and a bed built by
their grandfather. It would entirely frustrate the intent of Gordon Lanham to allow the
Lanhams to profit through the laws of intestacy.
Finally, the Lanhams allege that because there were additional devises by
dictation, Gordon Lanham did not intend the Lanham Will to be his last will and testament.
(Declaration of Allen Ellis dated June 13, 2016, Exhibit 9). To create a valid will it must only
comply with the minimal formalities set forth in the Idaho Probate Code. Once a will is
created, the testator may revoke or amend the will, but only through formal processes.
Idaho Code Section 15-2-507. Those formalities were not followed in this case. As a
result, any additional dictation is not legitimate and does not impact the validity of the
Lanham Will. The Lanhams are attempting to circumvent the intent of the Lanham Will to
recover a majority of the estate that the Gordon Lanham sought to disinherit them from.
Such an attempt does not comport with Idaho law.
III.
DOUGLAS FLEENOR DID NOT BREACH HIS DUTY OF CARE
The Lanhams’ allege that Douglas Fleenor breached his duty of care by
failing to file the appeal within the 42-day time period. However, this argument does not
take into account Douglas Fleenor’s numerous attempts to discuss the appeal deadline
with Thomas Lanham, and Thomas Lanham’s reluctance to file the appeal. On June 10,
2014, Douglas Fleenor and Thomas Lanham discussed the limited time to file an appeal
after the Magistrate Judge’s decision in favor of the personal representative and against
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Thomas Lanham. (Affidavit of Douglas Fleenor in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment dated September 30, 2016). Thomas Lanham instructed Douglas
Fleenor that he wanted to wait due to concerns over the cost of an appeal. Id. Due to
Thomas Lanham’s concerns, Douglas Fleenor and Thomas Lanham discussed filing a
motion for reconsideration as a cheaper alternative to pursuing the appeal, and on June
20, 2014, Douglas Fleenor filed a motion for reconsideration with the Court. Id.
On July 9, 2014, the Court denied the motion for reconsideration and Douglas
Fleenor called Thomas Lanham and again discussed the deadline for filing an appeal. Id.
Thomas Lanham instructed Douglas Fleenor to not file an appeal unless and until he
decided he wanted to proceed. Douglas Fleenor made several attempts to contact Thomas
Lanham over the next few weeks to ask about the appeal and Thomas Lanham failed to
respond. On August 13, 2014, Thomas Lanham told Douglas Fleenor to file the appeal.
Douglas Fleenor informed Thomas Lanham that the appeal deadline had passed but there
may be a chance due to their previous motion to reconsider. Id. Douglas Fleenor then filed
the appeal on the same day.
Douglas Fleenor has testified that under the circumstances, his filing of the
notice of appeal complied with the applicable standard of care. This evidence creates a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Fleenor’s filing of the appeal more than
forty two days after the Court’s decision violated the standard of care.
IV.
DUTIES OWED TO KEITH LANHAM
It is undisputed that Keith Lanham did not have a contractual attorney-client
relationship

with

Douglas

Fleenor.

The

Lanhams

incorrectly

apply

the
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balance-of-the-harms test set forth in Harrigfeld v. Hancock and Lucas v. Hamm, to argue
that Keith, as a beneficiary of the Lanham Will, was owed a duty by Douglas Fleenor.
Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004); Lucas v. Hamm, 56
Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961). This argument ignores the precedent concluding
the multi-factor balancing test does not apply in adversary situations. See Bowman v. John
Doe Two, 704 P.2d 140 (Wash. 1985)(attorney representing son did not owe duty to
mother); Rhode v. Adams, 957 P.2d 1124 (Mont. 1998)(attorney representing mother in
custody dispute did not owe duty to father);

Norton v. Hines, 123 Cal.Rptr. 237

(Cal.Ct.App. 1975)(attorney did not owe duty to former adverse litigant, declining to extend
holding of Lucas).
Additionally, both Harrigfeld and Lucas are strongly distinguishable from the
case at bar because in those cases, the attorney drafted the will that led to the dispute.
Here, Douglas Fleenor did not draft the will. Douglas Fleenor represented Thomas Lanham
in a challenge to the Lanham Will. Thus, unlike the situations in Harrigfeld and Lucas,
Douglas Fleenor’s role arose out of litigation. Keith Lanham was an adversary to Thomas
Lanham in the will contest. Keith Lanham was represented by his own attorney, and later,
Keith Lanham executed an affidavit in which he testified that Thomas Lanham should
receive nothing under the Lanham Will. (Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to
Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit C). Douglas Fleenor’s duties were owed to Thomas
Lanham. He cannot also be held to owe duties to a litigant who was adverse to his client.
Keith Lanham ignores the statement of the Harrigfeld Court that the general rule is that
attorneys do not owe duties to non-clients. Keith Lanham further ignores the Supreme
Court’s statement in Harrigfeld that its holding “will not subject attorneys to lawsuits by
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person who simply did not receive what they believed was their fair share of the testator’s
estate, or who simply did not receive in the testamentary instruments what they understood
the testator had stated or indicated they would receive.” Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 138, 90
P.3d at 88.
The Lanhams maintain that there was no conflict of interest between Thomas
and Keith Lanham. Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 provides in relevant part:
Except as provided in paragraph (b) a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1)

the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or

(2)

there is a significant risk that the representation
of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a
former client or a third person or by the personal
interests of the lawyer, including family and
domestic relationships.

Here, Thomas and Keith Lanham were both seeking to recover property from
the Estate of Gordon Lanham. There was an inherit potential conflict of interest between
them. In fact, the inherit potential conflict of interest became a real conflict when Keith
Lanham testified in an affidavit that Thomas Lanham should not recover. (Affidavit of
Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit C).
The Court cannot determine that there was no conflict between Thomas and
Keith Lanham simply as to the issue of the timeliness of the appeal. If Douglas Fleenor
had a conflict that prevented him from representing both Thomas and Keith Lanham at the
trial court level, that conflict permeates the entire representation. The adversity between
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Thomas and Keith prevents the Court from imposing a duty owed by Douglas Fleenor to
Keith Lanham, a non-client.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Douglas Fleenor requests that the Court deny the
Lanhams’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2016.
CAREY PERKINS LLP

By

/s/ Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,

DEFENDANT DOUGLAS
FLEENOR'S AFFIDAVIT IN
OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of _ __ )
DOUGLAS FLEENOR, havi ng been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and

says:
1.

I am the Defendant in the above-captioned action, and the following

statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct.
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2.

I am, and at all relevant times have been, an attorney admitted to

practice, and in good standing, in the State of Idaho. I have actual knowledge of, and I am
familiar with, the standard of care applicable to an attorney practicing in the State of Idaho
at the times that I provided legal services to Thomas Lanham. I developed my actual
knowledge of, and familiarity with, the standard of care through practicing in the State of
Idaho and discussing the practice of law with attorneys and judges in the State of Idaho.
The opinions stated herein are stated with reasonable professional certainty.
3.

On March 5, 2014, Thomas Lanham retained me to represent him with

respect to Gordon Lanham's will. Attached hereto as Exhibit A, is my file copy of the
retention agreement entered into by Thomas Lanham in retaining me to represent him.
This file copy has been maintained by me in the ordinary course of my doing business.
4.

On June 10, 2014, the Judge ruled from the bench and granted

summary judgment in favor of the personal representative and against Mr. Lanham. After
the Judge's decision I discussed the possibility of an appeal with Mr. Lanham and informed
him that time was limited if he wanted to pursue an appeal. Mr. Lanham expressed some
concern over the possible cost of appeal and told me to wait.
5.

On June 17, 2014, due to his concerns about the cost of an appeal,

I talked with Mr. Lanham about filing a motion for reconsideration as a cheaper alternative
to pursuing an appeal. Mr. Lanham agreed to proceed with a motion for reconsideration.
On June 20, 2014, I filed a motion for reconsideration with the court.
6.

On July 9, 2014, I informed Mr. Lanham by telephone that the

Magistrate Judge had denied the motion for reconsideration. I told Mr. Lanham we only had
until the first week of August to appeal. Mr. Lanham instructed me to hold off for now. Mr.
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Lanham asked me to estimate how much it would cost to undertake an appeal, and I told
him that it would cost approximately $5,000 dollars. Mr. Lanham then told me that he did
not want me to file an appeal at that time.
7.

I called Mr. Lanham several times over the next weeks asking about

the appeal, but he did not get back to me.
8.

On August 13, 2014, Mr. Lanham told me to file an appeal. I told him

that the time had run out and that it was too late to file a timely appeal, but stated there
may be a chance due to the motion for reconsideration . After our conversation I filed the
appeal.
9.

It is my opinion that I met the standard of care for an attorney

practicing in the State of Idaho in not filing an appeal within 42 days of issuance of the
Magistrate Court's opinion and order granting the personal representative's motion for
summary judgment and denying Thomas Lanham's motion for summary judgment,
because Thomas Lanham expressly directed me not to file an appeal unless and until he
told me to file an appeal. It is my opinion that at all relevant times the standard of care for
an attorney practicing in Idaho requires the attorney to follow the instruction of his client
with respect to whether or not to file an appeal, and it is my opinion that I met the standard
of care in following Mr. Lanham's instruction to not file an appeal. It is my opinion that at
all relevant times the standard of care for an attorney practicing in Idaho requires the
attorney to inform the client of the consequences of a late appeal, and it is my opinion that
I met the standard of care in informing Mr. Lanham that failing to file an appeal within 42
days of the Court's opinion could foreclose an appeal. It is my opinion that there was a
valid argument that the filing of the motion for reconsideration extended the time for taking
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of an appeal, and that it was within the standard of care for me to inform Mr. Lanham that
the filing of the motion for reconsideration might extend the time for an appeal.
FURTHER your Affiant saith not.

, __

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this:':{) day of

2016.

~k~

Notary Public for d ho

,~
1
Residing at
~
wuvt-t- --·
Commission expires 7- l 3'- 2
6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of October, 2016, I electronically
filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICourt/E-Filing system
which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the ICourt/E-Filing Registered Participants as
follows:
Allen B. Ellis
Ellis Law, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone (208) 345-7832

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-9564
ICourt/E-Filing
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ATTORNEY FEE AGREEMENT
Thomas E. Lanham

This will confirm our agreement that you will retain Douglas E. Fleenor in representing your interests in
the Gordon Thomas Lanl1am estate. You have provided your express authorization to institute
administrative or legal proceedings as may be deemed necessary.
As compensation for ]egal services you promise to pay the following:

I.

Attorney fees for tbe services of Douglas E. Fleenor at the rate of $200.00 per hour.

2.
All necessary costs associated with this representation, including but not limited to filing
fees, discovery costs, deposition costs, witness foes, faxes, photo copies, and the like.
Under our attorney/client relationship, you as the client will be the final decision-maker with regard to
substantive decisions regarding the course of this action. Douglas E. Fleenor shall have the right to
manage and control the matter.
No matter how likely I believe it is that you will obtain a successful outcome, I cannot guarantee a
positive r esult.
Either of us may end this Agreement. I reserve the right to withdraw if you fail to honor this
Agreement, or for any just reason permitted or required under Idaho rules or codes. If l withdraw, I will
send you written notice.
You may end this Agreement at any time by sending written notic.e. If you end the Agreement, you will
still owe for expenses incurred and work performed up the time of notice, and for any expenses or
work incurred to withdraw and close your file.

to

I look forward to working with you in this matter.

Thomas E. Lanham

Dated
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Electronically Filed
10/10/2016 11:31:04 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
208/345-7832 (Tel)
208/345-9564 (Fax)
ISB No. 1626
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

oc
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD, as party plaintiff in the stead
of Keith C. Lanham,
Plaintiffs
v.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2016-8252
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Come now the plaintiffs, through their attorney of record, and submit the herein reply brief
in support of their motion for partial summary judgment.
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF
THE WILL: RATHER. THEY ASSERT THAT THE TESTATOR'S
REAL PROPERTY WAS NOT DEVISED BY THE WILL
AND MUST PASS BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION.

The will did not convey a power of appointment to the executor Judd Lanham with
respect to the testator's real property:
(I) Real property not subject to any "power": At the time of his death, the testator owned

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY WDGMENT - I

000159

acreage in Valley County (Big Creek) and a ranch in Gem County. The ranch was not mentioned
in the will, and the testator expressly "want[ed] to think about that 47 acres in Big Creek". Also,
there is no reference to a "power of appointment" in the will. Absent disposition by the will, these
properties pass to the plaintiffs by intestate succession given the absence of a residuary clause. See
plaintiffs opening brief.
(2) Indispensable to an enforceable power of appointment is an identification of the property
that is subject to the power: The Lanham will fails to identify the property that is subject to the
alleged power. The will (Exhibit A to Lundberg affidavit) recites that executor Judd is to distribute
the property "as he sees fit" pursuant to "power of attorney". However, the "property" is not
identified. Thereafter, contradicting this language, the testator seeks to devise certain articles of
personal property to named beneficiaries, rather than allowing his executor to do it, i.e., "Kathy can
disburse", some books "belong to Lizzy"; "as far as my guns are concerned, I am gonna have to try
and decide how that goes"; table and chairs "belong to Lizzy"; "sand painting that belongs to Lizzy".
As to the Big Creek real property, "I want to think about that".
As defined in Black's Law Dictionary: "power of appointment. A power conferred on a
do nee by will or deed to select and nominate one or more recipients of the donor's estate or income"
(Id., Seventh Edition, p. 1190). Indispensable to the creation of a coherent power of appointment

is identification of the property to which the power is subject. The will in question fails in this
regard. The need for property identification is particularly crucial because the Lanham testator
specifically devised items of personal property in derogation of so-called power of appointment.
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In arguing for the existence of a "power of appointment". defendant erroneously conflates
such power with the "power of attorney" referenced in the will: The will recites that executor Judd
is the recipient of the testator's "power of attorney over all my personal and real property". There
is no reference to a "power of appointment".
Defendant's brief asserts: "He [the testator] appointed Judd Lanham as his executor, and
granted him power ofattorney, to have full control to distribute his property after his death" (p. 5,
emphasis added). Under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act such distribution by the executor is
a legal impossibility. According to the Act, "a power of attorney terminates when .

. the

principal dies"(§ 15-12-110). Hence, the executor had no authority, post death, to convey any
property, real or personal.
Defendant may argue that the testator confused "power of attorney" for "power of
appointment"and, therefore, the will should be read as conferring a power of appointment. The
express language of the will causes this argument to fail. The will recites that the executor's power
of attorney is effective immediately, a feature inconsistent with a testamentary power of
appointment. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a "power of appointment" is "[a] power
conferred on a donee by will or deed . . ." Id., p. 1190, (Seventh Ed.).
By the terms of the will (Exhibit A): (a) "I am giving his (sic) Power of Attorney for full
control now" (p. 1); and (b) "I am giving him a Power of Attorney for full control now and even after
I am dead." (pp. 4, 5).
The mere absence of a residuary clause does not transform will provisions into a power of
appointment: Defendant argues that the existence of a residuary clause is incompatible with the
existence of a power of appointment. Again, as noted above, the will gave the executor a power of
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attorney, not a power of appointment. In any event, defendant seems to be asking this Court to
conclude that the absence of a residuary clause transforms will provisions into powers of
appointment.
Idaho Code § 15-2-610, cited by defendant does provide that a residuary clause does not
constimte an exercise of a power of appointment unless specific reference is made that the residuary
clause includes the property subject to the power. Absent a residuary clause in the Lanham will, the
statute is not relevant.
DEFENDANT ERRONEOUSLY ARGUES THAT APPLICATION OF
OF THE HARRIGFELD CRITERIA DOES NOT COMPEL THE
CONCLUSION THAT HE OWED KEITH THE S~\.fE DUTY
OF CARE WHICH HE OWED TO PLAINTIFF
Plaintiffs incorporate herein pages 14 through 17 of their opening brief which is an
exposition of why the criteria in Ha.rrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134 (2004) force the conclusion
that defendant attorney owed Keith Lanham a duty of care. Defendant's answering brief fails to
establish that sueh conclusion is incorrect.
At the time defendant filed the notice of a1212eal. there was no adversary relationship between
defendant and Keith: Tom Lanham hired defendant to appeal the magistrate decision holding that
the will in question devised the entirety of the Lanham Estate assets. The case authority cited by
defendant deal with claims made by a litigant against his adversary's attorney respecting alleged
negligence occurring in that litigation.

In the underlying litigation, Keith and the defendant attorney were not adversaries. The failed
appeal was against Judd Lanham, the executor of the Lanham Estate who was claiming that the will
disposed of the decedent's real property. As reflected in Keith's declaration, he withdrew from the
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probate litigation in order to avoid additional attorney fees. He was under the illusion that (1) the
will devised the Big Creek property and (2) that the ranch had been conveyed, inter-vivos, by the
decedent to his grandson.
Defendant attomev erroneously seeks to distinguish Harriffield and Lucas by the fact that the
defendant attorney in those cases drafted the v.ill: There is nothing in the Harrigfeld/Lucas criteria
which limits attorney conduct which can give rise to non-client liability. In Lucas, three named
beneficiaries (non-clients) failed to get their inheritance because the bequest was an illegal restraint
on alienation. Lucas held that these non-clients were owed a duty of care by the drafter, i.e., it was
foreseeable that a drafting error would cost them financial loss. Id. 56 Cal.2d at 588, 589. It was
equally foreseeable to defendant Fleenor that Keith Lanham, the remaining intestate heir, would
suffer the same financial loss as his brother in the event of a late appeal. Whether drnfting a will or
perfecting an appeal, Lucas and the case at bench have a commonality: the risk to the non-clients in
the event of negligence as well as their identity were known to the attorney from the outset, unlike

Harrigfeld
There was no conflict of interest between Keith and Thomas:

As potential intestate

beneficiaries, the respective entitlement of Keith and Thomas was fifty/fifty. Whether they won or
lost the appeal (had it been timely filed), the impact on them would be identical, i.e., owners as
tenants in common to the real property or non-owners.
PROXIMATE CAUSATION IS A LEGAL ISSUE
FOR THE COURT TO RESOLVE.
Because the existence of proximate cause turns on the merits of the time-barred appeal, the
overwhelming majority of cases conclude that this issue, i.e., the merits ofthe appeal, is a legal issue
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for the Court. See analysis in plaintiffs' opening brief, pages 11 - 13.
The authorities cited by defendant are not on point. One involves the alleged negligence of
an attorney in allowing evidence to be destroyed (Murray v. Farmers Ins., 118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d

IO I (1990)). In the other case, the client sued the attorney for his failure to file a financing statement
(Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 813 P.2d 350 (1990).

Defendant argues that removing from jury consideration "the determination of violation of
standard of care of proximate cause" (sic) is in violation of the Idaho Constitution. First, Court
determination of proximate causation does not remove from the jury whether there has been a
"violation of the standard of care". Secondly, as defense counsel well knows, legal issues are
routinely removed from jury consideration, the Idaho Constitution notwithstanding.
DEFENDANT HAS IMPROPERLY INCLUDED IN HIS RULE 56
"ANSWERING BRIEF" AN ARGUMENT NOT ADDRESSED
IN EITHER HIS SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION OR IN
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment addresses two issues: (I) proximate causation, i.e.,
whether the magistrate's ruling which held the real property to be devised by the will was subject
to reversal on appeal; and (2) whether defendant attorney owed a duty of care to plaintiff Keith
Lanham ("Keith"). Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment addresses these two issues and
a third issue, i.e., whether plaintiff Keith is "bound" by "judicial admissions".
Now, for the first time, in his Rule 56( c) "answering brief' defendant asserts that he was not
negligent, conceding that this issue is fact-driven and not amenable to summary disposition.
Defendant's point is not clear. The issue of fact presented by defendant's alleged negligence does
not impair plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the legal issues of proximate
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causation and defendant attorney's duty of care to Keith.
Dated this 10th day of October, 2016.

/s/ Allen B. Ellis
Allen B. Ellis
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 10th day of October, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Richard L. Stubbs
Carey Perkins, LLP
P.O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701

_ _ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
_ _ Hand delivery
_ _ Overnight delivery
_x_ Facsimile (345-8660)

/s/ Allen B. Ellis
Allen B. Ellis
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Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

Richard L. Stubbs, ISB No. 3239
Samantha L. Lundberg, ISB No. 9992
CAREY PERKINS LLP
Capitol Park Plaza
300 North 6th Street, Suite 200
P. O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,

DEFENDANT DOUGLAS
FLEENOR’S REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs’ Answering Brief discusses Keith Lanham’s claim only. Plaintiffs
raise two arguments in their Answering Brief: 1) Keith Lanham's withdrawal of his petition
for a declaration of intestacy does not constitute a waiver of his claim against Mr. Fleenor
for legal malpractice because he mistakenly believed that Gordon Lanham's real property
had already been disposed of; and 2) Keith Lanham's judicial admissions were erroneous
DEFENDANT DOUGLAS FLEENOR’S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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or irrelevant. Note that Plaintiffs did not respond to Mr. Fleenor’s assertion that it would be
improper to impose a duty on Mr. Fleenor as to Keith Lanham where Keith Lanham was
represented by separate counsel in the underlying suit. See, Pelham v. Grieseheimer,
440 N. E. 2d 96 (Ill. 1982) (holding that to conclude attorney representing a spouse in a
divorce also owed a duty to children would create conflict of interest situations). The fact
that Keith Lanham was represented by a separate attorney creates an inherent conflict that
precludes Douglas Fleenor from being liable to Keith Lanham.
II.
KEITH LANHAM'S AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY WAIVED HIS CLAIM
Plaintiffs portray Douglas Fleenor as arguing that Keith Lanham's withdrawal
of his petition for a declaration of intestacy constituted a waiver of his claim. This is not Mr.
Fleenor's argument. Instead, Mr. Fleenor argues that Keith Lanham's filing of his affidavit
constituted a waiver of his present claim. See, Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 21 ("Keith Lanham's assertion in the affidavit is a waiver
of his present claim.") The waiver occurred in Keith Lanham's testimony:
I believe and accept that my father made the specific gifts to
my brother, Thomas Everett, and me as set forth in his Will for
his own personal reasons and his wishes should be honored.
Affidavit of Keith Lanham dated May 23, 2014.
Keith Lanham's affidavit testimony could not be more clear. Keith Lanham
testified that he believed and accepted that his father made specific gifts to both Thomas
Lanham and to him as set forth in his Will for his own personal reasons and that Gordon
Lanham's wishes should be honored. The fact that Keith Lanham may have believed that
Gordon Lanham's real property had already been disposed does not make this a less than

DEFENDANT DOUGLAS FLEENOR’S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
000167

knowing waiver, particularly when this is considered in its proper context. Keith Lanham
filed a petition for a declaration of intestacy. Then, before he withdrew his petition, Keith
Lanham provided an affidavit in which he testified that he believed and accepted that
Gordon Lanham made the specific gifts to Thomas and Keith "as set forth in his Will for his
own personal reasons and his wishes should be honored." In this testimony, Keith
Lanham concedes that Gordon Lanham's Will is valid. Keith Lanham also concedes that
Gordon Lanham effectively disinherited Thomas and Keith for Gordon's "own personal
reasons and that his wishes should be honored."
Keith Lanham knew he had a right to challenge Gordon Lanham's will. He
waived that right when he filed his affidavit. When Keith Lanham filed his affidavit, he knew
that he could have continued to contest the will as his brother Thomas was doing. Instead,
Keith Lanham chose to renounce his right to contest the will. He is not allowed to
"unwaive" that right now.
III.
KEITH LANHAM IS BOUND BY HIS JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Plaintiffs assert that Keith Lanham's judicial admissions are limited to the
following: 1) Gordon Lanham made specific bequests to Thomas and Keith Lanham that
should be honored; 2) the Big Creek property should be devised according to the Will;
3) the quitclaim of 100 acres to Thomas Lanham was a gift, and then Thomas abandoned
Gordon Lanham; 4) Gordon Lanham was estranged from Thomas Lanham, and Keith
Lanham reconciled with Gordon Lanham; and 5) Judd Lanham was the appropriate
person to be personal representative. Plaintiffs do not dispute Douglas Fleenor's statement
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of the law concerning judicial admissions. Plaintiffs also do not dispute that Keith Lanham
was represented by an attorney other than Mr. Fleenor in the underlying action.
The judicial admissions made by Keith Lanham are not limited to the five
described by Plaintiffs. Keith Lanham's affidavit testimony constituted a "deliberate, clear,
unequivocal" statement about concrete facts within his knowledge. Grain Growers
Membership & Investment Trust v. Liquidator for the Universal Life Insurance Co.,
144 Idaho 751, 759, 171 P.3d 242, 250 (2007).

Keith Lanham admitted in court that

Gordon Lanham's specific gifts to Thomas and Keith in his Will were made for his own
personal reasons. Keith admitted in court that Gordon Lanham's will was valid and that he
did not challenge it. Keith admitted in court that Gordon Lanham's wishes should be
honored. He then withdrew his petition.
The Magistrate Court relied on this testimony by Keith Lanham in rendering
its decision. Keith Lanham is not permitted now to revoke his testimony. The assertions
in Keith Lanham's affidavit are completely binding on his claim, and bar it.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Keith Lanham's affidavit testimony constitutes a waiver of his claim. In
addition, in filing his affidavit, Keith Lanham made judicial admissions that were relied upon
by the Court, and by which he is now bound. Keith Lanham was represented by an
attorney other than Douglas Fleenor in the underlying lawsuit. Accordingly, Douglas
Fleenor respectfully requests that the Court grant his Motion for Summary Judgment.
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DATED this 10th day of October, 2016.
CAREY PERKINS LLP

By/s/Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of October, 2016, I electronically
filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt/E-Filing system
which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the iCourt/E-Filing Registered Participants as
follows:
Allen B. Ellis
Ellis Law, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone (208) 345-7832

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-9564
ICourt/E-Filing

/s/Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE
P. REYNARD,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.
________________________________

I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2016-8252
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action for legal malpractice. The Last Will and Testament of Gordon Lanham
was admitted to probate in Gem County. His cousin, Judd Lanham, was appointed personal
representative. Plaintiffs Thomas and Keith Lanham1 are Gordon Lanham’s children. He left
them each one dollar in his will. Plaintiff Thomas Lanham unsuccessfully contested the will as
to its validity and as to its inclusion of certain property in the probate estate. The contest of the
will was originally joined by plaintiff Keith Lanham. Keith Lanham withdrew his objection
prior to the hearing before the probate judge. Plaintiff Thomas Lanham was represented in the
probate proceedings by defendant Douglas Fleenor. Plaintiff Keith Lanham was represented by
separate counsel. An appeal from the magistrate’s decision was held to be untimely, and this
lawsuit followed.

1

Janine Reynard, bankruptcy trustee for Keith Lanham, has been substituted as a party in his place by
Order entered August 31, 2016. For the sake of simplicity and consistency, this opinion will continue to refer to
Keith Lanham as a party, recognizing that the real party in interest is the bankruptcy trustee.
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Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, stating that (1) had the underlying notice
of appeal for In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon T. Lanham been timely filed, Plaintiffs
Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham would have been adjudicated the intestate heirs to the
decedent’s real property; and (2) Defendant owed a duty of care to Keith Lanham. Defendant
moved for summary judgment for dismissal of the case because (1) a timely appeal would have
been unsuccessful; and (2) in any event defendant owed no duty to plaintiff Keith Lanham.
II. DISCUSSION
i.

The Duty Owed to Keith Lanham

The Court reiterates its ruling made from the bench: Defendant Douglas Fleenor owed
no duty to Plaintiff Keith Lanham. Keith Lanham was represented by separate counsel, and it is
undisputed that Defendant did not undertake to represent him. This case does not fall within the
exception to the general rule set forth in Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884
(2004). Nor did Defendant voluntarily undertake any duty to act on Plaintiff Keith Lanham’s
behalf as did the defendant in Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323, 336 P.3d 256(2014). The mere
fact that Keith Lanham might incidentally benefit from a successful appeal is insufficient to
impose such a duty and consequential liability.
ii.

The Outcome of a Timely Appeal

Both parties suggest that they would be successful had the appeal been timely filed.
When viewing this question from the standpoint of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment,
there is a preliminary question of whether the outcome of a hypothetical appeal is a question of
law for the court or a question of fact for a jury. Plaintiff cites a treatise on legal malpractice:
“The resolution of a petition or appeal must and can be made by the trial judge as
an issue of law, based on review of the transcript and record of the underlying
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action, the argument of counsel, and subject to the same rules of review as should
have been applied to the motion or appeal. This does not usurp the entitlement to
a jury because the issue is one of law.”
Legal Malpractice, 2012 Edition, Vol. 4, sec. 33.43, p. 942.
The treatise cites multiple cases from several jurisdictions. For example, the Washington
Supreme Court held that for “cases involving an attorney’s alleged failure to perfect an appeal,”
courts have consistently recognized that the determination of the success of the appeal is within
the exclusive province of the court and not the jury. Daugert v. Pappas, 704 P.2d 600, 603
(Wash. 1985).
At oral argument, Defendant’s counsel suggested the outcome of the appeal was a
question of fact to be determined by the jury. No similar argument was made in the briefing
submitted by the defense and no authority for this proposition was cited at oral argument. The
Court is persuaded that the treatise is correct. Whether or not a properly perfected timely appeal
would have been successful is a question for the court. The Court is further persuaded that the
issue is to be decided “based on review of the transcript and record of the underlying action, the
argument of counsel, and subject to the same rules of review as should have been applied to the
motion or appeal.”
The difficulty here is that, while many of the facts are not in dispute, including those
recited above, the Court does not have before it a complete record of the proceedings before the
magistrate court in the underlying case, nor any clear understanding of the judgment entered by
the probate court in the underlying case. The record does not tell us what “affidavits, the audio
recordings and the entire record” is the basis for the probate court to “find in favor of the
Personal Representative on every factual dispute.” Nor has Plaintiff presented evidence of
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exactly which appellate record would be presented in the hypothetical appeal along with the
argument for exactly the relief that would be available in a properly perfected appeal. While it is
correct that the opinion of the Honorable Duff McKee raises concerns regarding the procedure
and decision of the magistrate judge, that is a far cry from a decision on the merits based upon a
complete record.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this issue suffers the same frailty. Absent
a complete record and argument that would be before an appellate court in the hypothetical
appeal, this Court is not prepared to say the magistrate ruling was correct. There are a number of
interesting issues, including the question of what is required to create a power of appointment,
whether the will in this case does so, what evidence is admissible to make that determination and
what issues were before the trial court. Ultimately, Plaintiff Thomas Lanham bears the burden
of proof and persuasion in this case. However, where Defendant is moving for summary
judgment, it is incumbent upon Defendant to present the Court with a complete record upon
which a decision can be made.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is denied.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Janine P. Reynard, as party plaintiff in
the stead of Keith C. Lanham, is granted and Plaintiff Reynard’s complaint will be dismissed.
The remainder of Defendant’s summary judgment motion is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: 11/22/2016 11:48 AM

___________________________
RICHARD D. GREENWOOD
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD, as party plaintiff in the stead
of Keith C. Lanham,
Plaintiffs
v.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2016-8252
STIPULATION ON THE ISSUE
TO BE RESOLVED IN SUMMARY
JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS

Come now the parties, through their respective attorneys of record, and stipulate and agree
as follows:
WHEREAS, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of the
legality of the magistrate court's Findings of Fact and Judgment in the underlying probate
proceedings, to wit, In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham (Gem County Case No.
CV-2013-886).
WHEREAS the herein Court has ruled the aforesaid motions for summary judgment cannot
be resolved until a record of the underlying proceedings is made a part of this record.
STIPULATION ON THE ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED
IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS - 1
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WHEREAS the parties are in the process of assembling the aforesaid record in order to
comply with the Court's ruling.
WHEREAS the Court has directed the parties to prepare a stipulation which identifies the
issue to be resolved in the pending summary judgment proceedings.
WHEREAS the parties have fully briefed the issue presented, and the matter can be
submitted for decision at such time as the underlying record has been filed with the Court, subject
to the Court's discretion to require oral argument.
Therefore, based upon the above premises, the parties, through their respective attorneys
of record, stipulate and agree to submit the following issues to the Court for resolution without
further briefing: Plaintiffs issue: had the underlying notice of appeal for In the Matter of the Estate
of Gordon T. Lanham been timely filed, Plaintiffs Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham would have
been adjudicated the intestate heirs to the decedent's real property. Defendant's issue: a timely
appeal would have been unsuccessful.
Dated this 10th day of February, 2017.

/s/ Allen B. Ellis
Allen B. Ellis
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Dated this 13th day of February, 2017.
/s/ Samantha L. Lundberg
Samantha L. Lundberg
Attorney for Defendant
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

Richard L. Stubbs, ISB No. 3239
Samantha L. Lundberg, ISB No. 9992
CAREY PERKINS LLP
Capitol Park Plaza
300 North 6th Street, Suite 200
P. O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660
Email: service@careyperkins.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BASED ON NEWLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE

COMES NOW Defendant Douglas Fleenor, by and through his counsel of
record, and hereby submits this Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief in Support
of his Motion for Summary Judgment based on newly obtained evidence, stating the
following in support thereof:
1.

On August 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary
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OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON NEWLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 1
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Judgment, and on September 7, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
2.

The Court issued a Memorandum Decision on November 22, 2016,

indicating that the Court could not resolve all the issues presented due to an inadequate
record.
3.

Following the Court’s Decision, the parties assembled additional

records to provide the Court with sufficient facts to make a ruling. These records were
provided to the Court on or about March 2, 2017.
4.

In obtaining a complete record, Defendant discovered evidence the

Court and the parties did not incorporate into their briefing prior to the November 22, 2016
decision.
5.

The request to submit supplemental briefing will not prejudice Plaintiffs

and is timely as the Court has not yet issued a ruling resolving all the issues on the
cross-motions for summary judgment
Respectfully submitted,
DATED this 18th day of April, 2017.
CAREY PERKINS LLP

By

/s/ Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of April, 2017, I electronically
filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICourt/E-Filing system
which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the ICourt/E-Filing Registered Participants as
follows:
Allen B. Ellis
Ellis Law, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone (208) 345-7832

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-9564
Icourt/E-Filing
aellis@aellislaw.com

/s/ Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs
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Richard L. Stubbs, ISB No. 3239
Samantha L. Lundberg, ISB No. 9992
CAREY PERKINS LLP
Capitol Park Plaza
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P. O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,
DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Thomas and Keith Lanham brought a legal malpractice action
against Defendant Douglas Fleenor alleging that Defendant Fleenor committed
malpractice when he did not file a timely appeal in the prior lawsuit challenging the validity
of the will of their father, Gordon Lanham. On August 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, and on September 7, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion for
DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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Summary Judgment. On November 22, 2016, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision
indicating the Court could not resolve all the issues presented due to an inadequate
record. Following the Court’s decision, the parties assembled the additional Gem County
records to provide the Court with sufficient facts to make a ruling. While obtaining a
complete record of the Gem County documents for the Court, Defendant Fleenor
uncovered additional information that further demonstrates the Magistrate Court’s finding
that Gordon Lanham’s Will was valid under Idaho law was based on substantial and
competent evidence. Accordingly, Defendant Fleenor requests the Court grant his Motion
for Summary Judgment.
II.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE MAGISTRATE COURT’S FINDINGS
OF FACT
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Douglas Fleenor did not timely file an
appeal, and that had he filed an appeal, the Appellate Court would have found the
Magistrate Judge improperly granted the estate’s motion for summary judgment.
A court’s findings on cross motions for summary judgment will not be
disturbed on appeal so long as the record is sufficient to support the findings. Riverside
Development Co., v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 522, 650 P.2d 657, 664 (1982); Cougar
Bay Co., Inc. v. Bristol, 100 Idaho 380, 383, 597 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1979) (in reviewing
the sufficiency of the record to sustain a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the Court limits the review to whether there is substantial, competent, although
conflicting evidence, in the record to support the findings).

DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
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In the prior proceedings, on April 23, 2014, Douglas Fleenor, on behalf of
Thomas Lanham, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Memorandum in Support,
alleging that the property of the decedent, Gordon Lanham, should have passed intestate
to the decedent’s heirs for the reason that the Last Will and Testament of the decedent
failed to dispose of all of decedent’s property. Affidavit of Richard L. Stubbs in Support of
Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
Exhibit A. On May 23, 2014, Attorney Nancy Callahan, on behalf of the estate, filed a
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, alleging the will was
valid. Id., Exhibit B.
As evidence considered in the cross-motions for summary judgment, the
Court reviewed the transcription of Gordon Lanham’s Will, the audio recording of Gordon
Lanham’s Will, as well as the affidavits of Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Judd Lanham, and
Keith Lanham, which discuss the decedent’s intent to completely disinherit Thomas
Everett Lanham. The affidavits explicitly state that Thomas Everett Lanham was not to
profit from the estate and that Judd Lanham should distribute the remaining property not
specifically addressed in Gordon Lanham’s Will.
Catherine Lanham Gillihan, the older sibling of Gordon Lanham, testified in
an affidavit:
When Gordon Thomas was unable to be a lineman and had
limited work, his son, Thomas Everett agree to pay his father
for part of the property. Gordon Thomas quit claimed Thomas
E. some 100 + acres. The agreement was contingent on
Thomas E. selling his ranch. The sale failed and numerous
problems ‘snowballed.’ Because there was no written
contract, Gordon Thomas received no money and Thomas E.
listed that property for sale. Because of this transaction and
because Thomas E. failed to pay child support or arrange for
DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
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any further education for Joe or Robbie, and because Gordon
Thomas with assist from myself contributed to the education
of Joe and Robbie, Gordon Thomas felt Thomas E. needed
no further distribution from the estate.
Affidavit of Richard L. Stubbs in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit C. Ms. Gillihan went on to testify:
When Gordon Thomas was asked about his will, he told me
that when he dictated his estate wishes he had been at odds
with his family and that he was now making new distributions.
He stated that if it was incomplete, Judd knew his wishes and
that he completed trusted him to take care of Keith, Joe, and
Robbie. Gordon Thomas told me he didn’t put any one else in
charge because of the family conflict it would cause. He told
me he wanted Joe to be on the land and in his house to care
for him. He had a life tenancy for the property, and that the
ranch would be Joe’s when he died. He wanted Judd to pay
off Linda and take care of Keith, Joe, and Robbie, using his
discretion, with his remaining property. He left an audio tape
of his intentions and directions to Judd.
Id. Ms. Gillihan additionally attested to Gordon Lanham’s mental state and stated that “he
was coherent and clear as to his intentions and desires.” Id.
Judd Max Lanham, cousin of Gordon Lanham and the named personal
representative, testified in an affidavit that Gordon Lanham:
[S]aw his elder son, Thomas Everett, as a liar and a thief,
having quitclaimed about 115 acres to Thomas Everett on his
promise that he would help support Tom. Once the quitclaim
deed was recorded, Thomas Everett abandoned Tom. He felt
betrayed and saddened by Thomas Everett’s words and
actions. To say that this situation broke his heart is not an
exaggeration. Tom was ashamed of Thomas Everett’s
behavior toward the many women in his life and his neglect of
his children, particularly Joe and Robby.
Affidavit of Richard L. Stubbs in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit D. Judd Lanham also testified “Tom
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died on December 5, 2013. He left a Last Will and Testament naming me personal
representative. I did not want to be personal representative but Tom insisted because he
predicted problems from his son Thomas Everett Lanham, whom he was estranged from
until the day he died.” Id.
Additionally, Keith Lanham testified in an affidavit “I believe and accept that
my father made the specific gifts to my brother, Thomas Everett, and me as set forth in
his Will for his own personal reasons and his wishes should be honored.” Affidavit of
Richard L. Stubbs in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit E.
At the hearing on June 10, 2014, the Court heard arguments on the crossmotions for summary Judgment. Prior to arguments, the Magistrate Judge informed the
parties he had taken considerable time to review the record on the motions for summary
judgment, and stated that he thought the residuary clause in Gordon Lanham’s Will was
“explicit and clear that he wanted Judd to dispose of anything that was left that wasn’t
disposed of.” Affidavit of Richard L. Stubbs in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit F. Judge Smith then
stated he wanted to hear oral arguments for any additional information.
After hearing arguments from both parties, and reviewing the briefing prior
to the hearing, Judge Smith held:
I’m going to grant summary judgment on behalf of the
personal representative and I’m going to deny, Mr. Fleenor,
your motion for summary judgment. I find based on the will
(inaudible) admissible to show the donor’s intent. What the
deceased wanted is disposed of (inaudible) and through
parole evidence, you can determine his intent. The two boys
were specifically disinherited. I’m not going to override his
DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
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wishes. You know, I find that even in the light most favorable
to the adverse party, that there’s not genuine issue of material
fact implying we need a trial at this point. The rule’s clear the
donor’s intent was established by the concurrent recordings.
Ms. Callahan, you’ll prepare the order of summary
judgment…on behalf of the personal representative and they
have higher courts to take a look at what this court decides
but it’s real clear to me what Mr. Gordon Thomas Lanham
wanted and it’s real clear that not only in my mind does he
dispose of the property, but also his wishes are contained in
the recordings of what his intent was, that that would be
admissible and that’s the order of the Court.
Id. (emphasis added). On June 25, 2014, the Court issued its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, holding “claimant Thomas Everett Lanham advanced several claims,
but he failed to support his claims and arguments with one iota of credible, admissible
evidence. Based on the language of the will itself, the affidavits, the audio recordings, and
the entire record, the Court finds in favor of the Personal Representative on every factual
dispute.”

Affidavit of Richard L. Stubbs in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit G.
The Magistrate Court relied on substantial and competent evidence in the
record in rendering its decision that Gordon Lanham’s Will was valid pursuant to Idaho
law. Accordingly, even if the appeal had been timely filed, the Appellate Court’s review
would have been limited to whether the Magistrate Court’s findings were supported by
sufficient evidence in the record. See Riverside Development Co., v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho
515, 522, 650 P.2d 657, 664 (1982); see also Cougar Bay Co., Inc. v. Bristol, 100 Idaho
380, 383, 597 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1979). In making its decision, the Magistrate Court relied
on the language from Gordon Lanham’s Will itself, bolstered by the audio recording of
Gordon Lanham, and the Affidavits of Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Judd Max Lanham,
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and Keith Lanham. This is sufficient evidence to make the determination as to whether
Gordon Lanham executed a valid will before his death, and as such, the Magistrate’s
decision would not have been disturbed on appeal.
III.
CONCLUSION
The Magistrate Court’s decision was based on substantial evidence in the
record. Accordingly, the decision would not have been reversed on appeal. Even
assuming Douglas Fleenor breached a duty, the alleged breach did not cause any harm
because the Appellate Court would have sustained the Magistrate Court’s decision. For
the foregoing reasons, Douglas Fleenor requests to Court grant his motion for summary
judgment.
DATED this 4th day of May, 2017.

CAREY PERKINS LLP

By:__/s/Samantha L. Lundberg______
Samantha L. Lundberg, of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of May, 2017, I electronically filed
the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICourt/E-Filing system which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the ICourt/E-Filing Registered Participants as follows:
Allen B. Ellis
Ellis Law, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone (208) 345-7832
Attorneys for Plaintiff

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-9564
ICourt/E-Filing
aellis@aellislaw.com

/s/ Samantha L. Lundberg
Samantha L. Lundberg
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,

vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMANTHA L.
LUNDBERG IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
)
County of Ada

SAMANTHA L. LUNDBERG, having been first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and says:
1.

I am a member of the law firm of Carey Perkins LLP, attorneys of

record for the Defendant Douglas Fleenor in the above-captioned action, and the
following statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct.
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMANTHA L. LUNDBERG IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-1
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2.

The following records produced herewith as Exhibit "A" through

"G", from the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham, Gem County Case No.

CV2013-886 were provided to the Court on or about March 2, 2017, and are being
reproduced for the ease of the Court in reviewing the Supplemental Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
3.

Attached as Exhibit "A" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of

Thomas Lanham's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
April 23, 2014.
4.

Attached as Exhibit "B" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of

the Personal Representative's Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, dated May 23, 2014.
5.

Attached as Exhibit "C" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of

the Affidavit of Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Exhibit 1 to the Memorandum in Support of
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, dated May 22, 2014.
6.

Attached as Exhibit "D" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of

the Affidavit of Judd Max Lanham, Exhibit 2 to the Memorandum in Support of Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, dated May 23, 2014.
7.

Attached as Exhibit "E" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of

the Affidavit of Keith Lanham, Exhibit 3 to the Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, dated May 22, 2014.
8.

Attached as Exhibit "F" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of

the transcript of the Hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment, dated June 10, 2014.

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMANTHA L. LUNDBERG IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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9.

Attached as Exhibit "G" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of

the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the Motion and Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment, dated June 25, 2014.
FURTHER your Affiant saith not.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

_!r__ day of May, 2017.

(SEAL)

STEPHANIE WHITE
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IOAHO

u lie for Idaho
Residing at ~ ' {O
Commission expires {0 ,Zo / ZO

f
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4 th day of May, 2017, I electronically filed
the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICourt/E-Filing system which
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the ICourt/E-Filing Registered Participants as follows:
Allen B. Ellis
Ellis Law, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone (208) 345-7832
Attorneys for Plaintiff

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-9564
ICourt/E-Filing
aellis@aellislaw.com
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F~om:Key Business Center

04~12014 14: 17

208 947 5910

#870 P.004/008

Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989
Attorney & Counselor at Law
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100
Boise, ID 83702
208-472-8846
208-947-S910 fax
Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham

IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF nm THJRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

In the Matter of the Estate of
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM;
Deceased.

Case No. CV 2013-886
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham, by and through his attorney, Douglas
E. Fleenor, and submits his Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment.
Petitioner seeks summary judgment declaring that property of the decedent passed
intestate to the decedent's heirs for the reason that the Last Will and Testament of the decedent
fails to dispose of all of decedent's property.

FACTS

The personal representative filed a purported Last Will and Testament of the above
named decedent dated January 19, 2011.
Decedent's Last Will and Testament fails to make any dispositive provisions or give
direction regarding the residue of his estate.

In paragraph four on page two, the Will states, "I want [Judd] to be able to distribute my
property and my personal effects in any way that he sees fit and I will try to put an the wording

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 1

49
000194

From:Key Business Center
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041\...(2014 14 : 17

#870 P.005/008

about the personal effects." Then again in the last paragraph, the WiJl reiterates, "I want [Judd}
to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects as stated in my Last Will and
Testament."
Page 3 of the Will contains the only possible devise, stating " .. .I gotta $3,000 sheep head

that Judd can hang up in his cabin if he wants to.,,

Toe remainder of the Will discusses the ownership of certain property located at his
residence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate with the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions
on fil~ show th.at there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). Failure of a party to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and upon which that
_p arty bears the b~den of proof entitles the moving party to swrunaryjudgmeot as a matter of law.
The Idaho Supreme Court has thoroughly addressed the standards governing motions for summary

judgment.
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court is generally required to
liberally -c onstrue the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions. drawing
all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Construction Management Systems.

Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America, 135 Idaho 680,682, 23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001). However, Rule
56(3) requires the non-moving party to go beyond pleadings through affidavit, depositions, etc.• to
demonstrate that there are genuine issue of material facts, Doe v. Durischi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P .2d
1238 (1986). If the non-moving party mils to do so, then the moving party is entitled to summary
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judgment as a matter of law. Id at 46, 716 P.2d at 124); see also Sparks v. St. Lukes Reg. Medical

Ctr. Ltd, 115 Idaho 505, 768 P.2d 768 (1988).
ARGUMENT
Idaho has adopted of the Uniform Probate Code, which allows decedents to pass their
property upon death through a validly executed Will.
A will should be interpreted, if possible, in such manner as to prevent intestacy when it
evinces an intention to dispose of the entire estate. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 6, 383 P.2d
339,341 (]963).
However, a devisee must be identified so that the courts can be certain that the testator's
inten1s and purposes are being carried out. Yribar v. Fitzpatrick, 91 Idaho 105, 108, 416 P.2d
164, 167 (1966), quoting 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, pg. 18, § 363.
In order to avoid intestacy, either partial or complete, the court is not permitted to place
on the will any construction not expressed in it, and which is based on supposition

as to the

intention of the testator in the disposition of his estate. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383
P.2d 339,341 (1963); In re Hoytema's Estate, 180 Cal. 430, 181 P. 645; In re Be/don's Estate, 11
Cal.2d 108, 77 P.2d 1052; 95 C.J.S. Wills§ 615c.
Idaho statutes authorize a person to devise or bequeath his property, but it does not permit
him to delegate to another the power to make such disposition for him. Hedin v. Westdala

Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241,250, 81 P.2d 741, 745 (1938). Such testamentary efforts have
been likened unto powers of attorney to make wills, which the law does not permit Id
Each of the above cases held that a devise fails when a devisee is not designated with
sufficient legal certainty. Examples of failed devises included a gift to any charitable
organization chosen by a spouse (Hedin), devising the residue to any worthy charity selected by

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

51
000196

Prom:Key Business Center

04~/2014 14: 18

208 947 5910

#870 P.007/008

the executor (Yribar), and a failure to dispose of half the estate (Corwin), Without a defined
devisee. the court cannot ascertain or enforce a decedent's intent.
Idaho Statutes also state that any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed
of by his will passes to his heirs. I.C. §15-2-10 I. In addition. if any devise fails for any reason, it
becomes part of the residue. I.C. § 15-2-606.
When a devise fails and the will lacks a. residuary clause, the residue passes through
intestate succession. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 ldaho 1, 5,383 P.2d 339,341 (1963),
In this case, even if the Will is valid, the decedent clearly failed to name devisees for his
property. Therefore, as a matter of taw, decedent's entire estate, with the possible exception of
one specific devise, passes to bis heirs by intestate succession pursuant to Chapter 2, Title 15 of
the Idaho Code. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to swnmary judgment on this issue.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, summary jud~ent should be granted in favor. of Petitioner,
finding the property of decedent passes to his heirs by intestate succession.
DATED this~ day of April, 2014.

Attorney for Petitioner
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F IA.~
MAY 2 3 2014
Nancy L. Callahan
Idaho Stat e Bar #4884
Rolf M. Keh ne
Idaho State Bar #2180
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN
101 Canal Street
Emmett, I daho 83617
Telephone:
( 208) 365-1200
Facsimile :
(208) 365-1646
Attorneys for Personal Representative

IN TH E DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF GEM

)

I n the Matter of the Estate of:

CASE NO. CV2013-886

)

)
)

GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF CROSS MOTI ON FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTION TO DISMISS

)
)

Deceased .

This memorandum is res pectfully submitted to the Court in
support of the

Personal

SUMMARY JUDGM ENT

Representative's

AND

OPPOSITION

CROSS

MOTION

TO THOMAS

FOR

EVERETT

LANHAM'S MOTI ON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Gordon Thomas Lanham executed a Last Will an d Testament on
January 19, 2011 naming his cousin, Judd Lanham executor giving him
Power of Attorney over all of his personal and real property. The Last
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Will and Testament of Gordon Thomas Lanham specifically provided for
his sons Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham to each receive a dollar and
a bed made by their grandfather. The ch ildren of Keith Lanham were
also specifically disinherited.

The Last Will and Testament was

transcribed from a recording made by the testator over a period of time.
On or about November 19, 2013 the testator executed a Transfer
on Death Deed naming Petitioner's son, Joe Lanham, beneficiary,
subject to payment of a mortgage to his former girlfriend and his
brother Rex Lanham Jr.'s ex-wife, Linda Louise Andrews Lanham(aka)
Linda Louise Andrews, . Gordon Thomas Lanham died on December 5,
2013.

The original Will was filed with the Court on December 20, 2013

and Judd Lanham was informally appointed personal representative.
On January 8, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, a son, filed pro se
an "Application to Attest Personal Representative" in the probate case
with a claim that the will was not valid and that the personal
representative was not qualified . On January 13, 2014, Keith Lanham,
by and through his attorney William F. Lee filed a Petition to Remove
Personal Representative with claims contesting the validity of the will
and removal of the personal representative. The matters were set for
hearing on January 21, 2014.
On or about January 15, 2014, the personal representative
attempted to satisfy the mortgage to Linda Louise Andrews Lanham in
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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the amount of $54,625.00 from funds left to the personal representative
in a POD account. He was verbally instructed by the decedent prior to
his death that Joe Lanham would take the ranch free and clear of any
encumbrances.

Linda Andrews Lanham refused to accept payment of

the mortgage.
On January 21, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, pro se, and Keith
Lanham with his attorney, William F. Lee, were present in Court in the
probate case.

Judd Lanham was present with counsel.

Also present

were the two witnesses to the decedent's Will, Rebecca Clift, notary,
Cathy Gillihan, sister of the decedent, and other family members. This
Court advised the parties that two matters were before the Court; the
issue of removal of the personal representative and the validity of the
Will. The Court advised the parties that it was not inclined to remove
the personal representative and that the matters concerning the
construction of the will were continued for a half day trial on April 2,
2014.
On March 5, 2014 the Personal Representative and Joe Lanham
filed a Quiet Title action in Gem County Case No. 2014-185 due to Linda
Andrews' refusal to accept satisfaction of the mortgage.
On March 24, 2014 Attorney Fleenor entered an appearance in this case
on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham in the probate case and in the
quiet title action on behalf of Linda Louise Andrews Lanham.

In the
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probate case he filed another Petition for Order Removing Personal
Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and a Petition of
Order Restraining Personal Representative on behalf of Thomas Everett
Lanham.
On March 28, 2014 the personal representative, . Judd Lanham,
filed his affidavit concerning the audio recording of the decedent which
was the basis for the Will in contest and because the recording included
additional instruction to the personal representative for distribution of
his personal property.
On March 28, 2014, William F. Lee, on behalf of Keith Lanham,
withdrew his Petition to Remove Personal Representative and Keith's
claim contesting the validity of the will.
On April 2, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham or his attorney failed to
appear for the Court trial to construe or determine the validity of the
Will, a trial that was pending since January 21, 2014.
On April 3, 2014, Thomas E. Lanham appeared with his counsel,
Douglas Fleenor, for hearing on their Petition for Order Removing
Personal Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and a
Petition of Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court having ·
reviewed the record and arguments of counsel denied the Petition for
Order Removing Personal Representative and further denied the Petition
for Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court awarded the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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estate attorney's fees.
On April

9,

2014 Attorney

Fleenor filed

an

Answer and

Counterclaim in the quiet title action alleging the deed transferring the
ranch to Joe Lanham was void and the ranch should be Included in the
estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham. Linda Louis Andrews further claimed
that the decedent failed to make any principle payments on the
December 17, 2002 mortgage entitling her to $137,369.46.

Paragraph

6 of the Counterclaim alleges that:
"On August 19, 2004, Gordon Thomas Lanham coerced Linda Lanham
into signing a "Mortgage Payment", by threatening to expose and
distribute personal, private and revealing photographs of Linda Lanham.
The purported amount of the interest payment was $23,400.00."
Paragraphs 8 and 9 further allege:
"That on December 11, 2006, Gordon Thomas Lanham fraudulently
caused Linda Lanham to enter Into an accord and satisfaction agreement
by promising her payment of cash in the amount to $50,000. The
accord and satisfaction consisted of Linda Lanham signing a Satisfaction
of Mortgage for the December 17, 2002 Mortgage, in exchange for
Gordon Thomas Lanham paying Linda Lanham $50,000 in cash and
executing a new Promissory Note and Mortgage in the amount of
$50,000 bearing Interest at the rate of 3% annum.
Upon obtaining
Linda Lanham's signatures, Gordon Thomas Lanham lelt the premises
without paying Linda Lanham any of the promised amounts."
On April 21, 2014 the personal representative and Joe Lanham
filed a reply to Linda Andrew's counterclaim alleging any claims of fraud
made by Linda Andrews Is barred by the statute of limitations and the
only amount due to Linda Andrews is $54,625.00.
On about April 21, 2014, an estate check in the amount of
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$54,625.00 was sent to Mr. Fleenor and Linda Louise Andrews Lanham.
On April 23, 2014, Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment in Gem County Case No.2014-187 on behalf of Linda Louise
Andrews Lanham on the issue that the Deed to Joe Lanham is void and
claims that the ranch should be included in the decedent's estate. On
that same day Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in
this probate case on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham on the issue that
the Will fails to make any dispositive provisions or give direction
regarding the residue of his father's estate and should pass intestate to
decedent's heirs.
ARGUMENT
The Last Will and Testament of Gordon Thomas Lanham clearly
and

unambiguously

and

for

independent

reason,

specifically

bequeathed that his sons, Thomas Everett Lanham and Keith Colby
Lanham, each receive one dollar and a bed that there grandfather
made for them each as children be returned to them, with the intent
that his sons take nothing from his estate.

The will also specifically

states that the children of Keith Colby Lanham would receive nothing
from his estate.
On the first page of the will Gordon Thomas Lanham states that:
"This is a new day. It's the 29th of November. Thanksgiving is over and
I just wanted to add to this program that my son, Thomas Everett
Lanham, 48 years old, has already been given all that he needs to have
and that I am going to leave $1 (sic) more dollar against whatever is
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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legal to him and then he Is going to be on his own."
On Page 2 paragraph 1 the Will states:
"It's a new day and it's snowing. It's 1st December 2010. It's the first
snow out back. I am not really looking forward to it, .... but anyway, I
want to go on about my son, Keith Colby Lanham and his wife, ·Amy
Lanham, that I am going to try to write it down or leave it in this
recording that. .. what I leave them is going to be $1 because in my
estate I don't want him to be able to sell and profit off his alcoholism or
drugs ....
Track 7 and 8 of the audio recording previously submitted allows
one to hear this decision he made to disinherit his sons in the decedent's
own words.
Track 8 of the audio recording made by the decedent (the entry
dated March 19, 2011) on the CD previously submitted to the Court,
clearly and unambiguously instructed that the lots at Big Creek property
were to be distributed as follows:
"My plans are to leave that 27 acres on the east side of that Big Creek
Property to Jamie Gillihan, my sister's only son, and I want to plan for
leaving the 20 acres on the west side to my grandson Joseph Lanham
and my other grandson Thomas Robert John Lanham and he is only
eighteen and Joe is 21 so I don't know how that will work on a deed etc.
However that works, but anyway, I'm working on what I am going to do
with this house and 34 acres because of the $50,000 mortgage that
Lizzie has on i~, I'm thinking that Jamie can pay her mortgage for his
27" acres ... "
The Court should take judicial notice of the quiet title action
concerning the decedent's real property, Gem County.Case No . CV2014187. In that case the Issue is payment of the "$50,000 mortgage that
Lizzie has on it", her counterclaim states that she is entitled to
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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$137,369.49, her claim the deed intended to gift the ranch to Joe
Lanham is void, and claiming that the ranch should be included In this
estate case, presumably as part of the ·residual estate.

Then in this

case, Thomas Everett is challenging the validity of the will to claim an
intestate portion of the residual estate.
Trial courts must determine the admissibility of evidence as a
"threshold question" to be answered before addressing the merits of
motions for summary judgment.

Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning

Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778,784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992), Ryan v
Beisner, 123 Idaho at 45, 844 P.2d at 27 (Ct.App. 1992), Gem State
Ins.

Co.

v

Hutchinson,

145

Idaho

10,

175

P.2d.172(2007),

Montgomery v Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1 at 6 (Idaho 2009).
When considering evidence presented in support of or opposition
to a motion for summary judgment, a court can only consider material
which would be admissible at trial.
Canal,Co;,

Petricevich v Salmon River

92 Idaho 865-,869, 452 P.2d 362,366 (1969) I.R.C.P.

56(e).
In addressing the evidentiary issues raised concerning the
statements attributed to Gordon Thomas Lanham on the CD recording
concerning the distribution of his estate, and the Affidavits of
Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Judd Lanham and Keith Lanham inform the
court of the decedent's reasons and intent to completely disinherit
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Thomas Everett Lanham after quitclaiming 115 acres to Thomas
Everett on his promise to help financially support his father as set forth
in the affidavits submitted herewlth are admissible hearsay and will be
admitted as evidence at trial as exception to hearsay rule I.R.E.
803(3) which provides:
Rule

803 :

Hearsay

exceptions;

availability

of

declarant

immaterial
(3)
The Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical
Condition . A statement of the declarant's then existing
state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition
(such as intent, plan, motive, design mental feeling, pan,
and bodily heath), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms
of declarant's will. ( emphasis added)
The Affidavit of Catherine Lanham Gillihan (Exhibit 1) and the
Affidavit of Keith Lanham (Exhibit 3), support the decedent's wishes
that neither Keith Lanham nor Thomas Everett were to profit from the
estate and that Judd Lanham should distribute his remaining personal
property.
The Affidavit of Judd Lanham, personal representative, clarifies
the terms of the will concerning the statement in the will that "I want
Judd to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects in
any way that he sees fit and I will try to put all the wording" in that
Gordon Thomas Lanham believed at the time of his death that the only
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remaining property after his specific bequests would be personal
property items to be distributed in-kind, if possible.
The intended beneficiaries of this estate are the sons of Thomas
Everett Lanham, namely Joseph "Joe" Lanham and Robert "Robby"
Lanham.

Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing argument and the evidence submitted
herewith, the Court should dismiss Thomas Everett Lanham's claim,
find that Gordon Thomas Lanham fully disposed of hi~ estate in his will
and his audio recordings and the personal property remaining in the
decedent's estate should be distributed by the personal representative
at his discretion for the reasons set forth herein and as intended by
Gordon Thomas Lanham.

Further, that the Court should order that

Thomas Everett Lanham reimburse the estate the attorney's fees
incurred herein.
Dated this~ay of May 2014.

~~

Attorneys for Personal Representative
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Nancy L. Callahan
Idaho State Bar #4884
Rolf M. Kehne
Idaho State Bar #2180
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN
101 Canal Street
Emmett, Idaho 83617
Telephone:
(208) 365"!1200
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646
Attorneys for Personal Representative

In the Matter of the Estate of:
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

Deceased
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Gem

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
}

CASE NO. CV2013-0886

AFFIDAVIT OF CATHERINE
LANHAM GILLIHAN

: ss
Your Affiant, CATHERINE LANHAM GILLIHAN, having personal
knowledge of the facts herein and being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and states as follows:
1. · I am a retired nurse and vocational education instructor. I am the

oldest sibling to Gordon Thomas Lanham and Judd Lanham is my first
cousin.

Our fathers operated a power line construction company

involving the entire family in the work.
2.

Linda Louise Andrews came Into the family by marriage to Rex E

Lanham, Jr. in October, 1965 and in the mid 80's she divorced receiving

AFFIDAVIT OF CATHERINE LANHAM GILIHAN- PAGE 1

!:}\')\\),t \

63
000210

a marital settlement plus a future distribution.

She will be receiving

another settlement from our mother's trust. Linda continued to live ·on
and off with our mother, Hazel Lanham. She borrowed a lot of money
from her that has never been repaid . She had full knowledge of our
family finances induding Gordon Thomas's and knew that his finances
were limited and that he was receiving assistance from his mother after
he returned to the Butte.

During his illness, Gordon Thomas's sons,

nephews, grandsons, and friends were assisting him to maintain his
equipment and repairs to his Butte property.
3. Following Linda's divorce, she married Sam Davis and Gordon Thomas
had married Joanne Blackwell; both were married to other people during
much of their relationship, and did not file any joint tax returns, or have
any financial accounts together. Gordon Thomas never introduced her to
anyone as his wife.

Linda Louise Andrews Lanham has always been

known by this family and friends as Rex Jr. 's ex-wife.
4. After her other ventures for her "dream" bed and breakfast were
bankrupt, Linda built a room on the side of Gordon Thomas's house,
knowing that the house was In structural disrepair and that it would not
pass any commercial codes, including the water.
5. At the same time, Linda was trying to build a similar venture on the
family's Mexican

property,

knowing

government would not accept It.

full

well

that the

Mexican

The government took that property
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and Linda returned to the border broke.

Gordon Thomas borrowed

money to go and get her and he stated "that she was yet in another
affair" and he ended his relationship with Linda. Gordon Thomas then
married his life-long friend, Norma de Cordova. Linda secured the
mortgage on the property.
6. Gordon Thomas delayed paying Linda because he had no cash flow.
He also felt he deserved consideration for payment of the mortgage
because he paid many of Linda's outstanding bills: her divorce from Sam
Davis, her eye surgery, care for her terminally ill mother, and numerous
other expenditures.
7. When Gordon Thomas was unable to be a lineman and had limited
work, his son, Thomas Everett agreed to pay his father for part of the
property. Gordon Thomas quit claimed Thomas E. some 100 + acres.
The agreement was contingent on Thomas E. selling his ranch. The..sale
failed and numerous problems "snowballed".

Because there was no

written contract Gordon Thomas received no money and Thomas E.
listed that property for sale. Because of this transaction and because
Thomas E. failed to pay child support or arrange for any further
education for Joe or Robbie, and because Gordon Thomas with assist
from myself contributed to the education of Joe and Robbie, Gordon
Thomas felt Thomas E. needed no further distribution from the estate.
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8. Gordon Thomas was hospitalized numerous times in the last 14
months of his life.

Linda wrote cards, telephoned, and came to the

hospital on numerous occasions.

She acted llke an old friend, not a

woman who was coerced or threated by Gordon Thomas In the past.
She stated to him that because she still owed him, she would care for
him in his home; an offer Gordon Thomas declined. At no time that I
am aware of did Linda ask about payment of the mortgage or that she
was owed more money. It Is only after Gordon Thomas's death is she
now claiming she Is owed more money.
9.

I understand that Linda Is now making accusations that Gordon

Thomas threatened or coerced her Into signing certain documents or he
would distribute "personal, private, revealing photographs of Linda
Louise Andrews. I have assisted Judd Lanham in going through Gordon
Thomas's personal effects and all of his pictures and papers.
compromising materials were found.

No

There were posed pictures like

"glamour shots" that Linda had taken by a professional studio and
distributed them herself. These photos have been returned to Linda.
10. When Gordon Thomas was asked about his will, he told me that
when he dictated his estate wishes he had been at odds with his family
and that he was now making new distributions. He stated that if it was
incomplete, Judd knew his wishes and that he completely trusted him to
take care of Keith, Joe and Robbie. Gordon Thomas told me he didn't
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put any one else in charge because of the family conflict It would cause.
He told me he wanted Joe to be on the land and in his house to care for
him. He had a life tenancy for the property, and that the ranch would be
Joe's when he died. He wanted Judd to pay off Linda and take care of
Keith, Joe, and Robbie, using his discretion, with his remaining property.
He left an audio tape of his intentions and directions to Judd.

1i.

When Gordon Thomas was undergoing surgery or treatments, he

was coherent and clear as to his intentions and desires. He could clearly
recall any fact or figure we needed about getting work done around the
place or for his finances.

He was clearly able to make any and all

decisions necessary for his future.
The above Is true to the best of my knowledge, Catherine Gillihan
Dated this ~day of May 2014.

~~[u._
Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Affiant.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ y of May 2014.
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~ Nancy L. Callahan
Idaho State Bar #4884
Rolf M. Kehne
Idaho State Bar #2180
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN
101 Canal Street
Emmett, Idaho 83617
Telephone:
(208) 365-1200
Facsimile: (208} 365-1646
Attorneys for Personal Representative

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF GEM

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,
Deceased

CASE NO. CV2013-0886

AFFIDAVIT OF JUDD LANHAM

_____________}
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Gem

)

: ss
Your Affiant, JUDD LANHAM, personal representative, having
personal knowledge of the facts herein and being first duly sworn upon
oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

Gordon Thomas Lanham and I were first cousins.

Our fathers

were brothers. We grew up together. He was the closest I would ever
have to a little brother. We played together as children, ran a little wild
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together as adolescents, worked In power llne construction with our dads
for several years, and spent time with our young families together
camping and otherwise socializing. I was with Tom through his marriages
and divorces to Colleen, JoAnn and Norma, and his relationship with
Defendant Linda Louise Andrews. At the time of his death he was confined to

a wheelchair and housebound. I spoke to him each day (sometimes twice a
day) until the day before he died.

2. Tom married his first wife, Colleen, while he was still in high school.
They had two sons, Thomas Everett Lanham and Keith Colby Lanham.
Keith has three sons and Thomas Everett has four children including, Joseph
(Joe) Lanham and Robert (Robby) Lanham. Joe and Robby are half-brothers.
Tom was estranged from his children. He was disappointed in the behavior
of Keith's sons, who rarely came to visit t heir grandfather and only, in Tom's
words, "when they wanted something from him." Prior to his death he was
rebulldlng his relationship with Keith.

3.

He saw his elder son, Thomas Everett, as a liar and a thief, having

quitclaimed about 115 acres to Thomas Everett on his promise that he would
help support Tom. Once the quitclaim deed was recorded, ·Thomas Everett
abandoned Tom. He felt betrayed and saddened by Thomas Everett's words
and actions.

To say that this situation broke his heart is not an

exaggeration. Tom was ashamed of Thomas Everett's behavior toward the
many women In his life and his. neglect of his children, particularly Joe and
Robby.
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4. During the last years of Tom's life, his support network was pretty much
reduced to Joe and wife Jessica, Keith and his wife Amy, Robbie, his sister
Cathi, a few close friends and me. Tom was especially appreciative of the
support of his grandsons Joe and Robby. Tom saw genuine promise in them.
He gave great credit to his sister Cathy for the way they had turned out; she
had taken a firm hand In helping them with upbringing and schooling. Over
the course of our discussions, Tom made it clear to me that he wanted Joe to
have his ranch, free and clear of the mortgage to Linda, and he wanted to
help Robby.

After his experience with Thomas Everett, he wanted to be sure

that he could live at the ranch for the rest of his life knowing that Joe and his
wife would care for him and upon his death the ranch would be transferred,
free and clear to his grandson, Joseph Lanham. A deed entitled Transfer on
Death Deed was recorded to memorlallze his intent, shortly before he passed

away.
5. Tom had a live-in relationship with Linda Louise Andrews Lanham (whose
last name Is Lanham because she was once married to Tom's older brother
Rex Jr.). At one point In their relatlonshlp in mld·1990, Tom agreed to let
Linda add_onto the ranch house In the hopes of turning the place into a dude
ranch or bed and breakfast. Linda used some of her money for the project.
To secure her Investment, Tom gave Linda a mortgage on his ranch. The
bed and breakfast Idea failed, which began Tom's long and tumultuous "onagain, off-again" relationship with Linda. As set forth In the documents filed
in the quiet title action, Tom and Linda entered into a series of recorded
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satisfactions and mortgages and at the time of his death Linda held a
mortgage of $50,000.00 with 3% Interest, payable on de~th.
6.

Tom died on December 5, 2013.

He left a Last Will and Testament

naming me personal representative.

I did not want to be personal

representative but Tom Insisted because he predicted problems from his son
Thomas Everett Lanham, whom he was estranged from until the day he died.
7. Once I was appointed personal representative and because the mortgage
was payable upon Tom's death and accruing 3% Interest, and knowing It was
Tom's desire that Joe own his ranch free and clear of further Involvement
with Linda, I attempted to satisfy Linda's mortgage.

I Issued a check for

payment in the amount of $54,625.00 for the principle and approximate
Interest that had accrued from January 2011 to January 15, 2014.

Linda

refused to accept this check.
9.

As a result of Linda refusing to accept payment I initiated a quiet title

action with, and on behalf of Joe Lanham and the estate In Gem County Case
No. CV2014-185.

In that action, Linda Andrew Lanham Is claiming that

deed to transfer the ranch to his grandson Joe Lanham Is void and the ranch
should be included this estate action.

She further counterclaims in the quiet

title action that due to threats or coercion Tom made in 2004 and 2006, she
is owed $137,369.49, instead of $54,625.00.
10.

Once Issue of payment of Linda's mortgage Is settled, Tom still has

outstanding debts and medical bills of approximately $28,354.00.

The rest

of his property, not Including the ranch, consists of household goods, farm
tools, guns, family memorabilia, an unknown distribution from the Hazel
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Lanham trust, and 2 undeveloped forest lots at Big Creek In Valley County
with a tax assessed value of $1620.00, although the market value may be
much higher.

11. According to track #9 (the entry dated March 19, 2011) of the CD
previously submitted to the Court, Tom wanted the Big Creek property
to be distributed as follows:
"My plans are to leave that 27 acres on the east side of that Big Creek
Property to Jamie GIiiihan, my sister's only son, and I want to plan for
leaving the 20 acres on the west side to my grandson Joseph Lanham
and my other grandson Thomas Robert John Lanham and he Is only
eighteen and Joe ls 21 so I don't know how that will work on a deed
etc. However that works, but anyway, I'm working on what I am going
to do with this house and 34 acres because of the $50,000 mortgage
that Uzzle has on It, I'm thinking that Jamie can pay her mortgage for
his 27 acres ... "
12. I believe that this is a specific instruction. Tom wanted me to sell
the 27 acres on the east side of the creek to Jamie Gillihan for $50,000
and to gift the remaining 20 acres to his grandsons Joe and Rob
Lanham, who has now reached the age of majority.

Tom's sister,

Cathy Gillihan, owns property at Big Creek and she has personal
knowledge of the lay-out of the properties.

This distribution is

possible, unless the properties need to be listed for sale to pay for
medical bill or further litigation in this case and the quiet title action.
13. Much of the personal property listed In the will and by Tom on the
CD was sold prior to his death.
14. Tom wanted me to distribute the remaining personal property in
kind to his various family members, and in consideratlon of their actions or
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Inactions related to challenging his wlll and estate. I am prepared to make
such distributions, unless this property needs to be sold to pay for Tom 's
medical bills or further lltlgatlon In this case and the quiet title action.
15. Tom specifically did not want his sons Keith and Thomas Everett Lanham
to profit from his estate and as set forth in his Last Will and Testament and
on Tracks 7 and 8 of the CD, In Tom's own word, It Is obvious that this was a
very painful and difficult decision for him to make.
16. Keith Lanham was able to reconcile with his father before his death and
he accepts and honors his father's wishes as set forth in his father's will.
17.

Thomas Everett did not have further contact with his father after

acquiring 100+ acres by quitclaim deed and they were estranged at the t ime
of Gordon Thomas Lanham's death .

-2"A

Dated this ~ day of May 2014.

!!Ji-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of May 2014.
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Nancy L. Callahan
Idaho State Bar #4884
Rolf M. Kehne
Idaho State Bar #2180
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN
101 Canal Street
Emmett, Idaho 83617
Telephone:
(208) 365-1200
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646
Attorneys for Personal Representative
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

In the Matter of the Estate of:

)
)
)

GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

)
)
)
)

Deceased
_____________
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Gem

CASE NO. CV2013-0886

AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH LANHAM

)

)
: ss
)

Your Affiant, KEITH LANHAM, son of Gordon Thomas Lanham,
having personal knowledge of the facts herein and being first duly sworn
upon oath, deposes and states as follows:

1.

My father, Gordon Thomas Lanham, passed away on December 5,

2013. At .the time of his death he was wheelchair bound and needed full
time assistance so he could continue to live on his ranch. My wife and I
live one property away and we were both working full-time . Joe was

AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH LANHAM- PAGE 1

t'/hib,t 3

74
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,......,.
working In North Dakota and he was able to help· my father financially.
His wife, Jessica, helped care for him during the last years of his life. He
was building a small house on his property so Joe and his family could
be closer to care for him. It was my father's Intent to live on his ranch
with Joe and his family living with him or on his property.
2.

He Intended to give the ranch to Joe and he recorded a deed to

transfer the ranch to Joe after he died.
3.

I .believe and accept that my father made the specific gifts to my

brother, Thomas Everett, and me as set forth In his Will for his own
personal reasons and his wishes should be honored.
4. The remainder of my father's personal property consists primarily of
old farm and ranching equipment and vehicles, household Items and
sentimental memorabilia. These Items of personal property and the lots
at Big Creek should be distributed according to his will and his recorded
wishes made after he executed his will. Judd Lanham is the appropriate
person to manage and distribute my father's estate as he knows what
my father wanted him to do.
5. A few years ago my father quitclaimed my brother Thomas Everett
approximately l00+acres. This was not intended as a gift. My brother
promised to help support my father so that he could pay his blll's,
including the mortgage to Linda Andrews Lanham.

My brother

abandoned my father after the quitclaim deed was recorded.

AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH LANHAM- PAGE 2
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7. I reconciled with my father prior to his death. I do know that my
father was completely estranged from my brother, Thomas Everett, at
the time of his death on December 5, 2013.
Dated this~day of May 2014.

fl~
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to b fore me this ~

day of May 2014.

Notary
Resldi
~-~~~----.--:--T-My Commission Expires: ~;::z._/_1 ~
t -~--
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IN THE DISTRICT COORT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR!CT

STAT~ OF I DAHO FOR THE COUNTY

OF GEM

LO

MAG!ST~T8 DIVISION

ll.&;2Q

OCT 2 2 201~
In the Matter of

. SlEJ.Yn:fOW, OLER!(

)
)

GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

} Case bl'o.
)

Daceased.

JJ@isM\
oi11W.m
1 3 - 88 6

)

)

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JtJDGMENt
THE HONORA8L£ TYLER D. SMITH, PRESIDING

STATE

or

IDAHO MAGISTRATE

EMMETT, IDAHO
JUNE 10, 20H

TRANSCRIPTION EY':
Canyon t~ansc~iption

P.O. Box 387

Caldwell, I d~ho

83606

Proceedings .acordcd by eleot~onic sound recording.
Transcript produced by transcription servics.
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RULlNG

L i tlE

8

6

11

19

5

19

~

12

23
22

13

3

3

000229

09/23/2015

06:16PM

2083651646

NANCY CALLAHAN

RECEIVED 09/04/2015 63:11PM 20836~1646

Sep. 4. 2015 ·3: 10PM

FOLEY FREEMAN, PLLC 208-888-5130

, .. ,
(Proceedrngs begin,)
Z
COURT: Be seated. I heva Gordon IAnhilm. I have
3 pelldlng eroas moti1ms; for surnmary Judgment and motion tn
,4 dl!imlli5 en behalf of the petSonal represenl:lltSve. lr1 this
6 particular case, I've spent considerable time thi!i morning
G going thrcugh the record on th• motions for $11mmarv
T Judgment.
,
Was there any additional tnronnatlan by way of
9 evidence that either side Willi 9oin9 ID pn1unt7 I know
O there wit • hearing in the dlsbirt anllt but I'm not SIJ!l!
11 that It had anything l:hilt would be diS'PoSitive <In my
1 d11clsion In this mJttar,
3
MS. ~UAHAN: Judge, I guess t can tell you what
14 I'm aware of dlilt h11ppened In thtt dllltt'ict couJt ltlilt M5.
. ·5 Llnc!a Lanham Andrav,,.; had (in1111cllble) il9~illlit the stay. We
•• did a quklt title 11i;tion. The defe.n<fant ~iloo to plead
17
II
1U

:ao
'1
22

~3

:4
25
·1

2

a
, ·4
5
&

7
8

·g

·,a
11
2

13

".4
~

i's
7
a·
19
,0
.:1
22
.3
..4

25

1
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COURT; {Iniludlble.)

2

MR. FLEENOR: El(a~y. Outside oftfo1t. there's no
3 a1apc,11uva provi&ions -- not even residue but thara's no
4 Oilipoi.itive provisions or r ~idue.
6
C0UR.T: ,r thou9ht you quoted It In your brter where
S he basically !!IVS, ''l wa11t Judd to be able to dtsb1bute my
1 property and persOflal effects in any way tllat he !il!l!S fit."
B So frankly, illl ti1C wording, you he1re peri;onal effects and
9 then lat:et says, ~And t went him to be able to dlsl:rt.butl!
10 my pro!Jertv ttnd pen.anal effec~ as stated In my J•st wlll
11 and t:esl:'JJITll!nt. •
12
Mlt. f=U:ENOR: Yes, that's exactly right but there

13 is no -- there Is no other language thee decides that and
14 1t111t language by ltaelf, Idaho wurts have already

1!1 del:'errnlnea tl'l111t'a no~good enough. You can't 1:$11 somecme
111lse or YllU c;an't shllt ttiat Intent IX> scm11ona else,
any dQfQllSQS in her counterclaim. She'd made some 91:mensl
A testator cannot say, "I want my wira to be able
allagaUons, She didn't meet the spednc elements of
18 t» oick the charities she gives It to,· er "I want my
fTaud that she was attempting to plead. ·1111!! statute of
1~ whOeve.r to pick th!! org11niatiaru1 whara my property goe!:.11
;z9 llio.e ilfl! the other -- those ere tfil!!! ~ th;,t l've cited
Hrnit.itiora; ilro:.e In 2006.
Concemil'lg her r.ilsing the Issue of a transfer on
21 in here ind so it's dear tiuil! that'!! not tlie t:esbltor's
death deed, the judge, - Judge Scultlwon:ti left that Jssue
22 Intent anymore. Thars now )udd'5 mtent er !tie perSOnal
ru bf! dat81'TV)lned by the court as far as Interpreting or
23 represenostlve's Intent, And Idaho law does not ellolll the
refurmadon of the deed that was signed and recorded by
2-t b!!ibil:or lb givei wh11t Idaho courts have eallt!ld II powe(" of
Gordort Lanham purporting tn obtain a lire emte and
2S attorney on death Is you can't s11y, ·1 w111t him to be able
4
6
tran,~ng the property to Joseph Lanham and I bellevt!
1 'lo diatnbute my estate as he sees nt. • lhers not~
2 dl$poaldve provisioll under Idaho law.
that lfli1t'11 what happme:d In dlstrt:t oourt.
courcn Well, and I'll Just kind of teU you guys
3
Thant"s bQ&n no leg;,! argument tl1at th.e pen;onal.
just based on my review, t think that-- I don'Hhlnlc
4 repmi:qnl:;ltive hi!$ put forth to co11tnst that b,c.aµse there
therl!!'s - the real l!'.sue 1 think Is -- In my mind hnvh'lg
5 is none. lt's a dear -- I me.an the l!l~Ul!5 in thlli a,e
reviewed 11: Is does tile residual clause 11ctu111fy dispose of
& very dear i& the Court can't SZ1y, "Yeah, tt's ok.iy for a
the main propen.y. eecausa I think the one pl1H;Q Df
1 personal representative to meke the!te detenninations by
property, b1111ed cm what's presentad to U,e CDurt, likely
I himself." And once that'a g1me: amiY, once -- onc.e he
h;,B Ix> be dispni;ed of by the re'Sldual dausa bec,1ui;~ lt
9 doesn't rnake any Intent know,,, then It passes back tnrough
101.11<,; like ii lifil citot. Ind n I don't see -- I'm jus;t
10 the residue or the emte, back in bl&'l:.loo provlslol'ls which
tellin9 ypu that', how I see It illi I ~d it. You guys can
11 go to his heirs. Arid even In the i;:.;,ie where he says, "I
argue,
12 o"IY want my two sons to get nolfling or a dollar," It g 13 b11ck In those l:!No sons beau.ise those are his helr1..
And thars kind of what lt comes down IX). I've
reviewed the resldu~l dause. 1 lt!lnk It's explldl: and
14
lhe only argument that !h&y've brought up that I
clear that he wanted Judd tn dl~pose of anyth1119 that wp
16 tan see In ttielr cross moaon Js mat you sh011ld look ~t
lert that wasn't disposed ot but r wanted to ht!•r argument
tG the testatx>(s intent through tttcse otherthing5 lmlt are
17 outside the wilt. 'Tliere's ,ttlcse recprdinR5, I know that
ror addttIon1t lnmrmetton and, Mr, l'l11enor, t'JI let ya11
18 those have be11n mentioned a c:ciuple of limes in court that
9 o or.it.
MR. FLEENOR.: Thank you, Your Honor, Our
19 there's •• the buii. for the will was these oral recordl(lga
argument's pretty much set l'Drth 1n our brief ~nd I gueu
20 that the blsblt:or made and there'!) omer recctdlng,; besld86
21 what's In the WIii.
just to recap that Is, ye,eh, evl!n If ttils will Is v11ll!t alld
22
Ana again, lilat'9 dear In th;.t Cc,,rwin e5tate as
we\'e nor even got i» that point yet but even if it w.u- and
Z3 well where It !51Jyr. thl! o,urt onnot FpecuJ,1te iii to what
sv8n If ·· when you're reading tfl~ will, th• tei;tilwr Hid,
24 the testator lnMndl!d to ttllldtirc in his will e><c:ept a.s the
"I dcJJ't want my sonr. to have anything. I want tnem l'o
25 Intent es e>CS,re.55ed In the ta&ta[l)r'~ words, What he
have one dollar each,'' or whiltever he put In the wlll -7
5

,./1O/20lA 01:17:22 PM
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1 oct\Jelly uffl In the WIil, that'G how the Court dirtannlnes
whit ttie 1:est11to~'s intent w~.

2

1
2

milm1.idin11 oftt,e l.ew,
the sblrutorv provisions 'When there's; nothing tnac go

4

MR. Fl,,EENOR: Okay7

s

COURT: Ms. call11h.1m,

a and tnat's to tno!e two.same sons 11nd that's very 111lniJar

8
MS. CAllAHAN; Jlld!Je, I think tnat th~ court at
7 the last n~n9 where Hr. Fl~nor, mtltiom; to determine
8 the validity ol'ttie will when he mltse<t the court tnel tu

datermine that and Uie Co11rt ordered attomey'li r- which

9

9

10

11

11

11

specifically dl&fnllerlted ny his father, Any res111ua1
13 would go n, Joe tind Robby. Keith Lanham, his ottler .i;on,
14 accepts and understands the reasons tar hi& tattler's wlsnes
15 in dl~lnllenting him ind Tom.
Tom l"el:eived 115 acres Which he su~uent:!y sold
16
17 fllr ovltl' $240,000. Now he's making a clalm hfll'e. I don't
UI know If it's; out oF splr.e or Interest but he11 really
19 g!)ttcn his shah3,
l t'.hink th.it what tfle court h;a«. tu detemlne Ii the
JO
21 testatior's intent and that'll What the Court needs to do 111
n ti:, look 11t the ot1ler evldeni:t! tt111t ifi illfmisslble In tht!f

2,

case. And t believe th•t ttla affidavits that Wt!'va

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

zo
21

n
23

24 i;ubmltted iind t.he record In this c;ue ,hows thllt hll wa&
25 1!1Cplid~y dear. He essenttaiy di~polied gf all Of his

pasAS umterttie w1111 It goe.i lflrough statutory con,tructs

6 to the Corwin Gillie ilOain is wherlf 1n the Corwin l!llse, ha
1 gives hAlr ll2 J believe It w1111 & granllrJaugl'lter lit the time
8 ar,11 doe,sn't dispose ot th~ other halt. And wl11,m he does

10 h.iven't been judged cm yd tnat r don't beUwe that
Mr. 'l"no1T111• Ev~( Qtt ~nJ\am evt!h has itiinding. tfe was

%4
25

f!

not dii;pose of the other half, the wholo thing goes to the
granddaught,u even though he argued J suppmse that he onlv
Int.ended h•lf of it to go to the granddaugh~.

That's the same type of case her<\. When the WIii
statute and tNtate statutes ZIN! lttrvugh hls hell'!I 11nd ·COllRT; Sa wh11t proparty do you think isn't
disposed of .spijdfiCA!lty7

MR, FLEE;NOlt! The only -- tho only property I see
that Is dispd!:ed of iii the sheep's heqd, The sheep•, ti-e-1d

Th11t"s the "lo~ thing that ha 'lives an11 property to
aoy.t>oov,
He names II bunc:ti of property and he says, "Ye1111,
f.ls\da or Joe or sDtnt!body has property here or I own these
9U11!1, n but he doe!n't !lly 'lyho to OIVe t:h011e guns to or l:ttl!
contenbi of my safe. He do~n·t 6aV who to give ttie
10

1

r:;ontenbi of the safe. Ha does say )Udd om hang Ifie

3
3

In his wlll one pemin will qet the ranch. He's dona a

a

2hecp's head In his Cllbln If hie wanb tn. Toill's the

deed tllzt a~mpb=d to transfer tilnt r•1nin9 11 life

dosl!St property or dos5t dispostt:lve fll'l)Ylsion that's In

'.4

est,~.

i
4
Ii

In l g1,1~$S you could c.all It a

6
7

recorded codicil to his wfll instructed Judd on hllw to

6

dlspo11& of the llig creek property which he 11avs he's going

7

IJ

to gNe to two people. That spadllc lnlltrucUon Is In

8

9

mere.

1~
· 18
11

18

19

and he has wlUtdrawn any obje(tian.
So l think any chaltellge tu ~~ will has been
d;_,:ided by the Court; wh@n Mr. Ftaenor and Mr. 1homos

Everett didn't show vi> t'or ~urt and I believe tt,11t the
rest of ma property should be distributed .. Judd's be.en

2Q directed to do.
21
22

.13

COUlt'r. All t19ht. Mr. Aeenor, I'll glv~ you •
final word.
Mlt. FU:ENOR: Right, I ouess just brleftV l:s lfla

24' argument th11t b~11,e the two soil$ were dlslnher!Uld
:lll pri,cu.ida- them fram receiving under the 88f.llte lu Just

j

property. I'm nat rc:ferendng ttlt: n1"c;h or ttie Dlgllom -Bi\1 Creek property b~U6e he doe!ll'l't .say
It 90@!1 tt>.
UNIDENlllilED SP!aAKE!l.: Could l say s:omettllng tQ
t hii;;, Judge?

~"o

MR, FLEENOR: No. And the other thing, you"lo

10

reart - you've read the deed as lll$8r\llng th~ llfe Interest

't1

wllim iii true but It's mona l;h.in tl'121t. lt's • ba111ifer on

12

death deed. Not Qttly dpes It reserve a life intere5t but

13

ho tesel'lles tr1e turn:nt right to buy, a..il, pledge,

14 whatever, to Ito whc1t11Ver he Wlll'tts with ii;, So we'r,, going
16 to argue that later IG that's not OIi affective deed. lhat
1ii should be pll,rt Qf tt,ii,; ertate as wall to p115:; to the two
17 boys.
1t,
COUR.T: Ms. tallatum, ilny olfler (lnaudiblQ,17
'
19
MS. CAllAHAN; Judge, I gue.ss my response wou1<1 bi!

20 thilt l think that tha decsdenrs recotcllngs spedfta,ny
21 sav how th11 Big Creek prepetty should Ii$ dls:po~ of. I
22 believe ttlat the Court, 1r tile ,~uo it r1i~, to lot>k at
23 the deed, It was -- if you look r,t lf1« dono~s Intent, If
24 you look at ~Ile a1T1da111~ or admissible mvidenc~ ev11rv11m1
25

lnbmded -- everyone '°1c!w, 11:Very

one

Of the famll)' jCCOpt

11

9
S of)' ~

I

thare. And thlt'i; what l reterat1°'d·iii lhe ~late of

9

As far il5 Wl'let"S lelt alter the rand! and the w, ur
10
tt,e
Big
Creelc property Ii; 1 bunch of (lnaud1blee)
11
memorabmn,
family items. And, you know, e111 Ju.lld puts In
12
'
hls
affidavit
is
th;it he was lnstr\Jctlell ta do It based on
13
14 whethe,r or not -- ttle actions of his 1,0ns in thii;; action

:

of $3,00D, som~here In then!, Judd c;in h11ng in hill c.abln.

property. ~e did Intend that Joe get the ranch. lt savs

He specffl1.ally

,I

doesn't :;,ay where the property goes, lt goes vra ~

1

!i

_

Und11r his will, he dlSlnherfl:8 them but tl,en under

3
4

COUR.T: Felr tnough.

3

24/ 2 8

Pago8to U!1f.1S
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I

!,1

!l

for Tht1rn11s Everett whP illso received his - well, retelvad
prop~ esi.entfollv 1.mder fnlse pnttenae. but thet It w.-1,

, 11t1Dmey',
2

Gordon Thomas' 1111:ent that his grandson, Jo9eph L.tnham,
16 Thomas Ev1tratt's son, receive ltle propett:y bc:Cc1use Thoma5

4

s

fven=tt Lanham didn't support hl11 son ,md they wet,1

&

6

c:ompletely eatnnged at the time of his death.

&

7

And If that lsstic 1~ brought before rhe Court, l
belfl!ve the case law's c:lt!ar that the Court ~n look at the
dollar's Intent, pllnil evir:f•mce comes In a, to the donor'.1
Intent ( inaudlble) i;o the onlv res!Clual property ~- well,

1
8

8

0

1, l11t me back ~p julit a seconcl.
1'1e say, that thet'e 111 no other dJepositive things
z
3 In the will, The stuff lr, the safe Is given to Judd and he
14 can do with It what he wantB. It w111, given to him. 1t
~aan't as a power of attorney. so WJr-, Flo::enor's wrong
,II there. 1 lhlnk rhat the rest otthe property Is sruff th.It
17 may have tq be sold to ~y (or att;omey's flleS and quiet
8 Htle adfon and I think thitt the wlWs c:lHr that Judd
5

shoyld be able to dilitritiute It the 1VIIY he sees flt
aa:ordlng m ttls wishe9-01' Gordon Thomas Lanham,
COURT: Mr. Fleenor, you have the last word,
1
MR. FU:ENOR: All r'I0ht. No, ( don't have 11nvtt)ing
22
~3 el&e to add lflec;11pt fort mei,n she'c tryin.11 to argue fac:;ts
4 tfl:at are not in l!Vidence. Cleany, even given his intent
2& ilt some point, the law l.'J clear. Thill's why w~r.e asking
'i9
'>O

3

9

10
11

11
13

14

15
111
17
11
19
20
l1
22

2J

24
25

14

for- ,ummary judgment,

z

this will,

3

COURT: l 1rn going tx> Qrant sum111arv Judgment on
t>ehalf of the personal N!f>resentatlve and I'm golnQ to
deny, Mr, Fleenor, your motion for summary judgment. I
find based on the will {Inaudible) adrliJHlbl11 to show th~
donor's Intent, What the deceHed \'!iln\ed is dlspos~ Qf
(lneudlble} ;ind through parolt evidence, you c:11r1 determine

8

COURT: Th11 Cwrt's tn ~~&11,
(Proceelkrtg5 concludl!d.)

There's no cltsposltrte. provl~lons in

1

1

No, 7301 P. 18

feer: tMd costs In th@ motion l'or !ummary

Jlldlilment.
MS. CAUAHAN: Thilnk you, )~dge,

12

4
8
6
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9 his Intent.
10
The two boy!: Wltfl! i;peclffcally dlSJnhartwd. I'm
•1 not golll9 to overlide hi~ wl§!les. You know, 1 find that
2 even in the light most ravorable to the 11dver..e pnrtv, tl111t
13 there's no genuine Ii.sue of meteriel f'llct implying we need

~
.

a trial at d'lls point. The rule's clear the donor's Intent

w&$ estBbllshvd by the conCJJm:nt recQl1ilng$. ~1i callahan, you'll pn.:pare the otdl!!r of summary judgment ••

&

,-.~. CAU.AHAN: I wlll,
COUR'f': -- on behalf or the pel'$onal r"presentattve
19 1110d they have hl!)~llr courts to take a look ist what this
:o court deddes but It's real c;lear to me ~at Mr. Gordon
.•;1 Thomas Lanham wanted end It's n!al c;lear tnllt not'. 6nly In

7
8

zz

my mind doas he dispose of th11 pr4lperty, but also his
wishes Jre contnlned ln the recon:tlngs or wt1111t hlli Intent ·
.l4 was, Ulilt ttlat waulil ba admissible and thitt',; the order or
25 the Court. I'll r11trve ruling on th• r11qu1.5t for
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Attorneys for Personal Representative
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNiY OF GEM

In the Matter of the Estate of:

GORDON THOMAS LANHAM,

Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2013-886

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON MOTION AND CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER came before the Court June 20, 2014 on a Motion for

Summary judgment flied by Claimant-Petitioner Thomas Everett Lanham and
on

a

Cross-Motion

for

Summary Judgment filed

by

the

Personal

Representative, Judd Lanham. The Court considered the filings, affidavits
and Memoranda submitted before the hearing, and considered oral
arguments of counsel made at the hearing.

ORIG\NAL
FINDI·N GS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONAL
REPRESE.NTATIVE - PAGE 1
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham passed away December 5th,

2013, after long-declining health problems.

In the time leading up to his

death, decedent met with friends and family and his attorney and disc.ussed
hls various kinds of assets and his intent for transferring them upon his
death. Some of those people who participated In those discussions signed
affidavits that were included in the record.
2.

Decedent periodically dictated his thoughts Into an audio

recorder.

That audio was transcribed and typed Into the form of a will .

Decedent signed the will before witnesses.

Decedent's and the witnesses'

signatures were notarized and that will was submitted for probate.
3. Decedent made additional recordings after he executed the wlll.
The audio recordings made by decedent were part of the record before the
Court as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Judd Lanham, the Personal
Representative. The record also Included affid~vits from Keith Colby Lanham
and Cathy Lanham GIiiihan, submitted by the Personal Representative.
4. The Court finds no reason to doubt the validity of the wlll. From
the affidavits and especially the audio recordings, it Is clear that decedent
Gordon Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the
time of he executed the will.

He demonstrated a thorough grasp of the

extent and nature of his assets. He also demonstrated a good grasp of his
potential heirs, and his relationships with them and sound reasons for
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 2
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treating each as he did.

There is no evidence suggesting that anyone

exercised undue influence or coercion over decedent.

In fact, in spite of

decedent's failing health and physical maladies, It appears he was a strong
willed and independent thinker at the time he executed the wlll. 1

s.

Claimant Thomas Everett Lanham advanced several claims, but

he failed to support his claims and arguments with one iota of credible,
admlsslble evidence.

Based upon the language of the will itself, the

affidavits, the audio recordings and the entire record, the Court finds In
favor of the Personal Representative on every factual dispute.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The will of decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham is legal, valid, and

binding.
2.

Decedent's intent Is sufficiently clear from the language of the

will, particularly as bolstered and explained by contemporary audio
recordings and the

affidavits submitted, to allow administration and, If

necessary, judicial enforcement.

As to the claimant, Thomas Everett

Lanham, decedent's Intent Is very clearly that claimant take by the will only
one dollar ($1.00) and a bed and there is no lawful reason to frustrate
decedent's intent.

1. The Court notes that a court trial had been scheduled for early April on the Issue
of the wlll's validity but that neither claimant, Thomas Everett Lanham, Jr., nor his attorney,
The Personal
Mr. Douglas Fleenor appeared at the time and date scheduled.
Representative's request for costs and attorney fees Is pending .
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-3. There are no issues of material fact remaining to be determined
by the Court and the Personal Representative Is entitled to judgment as a

matter

of

law

and

the

Court

therefore

GRANTS

the

Personal

Representative's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
ATTORNEY FESS AND COSTS
The Issue of an award of costs and attorneys fees will be taken up at
a future time and date.

SO ORDERED this

·1-tf"day of June, 2014.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 4

82
000238

Electronically Filed
5/16/2017 10:12:26 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
208/345-7832 (Tel)
208/345-9564 (Fax)
ISB No. 1626
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THOMAS E. LANHAM and KEITH C.
LANHAM,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CVOC-2016-8252
Case No. CV-2016-8252
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY NOTE
Plaintiffs concede that the decedent may have intended to disinherit them under the terms of
the Will. If so, this intention was frustrated by (1) his failure to make a specific devise of the two
real properties and (2) his failure to make a general bequest by the device of a residuary clause. A
testator can effectuate disinheritance only by a specific bequest or by a general residuary bequest.
The decedent here did neither.
Defendant's supplemental brief misapprehends the issue presented as one of testamentary
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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intent. Testamentary intent is trumped by the failure to devise. The failure of plaintiffs' father to
make a bequest of the real property, either specifically or by a residuary clause, required that the real
properties pass by intestate succession. As noted in plaintiffs' summary judgment brief, a testator's
ability to avoid the laws of intestate succession can only be exercised by disposing of the property
by will.1 No amount of extrinsic evidence respecting testamentary intent can neutralize the laws of
intestacy which is a rule followed by American and English jurisprudence. See footnote 1 and In
re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 P.2d 339 (1963). For that matter, even language in the Will
which purports to effectuate disinheritance cannot do so where the testator fails to dispose of an item
of property and there is no residuary clause. Id.
In ruling that the Will disposed of the entirety of the Lanham Estate, the magistrate
committed an error of law. This decision would have been reversed on appeal had there been a
timely appeal. Contrary to defense counsel's reliance on newly "uncovered information", the
"information" respecting the testator's intention to disinherit the plaintiffs is simply irrelevant.
Although a moot point given its irrelevancy, defendant's assertion that there was "substantial and
competent evidence" of the intent to disinherit strikes a discordant note as applied to the underlying
Rule 56(c) proceedings.

'See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 8, 9. Southgate v.
Karp, 154 Mich. 697, 118 N.W. 600; In re McKay Estate, 357 Mich. 447, 98 N.W.2d 604; Boisseau v.
Aldridges, 5 Leigh 222, 32 Va. 222, 27 Am Dec. 590; Coffman v. Coffman, 85 Va. 459, 8 S.E. 672, 2
L.R.A. 848; Todd v. Gentry, 109 Ky. 704, 60 S.W. 639; Pickering v. Stamford, (1797), 3 Ves. Jun. 492
(30 Eng. Rep. 1121; Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Beay. 318 (49 Eng. Rep. 361; In the Estate of Brown, 106
N.W.2d 535, 537 (Mich. 1960).

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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DEFENDANT'S CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY
ARE NOT ON POINT.
The defendant cites Riverside (cross motions for summary judgment are, effectively, a
stipulation by the parties that there are no genuine issues of material fact) and Cougar Bay (court's
findings of fact will be accepted on appeal where there is substantial, though conflicting, evidence
to support the findings).
The underlying decision by the magistrate was a summary judgment, not findings of fact.
Cougar Bay is not on point: it deals with findings of fact and conclusions of law, not summary
judgment disposition.
Riverside is limited to the scenario where each party bases its position on the same set of
facts., i.e., the parties agree that there are "no genuine issues of material fact". Id., 103 Idaho at 519.
Absent such agreement, cross motions for summary judgment do not eliminate factual issues. See
Moss v. Mid-American, 103 Idaho 298, 302, 647 P.2d 754 (1982); Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho
205, 998 P.2d 1118 (2000); Kempthorne v. Blaine County, 139 Idaho 348, 349, 79 P.3d 960 (2003).
The cross-motions here do not render the summary judgment bullet-proof on appeal. The
personal representative rested on a point of fact (testamentary intent); whereas, Mr. Fleenor, on
behalf of the plaintiffs, rested on a point of law (the existence of partial intestacy). More to the point,
as noted throughout plaintiffs' briefing, testamentary intent is irrelevant given that the real properties
must pass by intestate succession.
THE AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY PROFFERED BY DEFENDANT
IS BOTH INADMISSIBLE AND IRRELEVANT
The first rule in construction of a will is to look to its "four corners" in order to ascertain the

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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testator's intent. See In re Steelsmith Estate, 139 Idaho 216, 218, 76 P.3d 960 (2003); In re Jane
Doe, 1 48 Idaho 432, 435, 224 P.3d 499 (2009); In re Wilkins Estate, 137 Idaho 315, 318, 48 P.3d 644
(2002).
Extrinsic evidence as to the testator's intent may be employed where the will contains an
ambiguity. There is no ambiguity, and Gordon Lanham's testamentary intent is not relevant given
the failure to devise the real properties.
First, as to Tom and Keith, there is no ambiguity: The Will left Tom and Keith a bed and one
dollar and nothing else. Even if relevant, absent an ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible.
Secondly, defendant seeks to employ the three affidavits as evidence that the testator did not
intend for Tom and Keith to receive the subject real property. His intention is not relevant. The
problem here is as follows: (a) there was no disposition of the real property; and (b) absent such
disposition, the laws of intestacy come into play under the authority cited in plaintiff's earlier brief
See footnote 1. The decedent may have intended for his sons to receive only what is referenced in
the Will; but that intention is trumped (and rendered irrelevant) by his failure to dispose of the real
property, either by a specific devise or by a residuary clause.
CONTRARY TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION, THE WILL
DID NOT CONTAIN A RESIDUARY CLAUSE
Defendant points out that the magistrate construed the Will as containing a " residual (sic)
clause". See Exhibit F, p. 5. For multiple and independent reasons, the will did not contain a
residuary clause:
(1) The magistrate refers to the "residual clause" but does not recite language in the Will that
constitutes the residuary clause nor does he identify the residuary de'isee. Exhibit F, p. 5. By its very
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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nature, a residuary clause must "dispose of any estate property". See Black's Law Dictionary (7th
Edition), p. 1311.
(2) A residuary clause must contain an identified "residuary devisee". Idaho Code §
15-2-606 and § 15-3-906(a)(1)(C). See, e.g., In re Hartwig's Estate, 70 Idaho 77, 81, 211 P.2d 399
(1949).
(3) The power of attorney does not empower Judd Lanham post-death because the
power of attorney does not survive the death of the principal. See Smith v. Treasure Valley Seed Co.
161 Idaho 107, 383 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2016).
(4) It is not clear that Judd Lanham was given a free hand to dispose of the Estate
because the will constrained him to do so only "as stated in my Last Will and Testament." Exhibit A,
p. 5. With respect to Big Creek property, the testator recited "I want to think about the 47 acres in Big
Creek.", thus eschewing any testamentary disposition.
Dated this 16th day of May, 2017.

/s/ Allen B. Ellis
Allen B. Ellis
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 16th day of May, 2017, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Richard L. Stubbs
Carey Perkins, LLP
P.O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701

X

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand delivery
Overnight delivery
E-File

/s/ Allen B. Ellis
Allen B. Ellis
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Richard L. Stubbs, ISB No. 3239
Samantha L. Lundberg, ISB No. 9992
CAREY PERKINS LLP
Capitol Park Plaza
300 North 6th Street
P. O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660
Email: service@careyperkins.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and KEITH C.
LANHAM,
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,

DEFENDANT’S REPLY BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendant.

I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment concedes that Gordon Lanham intended to leave Thomas and Keith
Lanham each a bed, one dollar, and nothing else. However, Plaintiffs assert that Gordon
Lanham failed to create a residuary clause, and as a result the two real properties (Big
Creek and Gem County) must pass intestate. In making this argument Plaintiffs allege
that “Gordon Lanham’s testamentary intent is not relevant given his failure to devise the
DEFENDANT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
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real properties.” However, a plain reading of the will reveals that Gordon Lanham intended
to create a residuary clause by attempting to confer a power of appointment on Judd Max
Lanham. Further, in the event it is ambiguous as to whether Gordon Lanham intended to
create a residuary clause in the will, the Magistrate Judge was permitted to review
extrinsic evidence to determine Gordon Lanham’s intent.
Ultimately, by utilizing either a plain reading of the will, or reviewing extrinsic
evidence, Gordon Lanham’s intent was clear: he wanted to disinherit Thomas and Keith
Lanham, and grant Judd Lanham the power to distribute any remaining property as he
saw fit. The Magistrate Judge correctly found that the will was valid and disposed of
Gordon Lanham’s entire estate. Plaintiffs’ claims would not have been successful on
appeal, and Defendant requests the Court grant his motion for summary judgment.
II.
GORDON LANHAM CREATED A RESIDUARY CLAUSE IN HIS LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT
Plaintiffs acknowledge that when construing a will, you must first look within
its “four corners” to ascertain the testator’s intent. (Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pgs. 3-4). It is well established in
Idaho that “when interpreting a will, the intention of the testator must be given effect.”
Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 665 P.2d 1041 (1983).
A general residuary clause is created when the testator passes all property
owned at the time of death not otherwise disposed of by the will unless a contrary intention
appears in the will. In re Hartwig’s Estate, 70 Idaho 77, 82, 211 P.2d 399, 402 (1949)
(citing 57 am. Jur. 948-949). In reviewing the will to determine whether a residuary clause
has been created “the reasonable and natural presumption is that the testator intends to
DEFENDANT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
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dispose of his entire estate…Therefore in the construction of doubtful clauses in a will,
that interpretation is to be adopted, if possible, which avoids partial intestacy, unless it
clearly appears that the testator intended to die intestate as to part of his property.” Id.
Gordon Lanham’s Will repeatedly attempts to dispose of his entire estate
through language such as:
•

“I want to state in here that the executor of my Will is Judd Max

Lanham and I am giving him a Power of Attorney for full control now and even after I am
dead. I want him to be able to distribute my personal property and my personal effects in
any way that he sees fit and I will try and put all the wording about the personal effects.”
•

“I want to state in here again that the executor of my Will is Judd Max

Lanham and I am giving him a Power of Attorney for full control now and even after I am
dead. I want him to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects as stated in
my Last Will and Testament.”
Despite Gordon Lanham’s clear language in the will, Plaintiffs are alleging
that because Gordon Lanham did not specifically devise the Big Creek and Gem County
properties to anyone by name in the will, that they must pass intestate to Thomas and
Keith Lanham. However, this does not comport with Gordon Lanham’s intent to disinherit
Thomas and Keith Lanham, or his attempt to create a residuary clause by granting Judd
Max Lanham the authority to distribute his property and personal effects “in any way that
he sees fit.” The language in Gordon Lanham’s will is sufficient to support a finding that
a residuary clause was created and that Gordon Lanham intended to dispose of his entire
estate. Further, Plaintiffs’ contention that “Gordon Lanham’s testamentary intent is not
relevant given the failure to devise the real properties” does not comply with Idaho law.
DEFENDANT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
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See Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 665 P.2d 1041 (1983).
III.
IF GORDON LANHAM DID NOT CREATE A CLEAR RESIDUARY CLAUSE IN HIS
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT, THIS AMBIGUITY MAY BE RESOLVED THROUGH
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
Next, Plaintiffs have alleged that extrinsic evidence regarding the testator’s
intent may only be employed where the will contains an ambiguity. (Plaintiffs’
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pgs. 34). Whether an ambiguity exists in a document is a question of law, and the factfinder
may “resort to extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity and find the intentions of the
testator.” Matter of Estate of Berriochoa, 108 Idaho 474, 475, 700 P.2d 96, 97 (1985). As
mentioned previously, Idaho law requires that “the intention of the testator must be given
effect.” Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 665 P.2d 1041 (1983).
If an ambiguity exists as to Gordon Lanham’s intent to create a residuary
clause, the Magistrate Court acted within its discretion to review extrinsic evidence,
including the three affidavits and the audio recording of Gordon Lanham’s will, to
determine Gordon Lanham’s intent. After reviewing this admissible and relevant
evidence, the Court found Gordon Lanham’s Will was “explicit and clear that he wanted
Judd to dispose of anything left that wasn’t disposed of.” See, Exhibit F. The Magistrate
Judge reviewed sufficient evidence in order to make the determination that Gordon
Lanham intended to create a residuary clause. As a result, this finding would not have
been disturbed on appeal.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Either through a plain reading of the “four corners” of the will, or through
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reviewing extrinsic evidence, it is clear that Gordon Lanham intended to dispose of his
entire estate by granting Judd Lanham the power to distribute any property not specifically
bequeathed in the will. Plaintiffs have admitted that Gordon Lanham intended to disinherit
them through the will, and the Court should not allow them to recover now when it is
explicitly against the testator’s intent. Accordingly, because the Magistrate Court’s
decision would have been sustained on appeal, and even if Defendant Fleenor had
breached a duty Plaintiffs suffered no harm, Defendant respectfully requests the Court
grant his motion for summary judgment.
DATED this 22nd day of May, 2017.
CAREY PERKINS LLP

By:_ /s/ Richard L. Stubbs_______
Richard L. Stubbs, of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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basis for
dispute.” Nor
Plaintiff presented
Representative
Nor has
of
on every
Representative on
presented evidence
has Plaintiff
factual dispute.”
evidence of
every factual
in the
the hypothetical
exactly
which appellate
would be
along
appellate record
presented in
record would
appeal along
be presented
hypothetical appeal
exactly which
in aa properly
with the
would be
be available
properly
with
that would
the argument
for exactly
the relief
relief that
argument for
available in
exactly the
perfected appeal.
perfected
appeal.
…
Defendant’s motion
Defendant’s
judgment on
this issue
motion for
for summary
the same
on this
suffers the
same frailty.
issue suffers
frailty.
summary judgment
Absent
would be
be before
before an
in
that would
argument that
an appellate
Absent aa complete
complete record
appellate court
court in
record and
and argument
the
was
this Court
the hypothetical
not prepared
the magistrate
ruling was
magistrate ruling
is not
to say
Court is
prepared to
hypothetical appeal,
appeal, this
say the
interesting issues,
the question
including the
There are
correct.
of what
what is
is
number of
of interesting
question of
correct. There
are a
a number
issues, including
in this
required
will in
this case
the Will
Whether the
to create
of appointment,
What
required to
create aa power
power of
appointment, whether
case does
does so,
so, what
that determination
the
determination and
evidence
is admissible
to make
make that
What issues
admissible to
and what
before the
evidence is
were before
issues were
trial court.
trial
court.
3-4.
Memorandum Decision
Decision entered
November 22,
pp. 3-4.
entered November
Memorandum
2016, pp.
22, 2016,

Thereafter
be decided
the Parties
the issues
Thereafter the
stipulation regarding
Parties entered
regarding the
to be
on summary
entered aa stipulation
issues to
decided on
summary
judgment that
part:
in part:
that provided
judgment
provided in
WHEREAS
parties have
briefed the
WHEREAS the
the parties
the issue
the matter
matter can
and the
can
have fully
issue presented,
presented, and
fully briefed
be submitted
underlying record
time as
with
for decision
the underlying
at such
ﬁled with
submitted for
decision at
record has
has been
such time
been filed
be
as the
Court's discretion
the
the Court,
the Court's
to the
discretion to
to require
require oral
oral argument.
argument.
subject to
Court, subject
Therefore,
the following
the
following issues
stipulate and
to submit
submit the
to the
and agree
agree to
issues to
Therefore, [the
parties] stipulate
[the parties]
Plaintiffs’ issue:
Court
without further
further briefing:
for resolution
the underlying
brieﬁng: Plaintiffs’
resolution Without
Court for
had the
issue: had
underlying
In the
for In
the Matter
Matter of
the Estate
Lanham been
notice
been timely
notice of
of appeal
of the
Estate of
of Gordon
T. Lanham
Gordon T.
appeal for
timely
filed,
Plaintiffs Thomas
Keith Lanham
Lanham and
Lanham would
the
Thomas Lanham
and Keith
have been
been adjudicated
would have
adjudicated the
ﬁled, Plaintiffs
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Defendant's issue:
decedent's real
the decedent's
intestate
heirs to
property. Defendant's
intestate heirs
to the
real property.
appeal
issue: aa timely
timely appeal
would have
been unsuccessful.
have been
would
unsuccessful.

Later
the parties
the Court
for additional
Later the
brieﬁng.
parties requested
additional briefing.
granted aa request
Court granted
and the
request for
requested and
The
parties augmented
with audio
that contain
from which
The parties
the record
the recordings
which
contain the
recordings from
disks that
augmented the
record with
audio disks
decedent’s Will
the
will was
be other
in
that there
the decedent’s
there appear
other documents
Notwithstanding that
to be
transcribed. Notwithstanding
documents in
appear to
was transcribed.

in the
the
this
the record
the probate
intend to
the Court
the parties
to have
parties are
Court decide
record in
probate case,
are apparently
have the
decide this
apparently intend
case, the

matter
based upon
in this
in this
in addition
this case.
this case,
matter based
the record
The record
the
addition to
to the
upon the
record currently
record in
case. The
currently in
case, in
audio
Lanham Gillihan;
the Affidavit
Affidavit of
the Affidavit
Affidavit of
Catherine Lanham
of Judd
of the
of Catherine
consists of
audio recordings,
Judd
Gillihan; the
recordings, consists
Lanham;
Keith Lanham;
Petition for
the Verified
for Removal
Lanham
the Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of
of Keith
Verified Petition
of P.
P. Gordon
Removal of
Gordon Lanham
Lanham; the
Lanham; the
as
Will and
for Declaration
the Last
Other Relief;
Declaration of
Personal Representative
of Intestacy
Last Will
Representative and
and for
and Other
and
as Personal
Relief; the
Intestacy and
Testament
Allan Ellis
Ellis
the Declaration
Testament of
Declaration of
of Gordon
to the
of Allan
attached to
Gordon Lanham;
documents attached
various documents
Lanham; various
including
Findings of
including Findings
of Fact
Fact and
of Law
entered by
Conclusions of
and Conclusions
Law apparently
Judge Smith;
Smith; aa
apparently entered
by Judge
Judgment
in the
the file,
Other documents
an Inventory.
Judgment apparently
entered by
documents in
and an
Judge Smith;
Smith; and
Inventory. Other
apparently entered
ﬁle,
by Judge
such
in the
this
the briefs
the parties
the magistrate
not germane
the issue
magistrate court,
briefs of
of the
parties in
germane to
to the
before this
are not
such as
issue before
as the
court, are
Court.
Court.
The
probate judge
judge decided
judgement. In
In doing
this case
The probate
for summary
motions for
doing
on cross
cross motions
decided this
case on
summary judgement.
wellIn doing
so,
violated the
Findings of
the welldoing so,
he violated
of Fact
Fact and
of Law.
he entered
entered Findings
Conclusions of
and Conclusions
Law. In
so, he
so, he
in ruling
trial court,
established
judgment, is
weigh
that aa trial
not to
motion for
for summary
ruling on
is not
to weigh
on aa motion
established rule
rule that
court, in
summary judgment,

evidence
Montgomery v.
Montgomery, 147
147 Idaho
or resolve
controverted factual
Idaho 1,
resolve controverted
factual issues.
evidence or
issues. Montgomery
v. Montgomery,
1, 7,
7,
magistrate’s judgment
205
judgment
not an
the magistrate’s
Whether or
or not
an appeal
of the
205 P.3d
P.3d 650,
appeal of
656 (2009).
However, whether
650, 656
(2009). However,

would have
fall on
this error.
not rise
long as
the record
rise and
on this
error. So
is clear
clear and
and fall
record is
and
have been
been successful
would
successful does
does not
So long
as the
there
unresolved evidentiary
by the
judgment,
in reaching
trial Court
the trial
the summary
there are
reaching the
no unresolved
rulings by
Court in
are no
evidentiary rulings
summary judgment,
In an
this
Id. In
granting summary
this Court
from an
the hypothetical
an appeal
an order
Court can
order granting
can review
review the
appeal from
appeal. Id.
hypothetical appeal.
summary
in
trial court
the appellate
the same
the standard
the trial
judgment, the
used by
by the
of review
is the
appellate standard
court in
standard of
standard used
review is
same as
as the
judgment,

passing upon
upon aa motion
judgment. Summary
judgment is
if the
motion for
for summary
the
is appropriate
appropriate if
passing
summary judgment.
Summary judgment
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in aa light
light most
with the
ﬁle with
the court,
pleadings, affidavits,
on file
most
and discovery
documents on
read in
afﬁdavits, and
pleadings,
court, read
discovery documents

favorable
party, demonstrate
that the
the nonmoving
the moving
nonmoving party,
material issue
moving
to the
no material
of fact,
demonstrate no
favorable to
such that
issue of
fact, such

If the
party is
judgment as
Id. See
matter of
the evidence
entitled to
of law.
is entitled
to aa judgment
I.R.C.P. 56(c).
reveals
law. Id.
evidence reveals
as a
a matter
See I.R.C.P.
patty
56(0). If
then all
that remains
the
all that
material fact,
remains is
no
which the
is a
of law
no genuine
genuine issue
to any
question of
law over
over which
issue as
a question
as to
fact, then
any material

appellate
Partout v.
Harper, 145
145 Idaho
685786, 183
free review.
appellate court
court exercises
Idaho 683,
exercises free
183 P.3d
review. Partout
P.3d 771,
v. Harper,
771,
683, 685–86,
773774 (2008).
773–74
the question
the construction
the will.
The Court
Will. The
Here the
is the
of the
is free
free to
to disregard
question is
construction of
Court is
disregard
(2008). Here

it stood
Findings of
the Findings
the magistrate
the record
the magistrate.
magistrate and
the
before the
of Fact
Fact by
magistrate.
and review
review the
record as
stood before
as it
by the

For
purposes of
uncontroverted facts.
For purposes
the issues
the record
of the
presented here,
record reveals
facts.
reveals some
some uncontroverted
issues presented
here, the

At the
The decedent
Lanham died,
Keith. At
the
The
Thomas Lanham
leaving two
Thomas and
Gordon Thomas
and Keith.
decedent Gordon
two children,
children, Thomas
died, leaving
time
parcels of
property. He
will. The
left aa Will.
time of
Will is
his death
The will
three parcels
of real
real property.
He left
of his
he owned
is homemade.
death he
homemade.
owned three
It
It is
transcription of
the Decedent.
is apparently
of recorded
statements of
of the
Decedent.
recorded statements
apparently aa transcription

The
Will has
The will
no
has no

that term
term is
will explicitly
the will
identifiable
Nor does
identifiable residuary
is generally
understood. Nor
clause as
does the
as that
explicitly
generally understood.
residuary clause

directly
places, that
In the
in three
Will decedent
that his
the real
the will
his cousin
three places,
of the
real estate.
cousin
estate. In
decedent directed,
dispose of
directed, in
directly dispose
decedent’s property.
Judd
Max Lanham
Lanham dispose
of decedent’s
dispose of
Judd Max
property.

II.
DISCUSSION
11.
in question.
It is
It is
in mind
It
important to
mind that
that the
will is
the
the validity
the will
not in
is the
is important
to keep
of the
is not
question. It
keep in
validity of

interpretation
that is
its content
interpretation of
content that
of its
is disputed.
disputed.

“[I]n construing
the provisions
the meaning
meaning of
the
“[I]n
will to
of aa will
to ascertain
of aa testator,
construing the
provisions of
ascertain the
testator, the
testator's
intent
cardinal
of
construction
is
to
ascertain
the
testator's
intent;
and
...
[t]his
intent
is
the
is
cardinal rule
of
is
to
ascertain
construction
rule
intent; and
[t]his
to
be ascertained
within the
from aa full
the four
the
to be
full view
of everything
four corners
of the
corners of
ascertained from
View of
everything within
”
instrument.
instrument. ”
In
224 P.3d
In re
Doe, 148
148 Idaho
re Doe,
Idaho 432,
P.3d 499,
Wilkins v.
v. Wilkins,
Wilkins,
(quoting Wilkins
432, 435,
435, 224
499, 502,
502, (2009)
(2009) (quoting

it
Plaintiffs argue
137
while the
will may
the will
48 P.3d
Idaho 315,
137 Idaho
648 (2002).
P.3d 644,
argue that,
be valid,
that, While
valid, it
644, 648
315, 319,
319, 48
(2002). Plaintiffs
may be

fails
Plaintiffs correctly
will has
the real
the will
fails to
to dispose
of the
real property
no
has no
Decedent. Plaintiffs
dispose of
owned by
argue the
correctly argue
property owned
by Decedent.
identifiable
will explicitly
that term
term is
Nor does
the will
identifiable residuary
is generally
understood. Nor
clause as
as that
does the
explicitly
generally understood.
residuary clause
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that the
the decedent
the real
Defendant argues
directly
of the
real estate.
and explicitly
estate. Defendant
decedent clearly
dispose of
argues that
explicitly
directly dispose
clearly and

wanted to
Plaintiffs:
disinherit Plaintiffs:
to disinherit
wanted
Thanksgiving
just wanted
program that
this program
that my
Thanksgiving is
is over
to add
to this
and II just
wanted to
over and
add to
son,
my son,
Thomas
all he
Everett Lanham,
Thomas Everett
48 years
given all
he needs
to
has already
been given
needs to
Lanham, 48
already been
old, has
years old,
have
whatever is
him
that II am
going to
am going
to leave
more dollar
dollar against
against whatever
is legal
legal to
to him
and that
have and
leave $1
$1 more
and
Last will
Gordon Thomas
then he
going to
his own.
he is
is going
to be
on his
and then
and Testament
own. Last
will and
Testament of
Thomas
be on
ofGordon
Lanham, p.
p. 1.
1.
Lanham,
“Findings of
in issuing
F act,” his
that
While
the magistrate
his ultimate
ultimate conclusion
While the
magistrate erred
issuing “Findings
of Fact,”
erred in
conclusion that

there
intent of
plaintiffs is
disinherit plaintiffs
the intent
the descendant
there was
no genuine
genuine issue
of fact
fact as
to the
of the
to disinherit
is
descendant to
issue of
was no
as to
correct.
It does
inherit anything
Plaintiffs may
their father.
that Plaintiffs
from their
This would
not follow
not inherit
father. This
follow that
correct. It
would
does not
anything from
may not
in obtaining
ﬁrst time
time that
that aa person
disinherit succeeded
not be
the first
the testator
not
be the
obtaining some
testator sought
to disinherit
of
person the
sought to
some of
succeeded in
decedent’s property.
decedent’s intent
the
It is
intent as
important to
the decedent’s
the decedent’s
determination of
distinguish determination
is important
to distinguish
of the
to
as to
property. It

ambiguous
in aa will
Will from
from the
the more
the decedent
Whether the
more general
general question
of whether
provisions in
question of
wanted
ambiguous provisions
decedent wanted
disinherit his
his children.
184 Or.
to
McClain v.
Hardy, 184
children. See,
to disinherit
App. 448,
Or. App.
501
P.3d 501
v. Hardy,
56 P.3d
See, e.g,
448, 450,
450, 56
e.g, McClain

(2002).
Matter of
184 (1992)
therein:
P.2d 184
827 P.2d
and case
collected therein:
Estate of
See also,
case collected
Baxter, 827
also, Matter
(2002). See
(1992) and
of Estate
of Baxter,
[A]
broadly or
matter how
disinheritance clause,
no matter
or strongly
how broadly
operates
strongly phrased,
phrased, operates
clause, no
[A] disinheritance
only
will itself,
taking under
from taking
the will
the claim
claimant from
claim
to prevent
prevent aa claimant
or to
to obviate
under the
obviate the
itself, or
only to
of
pretermission, but
but does
from
not and
heirs at
of pretermission,
cannot operate
to prevent
prevent heirs
at law
and cannot
operate to
law from
does not
taking
when the
taking under
the decedent
inheritance when
intestate as
of inheritance
under statutory
has died
decedent has
died intestate
rules of
as
statutory rules
all of
his property.
to
to any
or all
of his
property.
any or
186787.
Estate of
Baxter, 827
P.2d at
at 186–87.
827 P.2d
Estate
of Baxter,

As
New York
in an
York case:
earlier New
As stated
an earlier
stated in
case:

“In order
right of
“In
be aa valid
inherit property,
off the
the right
there must
to cut
of aa distributee
to inherit
must be
distributee to
order to
valid
cut off
property, there
and
bequest or
persons. Mere
words of
other persons.
disinheritance are
legal bequest
or devise
to other
Mere words
of disinheritance
and legal
are
devise to
purpose.”
insufficient
insufﬁcient to
to effect
effect such
such purpose.”
In re
Bayles' Estate, 113
N.Y.S.2d 39,
In
113 N.Y.S.2d
40 (Sur.
re Bayles’Estate,
Ct. 1952).
1952).
(Sur. Ct.
39, 40
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if the
intent is
from the
the will
itself if
the will
Testamentary
will itself
will is
is a
of law
to be
determined from
is
question of
law to
a question
be determined
Testamentary intent
unambiguous. Even
will does
the Will
not expressly
the real
the inquiry
though the
Even though
of the
real estate,
unambiguous.
dispose of
does not
estate, the
expressly dispose
inquiry

A testator
in determining
does
judgment of
ultimate
determining the
not end
the judgment
the ultimate
another in
there. A
testator may
to the
of another
defer to
end there.
does not
may defer
The Idaho
appointment. The
though use
disposition
property though
use of
of appointment.
disposition of
of probate
of aa power
Probate Code
Idaho Probate
probate property
power of
Code

§15-12recognizes
powers of
but has
precious little
little else
appointment but
them. I.C.
of appointment
to say
recognizes powers
has precious
else to
I.C. §15-12about them.
say about

appointment” but
“presently exercisable
102(8)
power of
but the
definition is
the definition
is
general power
of appointment”
exercisable general
deﬁnes aa “presently
102(8) defines
exercisable” rather
“presently exercisable”
with what
than What
rather than
concerned
what constitutes
What constitutes
of
constitutes “presently
constitutes aa power
concerned with
power of

appointment.
by Defendant,
that aa power
appointment. Idaho
§15-2-610, cited
explains that
of
Idaho Code
cited by
power of
Code §15-2-610,
Defendant, merely
merely explains
holder’s will.
in the
appointment is
not exercised
the mere
the holder’s
appointment
by the
Will.
is not
mere existence
of aa residuary
existence of
exercised by
clause in
residuary clause
1
appointment.1
The
power of
The statute
not speak
the creation
to the
creation of
of aa power
of appointment.
statute does
speak to
does not

The
this Court
explaining or
The parties
not cited
not find
ﬁnd any
or
parties have
cited and
Court could
Idaho cases
and this
have not
could not
cases explaining
any Idaho
instructing
be
instructing what
appointment. However,
other courts
what is
is required
to create
of appointment.
to be
required to
create aa power
courts seem
power of
seem to
However, other
in
words required
power of
in general
that there
for creating
there are
creating aa power
technical words
general agreement
agreement that
no special
or technical
of
required for
are no
special or
appointment.
First Union
Nat’l’1 Bank
Bank v.
Ingold, 136
For example,
appointment. For
App. 262,
Union Nat
136 N.C.
523 S.E.2d
S.E.2d
v. Ingold,
NC. App.
example, First
262, 523
appointment may
not only
725
by express
of appointment
725 (1999)
express words,
but also
created not
also by
power of
be created
(“[A] power
words, but
only by
(1999) (“[A]
may be
by

implication
be used”);2
used”); 2 Irwin
Irwin Union
Bank &
implication of
Tr.
technical language
of law
no technical
Union Bank
law and,
language need
need be
& Tr.
further, no
and, further,
Co.
Long, 160
words
that the
the actual
312 N.E.2d
not necessary
Ind. App.
App. 509,
N.E.2d 908
is not
160 Ind.
actual words
Co. v.
v. Long,
908 (1974)
necessary that
509, 312
(it is
(1974) (it
‘power of
appointment’ be
in order
‘power
used in
power); In
In re
Kuttler's Estate,
of appointment’
to create
re Kuttler's
order to
create such
160 Cal.
such aa power);
Cal.
be used
Estate, 160

App.
particular form
form of
624 (1958)
the creation
App. 2d
2d 332,
P.2d 624
of words
is necessary
to the
creation of
of aa
325 P.2d
words is
necessary to
332, 325
(no particular
(1958) (no
Rowlands' Estate,
power of
In re
241 P.2d
Ariz. 337,
of appointment);
re Rowlands'
P.2d 781
781 (1952)
special
power
73 Ariz.
appointment); In
Estate, 73
337, 241
(1952) (No
(No special

words are
to create
of appointment).
are needed
create aa power
power of
words
needed to
appointment).

1““… [T]his
appointment.”
powers of
relating to
has therefore
therefore generally
to powers
of appointment.”
provisions relating
avoided any
Code has
generally avoided
any provisions
[T]his Code

1

§15-2-610 (West).
Ann. §15-2-610
Uniform Law
Uniform
Law Comments,
Idaho Code
Comments, Idaho
Code Ann.
(West).
22

But
Holzbach v.
Bank, 216
power of
appointment
But see,
216 Va.
219 S.E.2d
of appointment
v. United
United Virginia
Va. 482,
S.E.2d 868
Virginia Bank,
868 (1975)
482, 219
see, Holzbach
(1975) (A
(A power
is
a unique
It is
implication or
legal creature.
operation of
or by
of law,
deliberate act.)
is a
is created,
never by
unique legal
but only
creature. It
created, never
law, but
act.)
only by
by implication
by operation
by deliberate
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if the
it is
that the
ﬁrst determine
will is
From this
this it
the Court
the will
the
determine if
From
is clear
must first
is ambiguous
to the
clear that
Court must
ambiguous as
as to
creation
be given
If not,
intention of
the intention
the testator
appointment. If
of appointment.
of the
testator must
must be
given effect.
creation of
of aa power
effect.
power of
not, the
in determining
will not
When
will, itit will
will in
determining
not look
the four
the will
interprets aa will,
look beyond
four corners
of the
When aa court
corners of
court interprets
beyond the
testator's intent.
If the
intent. If
the testator's
the language
the document
its ordinary
the
wellof the
is unambiguous,
given its
document is
and welllanguage of
unambiguous, given
ordinary and

understood meaning,
be enforced
it will
Will be
written. Whether
Whether aa document
is ambiguous
is a
enforced as
document is
understood
ambiguous is
as written.
a
meaning, it
question
151 Idaho
which appellate
free review.
of law
question of
appellate courts
Idaho 235,
exercise free
law over
courts exercise
review. Beus
Beus v.
over which
v. Beus,
Beus, 151
235,

If the
254 P.3d
the language
the will
interpretation of
241,
will is
1237 (2011).
is ambiguous,
of the
is aa
language is
P.3d 1231,
ambiguous, interpretation
1231, 1237
241, 254
(2011). If
question
the ambiguity
The factfinder
extrinsic evidence
factﬁnder may
resort to
to extrinsic
to resolve
of fact.
question of
fact. The
and
resolve the
evidence to
ambiguity and
may resort
intentions of
ﬁnd the
the intentions
the testator.
find
Matter of
Estate of
Berriochoa, 108
of the
P.2d
testator. Matter
Idaho 474,
108 Idaho
700 P.2d
ofBerriochoa,
474, 475,
475, 700
of Estate

96,
App. 1985).
97 (Ct.
1985).
(Ct. App.
96, 97
Here
if the
will is
the language
the will
the paragraphs
the
Here the
of the
is ambiguous
to creation
creation of
of the
paragraphs related
related to
language of
ambiguous if
in isolation,
the
not when
the Will
appointment are
power of
but not
will is
Near the
when the
is read
of appointment
Whole. Near
are read
read as
power
read in
as a
a whole.
isolation, but

beginning of
will decedent
beginning
the will
of the
states:
decedent states:

“I am
“I
going to
friend and
Max Lanham
Lanham executor
am going
to make
make my
to my
executor to
and cousin
cousin Judd
estate
Judd Max
my friend
my estate
him Power
and
personal and
property.”
all my
of Attorney
real property.”
Power of
and give
give him
and real
over all
Attorney over
my personal
A
A few
still on
ﬁrst page,
the first
on the
he recites:
paragraphs later,
recites:
few paragraphs
later, still
page, he

“. .and II want
in here
“…and
that the
Will is
the executor
Max Lanham
Lanham and
want to
to state
here that
of my
is Judd
state in
executor of
and
Judd Max
my Will
II am
him aa Power
giving him
for full
after II am
control now
am giving
am dead.
of Attorney
full control
Power of
now and
and even
even after
dead. II
Attorney for
him to
in any
want him
be able
property and
personal effects
way
want
to be
to distribute
distribute my
effects in
and my
able to
any way
my property
my personal
effects.”
that
wording about
ﬁt and
that he
will try
all the
the wording
the personal
put all
he sees
personal effects.”
and II will
and put
about the
sees fit
try and
.

At
At the
the very
the will,
he repeats:
of the
end of
repeats:
will, he
very end

“I want
“I
want to
in here
that the
Will is
the executor
Max Lanham
Lanham and
to state
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again that
of my
is Judd
state in
executor of
and
Judd Max
my Will
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II am
giving him
for full
after II am
control now
am giving
of Attorney
full control
am dead.
Power of
now and
and even
even after
dead. II
Attorney for
want him
be able
property and
personal effects
him to
in my
want
to be
to distribute
distribute my
effects as
and my
stated in
able to
as stated
my property
my personal
my
Testament.”
Last
Will and
Last Will
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the power
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power of
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limited ambiguity
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the law
whether
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when determining
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the power
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“power
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legal term
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miscues of
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Lanham’s intent
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control “even
sufficient. Gordon
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create aa power
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The will
his assets
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distribute his
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effective to
death. The
could distribute
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was effective
dispose
power of
the contested
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the power
appointment.
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resorting to
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to extrinsic
issuing Findings
of Fact
Fact and
erred in
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of Law
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the appeal
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is harmless.
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Had the
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successful appeal,
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form of
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IT
IT IS
ORDERED.
IS SO
SO ORDERED.
Signed: 8/15/2017 11:41 AM
DATED:
DATED: ___________________

___________________________
RICHARD
RICHARD D.
GREENWOOD
D. GREENWOOD
District
District Judge
Judge
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Justin R. Volle, ISB No. 10237
CAREY PERKINS LLP
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th Street
6th
300 North 6
P. O. Box 519
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Telephone: (208)
(208) 345-8600
Facsimile:
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 345-8660
Email: service@careyperkins.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM
LANHAM and KEITH C.
LANHAM,
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
vs.
VS.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
FLEENOR,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS
FOLLOWS:
IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.
1.

This matter is
is dismissed
dismissed with prejudice.

_

DATED this ___ day
day of August, 2017.

Signed: 8/30/2017 12:28 PM

By:_____________________________
By:
Richard D. Greenwood
District Judge
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Allen B. Ellis
Ellis Law, PLLC
2537 W. State Street, Suite 140
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Richard L. Stubbs
Justin R. Volle
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ERKINS, M
ITCHELL, P
OPE &
POPE
MITCHELL,
PERKINS,
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CALLISTER LLP
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th Street
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300 North 6
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Telephone:
Telephone: (208)
(208) 345-8600
Attorneys for Defendants

[[ ]]
U.S.
US. Mail,
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[[ ]]
Overnight Mail
[[ ]]
Facsimile (208)
(208) 345-8660
[[ ]]
ICourt/E-Filing
service@perkinsmitchell.com
se rvice@perkinsmitche|l.com

,_,,_,,_,,_,,_,

]
]
]
]
]
|_n_n_n_n_n

U.S.
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Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
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aellis@aellislaw.com
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ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
2537 W. State Street, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83702
208/345-7832 (Tel)
208/345-9564 (fax)
aellis@aellislaw.com
ISB No. 1626

OCT 16 2017
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By AUSTIN LOWE
O!:PUTY

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant, Thomas Lanham

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THOMAS E. LANHAM
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant/Respondent.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-20 16-8252
NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVEENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named plaintiff/appellant, Thomas E. Lanham appeals against the above-

named respondent, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment of Dismissal entered September
6, 2017, by the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood presiding.
2.

The appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment

identified in paragraph (1) above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l ), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which the appellant intends to assert

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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in the appeal is as follows:

Whether the claim of appellant Thomas E. Lanham that respondent.

Fleenor committed professional negligence is subject to dismissal because, absent a meritorious
appeal in the underlying action, the dilatory notice of appeal was not a proximate cause of appellant's
financial loss.
4.

There has been no order entered sealing all or any,portion of the record.

5.

The appellant does not request a reporter's transcript.

6.

The appellant requests those portions of the clerk's record automatically included

under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as the following:
a. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed May 6, 2016;
b. Declaration of Allen B. Ellis, including exhibits, filed June 13, 2016;
~·

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed August 31, 20 16;

d. Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Partial Summary Judgment filed August 31, 20 16;
e. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed September 7, 2016;
f. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment fil.ed September
7, 2016;
g. Plaintiffs Answering Brief to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed October
3, 2016;
h. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed
October 3, 2016;

i. Defendant Douglas Fleenor's Affidavit in Opposition of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment filed October 3, 2016;
j. Plaintiffs Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed October
10, 2016;

NOTICE OF APPEAL- 2
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k. Defendant Douglas Fleenor's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment;

1. Memorandum Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment filed November 22, 2016;
m. Stipulation on the Issue to be Resolved in Summary Judgment Proceedings filed February
13, 2017;
n. Defendant's Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment Based on Newly Obtained Evidence filed April18, 2017;
o. Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
filed May 4, 2017;
p.

Affidavit of Samantha L. Lundberg in Support· of Defendant's Supplemental

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;
q. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment filed May 16, 2017;
r. Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment filed May 22, 2017; and
s. Memorandum and Order Re: Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment filed August 17,
2017.
7.

I certify:
(a)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk:s record has been paid.

(b)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(c)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20, I.A.R.

NOTICE OF APPEAL- 3

000264

'.I

Dated this 16th day of October, 2017.

Allen B. Ellis
Attorney for plaintiff/appellant Thomas E. Lanham
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 16th day of October, 2017, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Richard L. Stubbs
Carey Perkins, LLP
P.O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83 701

_ _ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
_ _ Hand delivery
_ _ Overnight delivery
X Facsimile (345-8660)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM,
Supreme Court Case No. 45488
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
and
KEITH C. LANHAM,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:
·
1. Two (2) CDs submitted with the Stipulation on the Issue to be Resolved in Summary
Judgment Proceedings, filed February 13,2017.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 6th day of December, 2017.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM,
Supreme Court Case No. 45488
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
and
KEITH C. LANHAM,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

ALLEN B. ELLIS

RICHARD L. STUBBS

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

Date of Service:

DEC 0 6 2017

----------------
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM,
Supreme Court Case No. 45488
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
and
KEITH C. LANHAM,
Plaintiff,
vs.
..

DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and docliments that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 16th
day of October, 2017.
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